Dr. Ash Rossiter

During the war in Ukraine, videos have circulated of drones laden with explosives targeting buildings, or being remotely piloted via first-person view (FPV) towards troops seeking cover in trenches or other structures. These "suicide" drones are reshaping conflict far beyond Ukraine.Few matters ignite more interest among security analysts than the impact of drones on modern conflict.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[1]</a> For well over two decades, sophisticated armed drones like the US MQ-9 Reaper have received the bulk of the attention, but this is quickly changing. Demand is shifting towards smaller, less complex drones, many of which are suicide drones that have been designed to detonate an explosive yield on impact.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[2]</a>Recent developments in Africa, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East have highlighted how diverse actors—from state armies to various non-state militias—rely on these drones to target their opponents.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[3]</a>If analysts have not yet fully grasped the ramifications of one-way attack drones, policymakers are taking notice and action. The US alone is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to develop countermeasures against these explosive-laden drones.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[4]</a>A New Breed of DronesThe concept of piloting explosive-laden uncrewed aerial systems (or their ground and naval counterparts)<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[5]</a> onto a target has a longer lineage than one might expect. However, the suicide drones of today have significantly more sophisticated capabilities<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[6]</a> than earlier systems due to the recent commercialization of key technologies such as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), which enable longer ranges and higher levels of precision. At the same time, the cost of producing such devices has fallen precipitously in the era of cheap consumer electronics. As a result, conflicts are increasingly flooded with suicide drones.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[7]</a>Depending on the specific type, these drones are used to attack frontline units, command units beyond the forward edge of battle, or hit sites of military or political value deep into enemy territory. In some ways, they are no different than other standoff munitions, but these drones are vastly cheaper and easier to build and acquire. The cost of missile procurement can easily reach millions of dollars per unit, while simpler one-way attack drones are an order of magnitude cheaper. As one recent think tank report noted: "A Javelin anti-tank missile costs almost $200,000 and will destroy one Russian tank. The average battlefield drone—with upgraded sensors and other modifications—costs around $2000 and is equally effective under most circumstances."<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[8]</a>These drones can therefore be bought or built in much higher numbers than more expensive conventional weapons with a similar range. This has strategic implications since an attacker’s calculus changes with numerous disposable systems on hand. In other words, as weapons become more inexpensive and accessible, a higher number of missions—and riskier missions—can be more easily planned.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[9]</a>A Nightmare for Defense&nbsp;Suicide drones are cheap, easy to manufacture, and precise. This presents a dilemma for defense systems: When faced with numerous suicide drones, there are few places to hide on the battlefield.Advances in conventional air defenses mean that most militaries ought to have sufficient anti-aircraft capabilities to repel most modern drones. However, attackers with large numbers of inexpensive drones can repeatedly strike an opponent’s territory across a wide enough area to exploit gaps, friction, or defensive errors. This offensive strategy imposes costly and potentially overwhelming demands on governments to better protect civilians and infrastructure far from the front lines.In some cases, these developments compel adversaries to change their behavior on the battlefield. Officials in Riyadh specifically mentioned that the need to stop Houthi suicide drone attacks was a driver for the 2022 peace talks.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[10]</a> However, Russia’s use of suicide drones has been less effective in targeting Ukraine’s economy and energy infrastructure to pressure Kyiv.A Revolutionary Weapon?What lessons about suicide drones can we draw from recent conflicts? First, these expendable drones are clearly effective on the battlefield. Suicide drones brought significant operational success for Ukrainian and Russian forces and quickly became popular among frontline personnel.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: black;">[11]</a>Second, evidence suggests that these drones have coercive potential against adversaries, but only up to a point. The threat of the continued use of the drones seemed to be decisive in shifting decision-making in the Yemen conflict. Houthis often targeted oil facilities, while Russian drone attacks focused on energy infrastructure that supported the wellbeing of Ukraine’s civilians. Although oil facilities are not technically military targets, the Houthi strategy was effective because it was extremely costly for major oil-producing states.The increased availability and lower costs of suicide drones has made them a force multiplier for state militaries and also led to widespread adoption by non-state actors. These drones have resulted in the proliferation of precision strikes; the repercussions of this major development will be felt across global arenas of conflict. We are only now beginning to glimpse the long-term implications of the cheap mass precision that these drones make possible.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[1]</a> See for example Ash Rossiter, "Military Technology and Revolutions in Warfare: Priming the Drone Debate," Defense &amp; Security Analysis, 39.2 (2023): 253-255.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[2]</a> Dominika&nbsp;Kunertova, "Drones Have Boots: Learning from Russia’s War in Ukraine," Contemporary Security Policy&nbsp;44.4 (2023):&nbsp;576-591.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[3]</a> Marcel Plichta, "Ukraine Strikes Back Against Russia as World’s First Drone War Escalates," Atlantic Council, 15 August 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-strikes-back-against-russia-as-worlds-first-drone-war-escalates/.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[4]</a> Ashley Roque, "US Army Selects Epirus’ Leonidas for High-Power Microwave Initiative," Breaking Defense, 23 January 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/us-army-selects-epirus-leonidas-for-high-power-microwave-initiative/.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[5]</a> Ash Rossiter and Peter Layton, Warfare in the Robotics Age, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2024, see especially chapter 3.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[6]</a> For example, during World War I, the United States experimented with unmanned aircraft as flying bombs.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[7]</a> Dan Sabbagh, "Ukraine Says It Could Make 2m Drones a Year with Financial Help from West," The Guardian, 20 March 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/20/ukraine-says-it-could-make-2m-drones-a-year-with-financial-help-from-west.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[8]</a> Jahara Matisek, Will Reno, and Anthony Tingle, "Weathering the Storm: Western Security Assistance on the Defensive in Ukraine," RUSI Commentary, 23 February 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/weathering-storm-western-security-assistance-defensive-ukraine.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[9]</a> Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Dumb and Cheap: When Facing Electronic Warfare in Ukraine, Small Drones’ Quantity is Quality," Breaking Defense, 13 June 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/dumb-and-cheap-when-facing-electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-small-drones-quantity-is-quality/.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[10]</a> Philip Loft, "Yemen: Conflict and Peace, 2021-2023," House of Commons Library, 4 May 2023, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9327/CBP-9327.pdf.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[11]</a> Alexander Salt, "First Person View (FPV) Drones and Canadian Defence," Triple Helix, March 2024, https://www.cgai.ca/first_person_view_fpv_drones_and_canadian_defence.&nbsp;

How Suicide Drones Are Shaping Modern Conflict