InterRegional for Strategic Analysis

The August 25, 2026, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260825-syrian-kurdish-leader-dissolves-force-that-spearheaded-jihadist-fight" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">announcement</a> by Mazloum Abdi that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) would end their mission and dissolve as an independent military force was not simply another milestone in the long-running negotiations between the Syrian government and Kurdish forces. Rather, it marked a turning point in one of the most complex issues to have shaped Syria’s political and security landscape for more than a decade.The SDF was not merely a military formation that emerged in the context of the war against ISIS. Over time, it evolved into the military backbone of a broader political, security, and administrative system that established a model of autonomous governance and controlled large areas of northern and eastern Syria and controlled significant strategic resources. Much of the SDF’s strength and influence also rested on U.S. support, which helped underpin its position within this broader system. Its dissolution therefore effectively marks the end of an era in which multiple centers of power operated within the Syrian state and inaugurates a new phase aimed at re-establishing central authority over territory, institutions, and resources.Context Behind the DecisionKurdish leader Mazloum Abdi’s decision to dissolve the SDF came amid a series of developments and changing circumstances that contributed to this outcome. The most significant of these can be outlined as follows:1. Implementation of the March 2025 Agreement: The decision to dissolve the SDF represents the continuation of a process that began with the March 10, 2025 <a href="https://www.majalla.com/node/327712/%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%E2%80%93-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%B3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">agreement</a> between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi. The agreement laid the groundwork for integrating the SDF’s civilian and military institutions into those of the Syrian state. Notably, in an indication of the considerable disagreements around the process, it took approximatly 17 months to reach the point at which the SDF would be dissolved.With the latest decision to dissolve both the SDF and the Kurdish autonomous administration, together with the integration already underway in some sectors, the March 10 agreement appears to have moved toward practical implementation and begun transitioning toward a model of full integration.2. Battlefield Changes Following the January 2026 Clashes: Until the end of 2025, the balance of territorial control in northeastern Syria allowed the SDF to negotiate from a position of relative strength. It continued to <a href="https://dip-aws.euaa.europa.eu/syria-security-situation/122-syrian-democratic-forces" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">control</a> large parts of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah, as well as areas in the Aleppo countryside. However, following the expiration of the deadline associated with the March 2025 agreement, disagreements over integration escalated into open confrontation.Between January 6 and 10, 2026, government forces took <a href="https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5228166-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">control</a> of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo before advancing eastward into areas previously controlled by the SDF. By January 18, the SDF had <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/en/major-defeat-for-the-kurdish-national-movement-in-syria/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">lost</a> approximately 80% of the territory it had previously controlled.Following these confrontations, the Syrian government sought to translate its battlefield gains into political influence. After ceasefire agreements were reached in January, the process shifted toward integrating SDF units into the Syrian army and reintegrating the autonomous administration’s security agencies and civilian institutions into state structures. The January 2026 clashes therefore changed the balance of power: the SDF lost much of its ability to impose its previous conditions, while Damascus gained greater leverage to link military control to the rebuilding of state institutions.3. Declining U.S. Support for the SDF: The weakening of the U.S. security umbrella was one of the most important developments reducing the SDF’s ability to resist integration. The organization’s strength had rested not only on its own military capabilities but also on U.S. backing, which provided training, weapons, intelligence, and political support while serving as a deterrent against any large-scale attempt by Damascus or Ankara to alter the map of territorial control.This equation began to change following the fall of the Assad regime. U.S. priorities gradually shifted away from protecting the autonomous governance model in northeastern Syria and toward supporting Syrian territorial unity and the stability of the new government in Damascus. The clearest indication of this shift came in January 2026, when U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1847494-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%89" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">stated</a> that the SDF’s historic role as the principal ground force fighting ISIS had largely come to an end, noting that the Syrian government was now prepared to assume responsibility for security and counter-ISIS operations.Another important indication of Washington’s changing position emerged following the January 2026 clashes. Rather than providing the SDF with support to regain lost territory, the United States <a href="https://asharq.com/politics/170436/%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">urged</a> it to accept integration. Washington subsequently backed the January 30 agreement establishing a framework for integrating the SDF’s forces and institutions, while bringing border crossings under the control of the Syrian state. The U.S. State Department viewed the agreement as allowing the fight against ISIS to continue through the central government in Damascus.4. The Extent of Türkiye’s Role in the Dissolution of the SDF: Since the SDF’s establishment, Ankara has regarded it as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and a direct threat to its border security. Based on this strategic assessment, Türkiye went on to conduct a series of military operations, most notably Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, Operation Olive Branch in 2018, and Operation Peace Spring in 2019. These operations reduced the geographical contiguity of Kurdish-controlled areas and prevented the emergence of a continuous Kurdish-controlled belt