Shaima Mahmoud‏‏

As the current face-off between Iran and the United States plays out, African economies are facing a range of external shocks, even though they have no direct involvement in the conflict. The continent remains vulnerable to spillover effects transmitted through multiple channels, with the scale of the impact varying considerably from one country to another in accordance with factors such as their level of energy dependence, integration into global trade, financial resilience, external position, and underlying structural vulnerabilities. In this context, the effects on African economies are transmitted primarily through three channels—energy, logistics, and finance—and are further amplified by fiscal constraints, food-price sensitivity, and institutional weaknesses.Multiple RepercussionsThe Iran war has already had a broad impact across Africa, while additional political and economic effects are likely to make themselves felt if the conflict persists. The most notable implications include the following:1. Reduced Prospects for Economic Growth Across Africa: The conflict poses a significant risk to Africa, where most economies are still growing below their pre-pandemic trajectories. According to <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2026-04/policy_brief-the_impacts_of_the_middle_east_conflict_on_africa-april_2026_.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">estimates</a> released in April 2026, Africa’s GDP growth could decline by 0.2 percentage points in 2026 if the conflict lasts longer than six months. The extent of the impact will vary across countries according to their import dependence, exposure to the Middle East, and prevailing global market conditions. The longer the conflict persists—and the greater the disruption to shipping routes, energy supplies, and fertilizer markets—the higher the risk of a broader slowdown across the continent.2. Rising Pressure from Higher Energy Prices: African countries are among the regions most exposed to the sharp fluctuations in global energy markets that follow in the wake of geopolitical disruptions. Rising oil and refined petroleum prices increase production and transportation costs while adding inflationary pressure to African economies. Although some oil-exporting countries may benefit from higher revenues in the short term, such gains remain highly dependent on <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/waca/publications/impact-iran-us-military-escalation-african-economies" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">global market conditions</a>.Oil-importing countries face greater challenges, including widening trade deficits, currency depreciation, and <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/energy-geopolitics-from-hormuz-to-lagos-commodity-shocks-and-african-vulnerability/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">growing public debt</a> burdens, all of which increase economic vulnerability. <a href="https://unctad.org/news/new-unctad-monitor-warns-vulnerable-economies-face-heaviest-burden-oil-shocks" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Estimates</a> suggest that higher oil import bills could exceed 5% of GDP in several countries, including Mauritania (7.3%), The Gambia (6.3%), and Burkina Faso (5%). These additional costs could force governments into difficult trade-offs between financing essential imports—particularly energy—and funding development priorities such as infrastructure, public services, and poverty-reduction programs.3. Higher Inflation and Currency Depreciation: A prolonged Iran war is likely to weaken currencies and intensify inflationary pressures across many African economies, potentially forcing central banks to reassess their policies and adopt a tighter monetary stance. By late March 2026, the currencies of 29 African countries had already <a href="https://businessfront.com/finance/insights/african-currencies-middle-east-war/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">depreciated</a>, increasing the cost of servicing external debt and importing essential commodities, particularly food, fuel, and fertilizers.4. Increased Activity at African Ports: Despite the negative consequences of the conflict, the war has also generated certain economic gains. Shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope have increased significantly, with an average of 20 container ships passing through the route each day between March 1 and April 24, 2026, compared to only six ships <a href="https://www.jordannews.jo/Section-111/All/Middle-East-War-Reshapes-Maritime-Routes-Africa-Becomes-a-Key-Hub-for-Global-Shipping-51022" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">during the same period in 2023</a>.Although the rerouting has lengthened transit times, it has boosted port activity in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, and <a href="https://www.vifindia.org/article/2026/april/22/The-Iran-Crisis-s-Impact-on-Africa-Emerging-Opportunities-Strategic-Risks-and-Economic-Shock" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Mauritius</a>. Cape Town, in particular, experienced a 112% increase in <a href="https://atlasinstitute.org/from-the-suez-to-around-the-cape-port-congestion-delays-and-its-consequences/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">vessel traffic</a> over the period from the war’s outbreak through early March, reinforcing its role