Audrey Kurth Cronin

For decades, al-Qaeda was the terrorist organization that posed the most significant threat to global security, particularly after it embraced the idea of a global struggle transcending national borders. In the 1990s, the organization’s then-leader, Osama bin Laden, issued his well-known call for global jihad and armed struggle and urged Muslims to join the fight. This call enabled Bin Laden to galvanize a transnational terrorist network, endow it with the necessary ideological foundation, attract new recruits, and carry out major attacks, most notably the September 11, 2001 attacks.September 11 represented the most radical moment in the organization’s history. The attacks triggered mounting international pressure on al-Qaeda’s central leadership, which subsequently lost several of its historic leaders, foremost among them Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The organization consequently came to rely primarily on geographically dispersed branches, such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).In light of the organization’s decline, Foreign Affairs recently published an article by Audrey Kurth Cronin entitled "How al-Qaeda Ended: Terrorists Sometimes Defeat Themselves." Cronin’s analysis is based on the premise that al-Qaeda has effectively come to an end and that its operational capabilities have significantly diminished. She argues that the organization, particularly its central branch in Afghanistan, no longer poses a major security threat to the United States despite its continued hostility toward Washington. Nevertheless, this hostility could intensify in the coming period as a result of the war with Iran, given the pragmatic relationship between al-Qaeda and the Iranian government, which has even provided protection to some of the organization’s leaders, particularly its current leader, Saif al-Adel.External PressuresThe article identifies several external pressures that contributed to the decline of al-Qaeda’s central organization:1. Declining Operational Capabilities of al-Qaeda: Cronin argues that al-Qaeda’s central organization has lost its momentum and ability to sustain operations. Before the September 11 attacks, the organization had maintained a steady tempo of international operations against U.S. targets while also inflicting damage on U.S. allies. Following the surge in terrorist activity during the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, the initiative shifted toward other terrorist groups, and al-Qaeda’s global operations effectively ceased after 2009.Another important factor in this decline was the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, which further weakened al-Qaeda’s cohesion. In the operation, U.S. forces raided the compound where Bin Laden was staying and killed him before transporting his body by helicopter to an aircraft carrier, after which he was buried at sea. This prevented the creation of a grave or symbolic gathering place for his followers.2. The United States Paid a Heavy Price to Weaken al-Qaeda: The article acknowledges the U.S. government’s role in accelerating al-Qaeda’s decline, while emphasizing the enormous costs borne by those who fought on the ground in the wars launched by the United States following the September 11, 2001 attacks. More than 15,000 U.S. military personnel and contractors were killed in combat, while approximately another 1.8 million were left disabled, and thousands of active-duty personnel and veterans died by suicide.Military personnel from U.S. allies who joined these wars also suffered hundreds of casualties, particularly those from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.3. Growing Competition Between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Influence: The emergence of ISIS placed enormous pressure on al-Qaeda. ISIS introduced a new model of terrorist organization that rapidly expanded its territorial control while simultaneously challenging al-Qaeda’s position within the broader jihadist movement. This model attracted new terrorist recruits and eroded al-Qaeda’s influence, particularly as the organization lost its foothold in key areas of activity, such as Iraq. The rise of ISIS also exacerbated divisions within some organizations that had been previously associated with al-Qaeda.4. The Importance of Intelligence Cooperation in Countering al-Qaeda: The article highlights intelligence cooperation between the United States and its allies as a decisive factor in disrupting al-Qaeda operations and strengthening Washington’s ability to identify threats beyond its borders. This cooperation included efforts to restrict terrorist financing, develop screening and biometric systems, and improve intelligence sharing.One example of the effectiveness of this approach was the disruption of an al-Qaeda-linked plot in 2006 to target civilian aircraft bound for the United States using explosives concealed in beverage containers, which resulted from close U.S.-British cooperation.Organizational StrainsDespite the significant impact of external pressures on al-Qaeda, the organization’s own choices also played a major role in accelerating its decline:1. The Role of Franchises in Increasing Public Rejection of al-Qaeda’s Ideas: Cronin argues that the term "al-Qaeda affiliates" is misleading. These organizations were not necessarily subordinate to a centralized al-Qaeda leadership; rather, they often emerged from preexisting groups with varying and sometimes unclear operational links to the parent organization. Their violent activities, which largely targeted Muslim civilians, damaged al-Qaeda’s image and the ideas Bin Laden had sought to promote.Bin Laden himself recognized this vulnerability, and his frustration is evident in correspondence discovered at the Abbottabad compound. In a May 2010 letter to one of his deputies, he warned that the organization risked losing the positive image it once enjoyed in certain quarters: whereas before al-Qaeda was seen as a defender of Muslims against their enemies, it was starting to be perceived as responsible for killing fellow Muslims.2. Growing Internal Divisions Within al-Qaeda: Internal divisions also contributed to al-Qaeda’s decline. The most dramatic split involved ISIS, which originally emerged as an al-Qaeda affiliate before reconstituting itself under a new identity.In 2014, ISIS seized large areas of Iraq and Syria and attracted approximately 15,000 foreign fighters from around 80 countries to join the self-declared "caliphate." This presented an enormous challenge to the original organization: al-Qaeda had ideas, but ISIS controlled territory.3. Growing Uncertainty Over al-Qaeda’s Leadership After al-Zawahiri: In July 2022, approximately one year after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Kabul. The limited reaction to his death underscored how weak al-Qaeda’s central organization has become.Al-Qaeda’s current de facto leader is believed to be Saif al-Adel, who is based in Iran. Cronin notes that al-Adel, along with other al-Qaeda leaders and their family members, spent years under some form of house arrest in Iran during the decade following the September 11 attacks. His freedom of movement and ability to operate there remain severely restricted. He has not even publicly declared himself the organization’s leader, perhaps because he fears assassination—or perhaps because, as Cronin puts it, there is effectively no organization left for him to lead.In conclusion, Cronin bases her assessment of al-Qaeda’s trajectory on statistical data comparing the number of attacks before and after 2009 to support her argument that the organization’s central structure, as originally shaped by Osama bin Laden, has declined. Nevertheless, her analysis overlooks the organization’s ideological dimensions, patterns of activity, and the radical and ideological backgrounds of its leaders. In this regard, it is relevant to note that several prominent first-tier al-Qaeda leaders emerged from national contexts that may have influenced them to pursue a strategy of gradual expansion rather than the major attacks that had previously defined al-Qaeda’s modus operandi. &nbsp;In this way, they may have sought to avoid the kind of activity that could prompt governments to intensify security pressure on the organization.Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaeda Ended: Terrorists Sometimes Defeat Themselves," Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2026.

What Remains of the Organization Founded by Bin Laden?