along the Turkish border.Following the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish pressure began to carry greater weight as Ankara emerged as one of the most influential actors in Syria and backed the principle of "one state, one army."Türkiye’s role, however, was not limited to direct pressure. Domestic developments in the Kurdish issue within Türkiye itself also indirectly reinforced the process of dismantling the SDF. The latest phase of this process began in October 2024, when Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally of the AK Party, unexpectedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cn0nwywlkddo" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">raised</a> the possibility of Abdullah Öcalan calling on the PKK to end its armed campaign. In February 2025, Öcalan explicitly called on the organization to lay down its arms and dissolve itself, and in May 2025 the PKK finally announced that it was ending its armed struggle and dissolving the organization.In August 2026, this political initiative was translated into an institutional process when the Turkish parliament <a href="https://www.reuters.com/ar/world/QST7CPBC6NOWRA7NZR527GFQCI-2026-08-10/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">approved</a>, by 468 votes out of 600, a legal framework entitled the Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration to implement the PKK’s dissolution and reintegrate its members.In Syria, these developments directly affected how Ankara viewed the problem. If Türkiye’s domestic process was moving toward dismantling the PKK’s armed structure, it would become increasingly difficult, both from a political and security standpoint, to accept the continued existence of a Syrian military structure linked to or overlapping with it. Ankara therefore explicitly linked its "Terror-Free Türkiye" process to the need to dissolve the SDF and end the presence of non-Syrian PKK members in Syria.Potential RepercussionsThe dissolution of the SDF and the Kurdish autonomous administration is likely to have several important consequences:1. Strengthening the Position of the Syrian Government in Damascus: The dissolution of the SDF and the Kurdish autonomous administration support the Syrian government’s efforts to rebuild a centralized state and restore control over civilian, security, and economic institutions. This could relatively reduce the fragmentation of power and territorial control that has characterized Syria for years.However, the success of these efforts will depend on more than appointing Kurdish figures to key decision-making positions. It will also require constitutional and legal guarantees, together with meaningful implementation, to protect the rights of Syria’s diverse ethnic communities. The issue of the Druze community in Suwayda remains another, potentially more complex, challenge, particularly given Israel’s role in this situation.2. Redistributing Control over Oil and Gas Fields: The handover of oil and gas fields and border crossings to the Syrian state represents one of the most significant economic and strategic gains for Damascus. Eastern Syria contains an important share of the country’s energy resources, meaning that returning these assets to central government control could strengthen Damascus’s ability to manage the economy, finance state institutions, and support reconstruction.However, this issue could also become a source of tension if local communities perceive the transfer of resources to the central government as depriving them of revenues without providing corresponding development benefits. Oil could therefore shift from being a potential instrument for state consolidation to a new source of local grievances. Damascus will consequently need a clear mechanism for allocating a share of resource revenues to local development in Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa.3. A Major Strategic Win for Ankara: The decisions to dissolve the SDF and the Kurdish autonomous administration represent a major strategic win for Türkiye, adding to a series of positive developments for Ankara since the overthrow of the former Syrian regime. The move effectively ends <a href="https://asharq.com/videos/165228/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-25-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Kurdish</a> control over approximately 25% of Syrian territory, significantly reducing the likelihood of a permanent armed Kurdish entity emerging in northern Syria—an outcome Türkiye had long regarded as a direct threat to its national security.The Turkish Ministry of Defense explicitly welcomed the SDF’s dissolution, describing it as a step that reinforces the principle of "one state, one army," while reaffirming Türkiye’s continued support for building the capabilities of the Syrian army.Beyond the dissolution of the Kurdish autonomous administration in Syria, a further strategic win for Türkiye is the broader reshaping of the Kurdish issue that is taking place at the regional level. Notably, the dissolution of the SDF coincides with the process of dismantling the PKK, a development that the AK Party is likely to leverage domestically.4. Redefining the U.S. Role in Syria: These latest developments in the Kurdish issue are also redefining the U.S. role in Syria and the scope of its involvement. All recent signs indicate that Washington’s priorities are shifting toward several core objectives: preventing the resurgence of terrorist activity in Syria, preventing Iran from reestablishing its presence in the country, supporting the Damascus government at multiple levels, and preventing direct confrontation between Türkiye and Israel in Syria.Accordingly, it could be said that the United States has not so much shifted from "supporting its Kurdish partner" to "abandoning it" as it has redefined the role of the Kurdish component within its broader Syria policy. Washington increasingly appears to regard the unification of the Syrian state and support for Damascus’s security, military, and political efforts as major priorities.In conclusion, the integration of the Kurdish component into the Syrian state will not be measured solely by the number of Kurdish figures appointed to positions within state institutions or by the level of Kurdish representation within the new political, military, and administrative structures. Rather, its success will depend on Damascus’s ability to translate political understandings into durable institutional guarantees. The real test will be whether Syria establishes a clear constitutional framework that protects Kurdish political, cultural, and linguistic rights and formalizes those guarantees through enforceable legislation and effective policies that ensure equal citizenship and equal opportunity; protect the right to education, culture, and local representation; and establish clear arrangements for decentralization and local governance.

How Is the Dissolution of the SDF Reshaping Syria?