as a key maritime hub along the Cape route.5. Rising Costs of Delivering Humanitarian Assistance: Disruptions to logistics networks, higher fuel prices, and severe supply shortages since the outbreak of the Iran war have increased operational costs substantially. As a result, the International Rescue Committee has reported operational cost increases of up to 50%.These pressures are placing growing strain on aid budgets at a time when humanitarian needs continue to mount in crises such as the one in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/two-months-iran-war-irc-operational-costs-spike-50-fuel-prices-rise-and-aid-routes-collapse" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Sudan</a>. On May 1, 2026, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that humanitarian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-crisis-hampering-aid-refugees-supply-chain-costs-soar-un-warns-2026-05-01/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">assistance</a> delivered to Sudan had more than doubled since the start of the conflict.6. Growing Security Concerns Across Africa: Some <a href="https://atlasinstitute.org/the-salient-impact-of-the-iran-war-on-the-african-continent/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">reports</a> indicate the possibility of Western interests becoming targets for Iran-linked groups, particularly Hezbollah, one of Tehran’s most prominent proxies. Over recent years, the group has reportedly taken advantage of political instability—especially in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa—to expand its influence and establish networks that support Iran’s broader geopolitical objectives, with backing from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).7. Potentially Greater Diplomatic Pressure on African States: African countries may increasingly face pressure to adopt formal or informal diplomatic stances toward the Iran war. While many states on the continent traditionally favor neutrality, their collective political weight could be leveraged to support one side or the other. This may expose African countries to additional direct and indirect political and economic pressure, particularly given the positions adopted by China and Russia toward the conflict.Policy ResponsesAfrican governments have adopted a range of measures to mitigate the effects of the Iran war. The most notable responses include the following:1. Fuel Price Increases Across African Countries: As the Iran war drove global oil prices higher, several African governments implemented substantial fuel price increases. On March 18, 2026, Zimbabwe <a href="https://apanews.net/zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-amid-middle-east-conflict/#:~:text=Home%C2%BBAFFAIRES%20%7C%20AFFAIRES%C2%BBZimbabwe,industries%20reliant%20on%20the%20fuel." rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">raised</a> gasoline prices by as much as 27%. In April 2026, Kenya increased diesel prices by KES 40 per liter, bringing the price to KES 206 per liter, while gasoline prices rose by KES 28 to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrlll7qgdzo" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">same level</a>. In Malawi, the Energy Regulatory Authority raised gasoline prices by 34% per liter and diesel prices by 35% in early April 2026. Mauritania increased gasoline prices by 15.3% and diesel prices by 10% on March 31, 2026, while on April 1, 2026, The Gambia announced fuel price increases of 18.79% for gasoline and 12.2% for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/fuel-prices-surge-africa-iran-war-hits-supply-2026-04-01/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">diesel</a>.2. Fuel Tax Reductions in Some African States: Several African countries sought to cushion the impact of the conflict by reducing fuel taxes. On March 31, 2026, South Africa announced a one-month fuel tax reduction for April 2026 following pressure from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/south-african-finance-minister-considering-lowering-fuel-levy-due-iran-war-2026-03-31/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">labor unions</a> and business groups. On April 28, 2026, the government extended the tax relief for an additional <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/south-africa-cuts-fuel-tax-two-more-months-ease-pressure-households-2026-04-28/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">two months</a>.Ethiopia introduced emergency fuel subsidies of approximately $0.63 per liter of diesel and $0.47 per liter of <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/ethiopia-deploys-fuel-subsidies-as-global-oil-shock-ripples-from-middle-east-conflict/0b0prhh" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">gasoline</a>. The government also announced that daily diesel supplies had returned to pre-crisis levels of nine million liters per day as of April 29, 2026. Officials noted that fuel was being imported at significantly higher prices through special procurement arrangements and that the government was currently absorbing additional subsidy costs estimated at around 20 billion Ethiopian birr per month on <a href="https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_8743979" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">fuel</a> imports.3. Greater Emphasis on Hydrocarbon Development: Some African countries have sought to leverage their hydrocarbon sectors to mitigate the impact of the conflict. Algeria, for example, launched a new international bidding round on April 19, 2026, offering <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/04/20/algeria-opens-new-oil-and-gas-bids-as-middle-east-war-strains-markets/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">hydrocarbon</a> exploration rights under the "Algeria Bid Round 2026," which includes seven exploration areas, among them strategic oil and gas basins in the south and southeast of the country.Similarly, on April 22, 2026, Sierra Leone announced a new <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sierra-leone-signs-permit-with-shell-allowing-offshore-surveys-2026-04-22/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">agreement</a> with Shell that will allow the energy company to conduct advanced geological and geophysical surveys across several offshore blocks. The initiative is intended to support offshore exploration, assess the country’s oil and gas potential, and attract additional foreign investment into the energy sector.Senegal also called on international investors in March 2026 to participate in two major energy projects aimed at strengthening domestic energy supplies and supporting <a href="https://senegal-embassy.uk/senegal-opens-major-energy-investment-opportunities-for-international-partners/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">long-term economic growth.</a>4. Measures to Rationalize Fuel Consumption: Many African governments have adopted measures aimed at reducing fuel consumption in the wake of the conflict. On March 25, 2026, Zimbabwe’s Finance Minister, Mthuli Ncube, announced that authorities were reviewing a proposal to increase the ethanol content in gasoline blends from 5% to as much as 20% in an effort to lower fuel prices at <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/2703-54186-zimbabwe-bets-on-higher-ethanol-blend-to-bring-down-fuel-prices" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">service stations</a>.In April 2026, Rwanda <a href="https://english.news.cn/africa/20260422/53361e69e405406ea10ec04fa0b1958e/c.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">instructed</a> government agencies to ensure that 30% of all newly purchased vehicles are fully electric in order to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Meanwhile, in efforts to cut back on diesel consumption, South Sudan’s electricity distribution company has begun rationing supply, which has led to <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/03/27/curfews-evs-and-ethanol-how-african-countries-are-trying-to-save-fuel/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">daily power outages</a> in the capital city of Juba.Meanwhile, <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/kenya-reverts-to-lower-quality-fuel-owing-to-a-conflict-on-another-continent/x9m23y5" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Kenya</a> temporarily eased fuel sulfur-content regulations amid supply disruptions linked to instability in the Middle East. According to reports published in May 2026, the Ministry of Investments, Trade and Industry approved a six-month exemption allowing the distribution of gasoline and diesel containing sulfur levels of up to 50 milligrams per kilogram.5. Searching for Alternative Trade Routes: Some African countries have sought alternative trade routes to mitigate disruptions associated with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Egypt has moved to strengthen the sea–land &nbsp;shipping corridor linking Egypt and Italy through the Ro-Ro transport system, which connects the Mediterranean port of Damietta with the Italian port of Trieste before goods are transported across Egypt to Safaga on the Red Sea and then shipped onward to <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/egypt-advances-alternative-europegulf-shipping-corridor-as-losses-in-strait-of-hormuz/y52dybm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Gulf markets</a>.Togo has also called for the establishment of new maritime routes linking Africa with Russia, particularly through the Port of Lomé, with the aim of facilitating imports of fertilizers and grain while strengthening <a href="https://afrinz.ru/en/2026/04/togo-calls-for-opening-of-new-sea-routes-between-africa-and-russia/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">economic cooperation</a>.ConclusionIn the short term, the risks associated with the conflict stem primarily from disruptions in the energy and logistics sectors. Over the medium and long term, however, these risks are likely to be transmitted more broadly through pressures on exchange rates, public finances, external financing, and food security.African countries face varying levels of exposure depending on their economic structures, particularly their reliance on energy imports, external position, fiscal situation, and productive capacity. While net energy exporters may enjoy a degree of protection, such status does not provide complete immunity from external shocks.This reality underscores the need for tailored policy responses that combine efforts to secure critical supplies with measures to bolster structural resilience. Such measures include reducing dependence on essential imported inputs, promoting more sustainable and adaptable production models, and diversifying energy sources.

The Iran War’s Impact on Africa