Mohamed Fawzy‏‏

On August 18, 2026, Israel carried out eight airstrikes targeting the runway and storage facilities at Abu al-Duhur Airbase in eastern Idlib province in northern Syria. In the aftermath, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained the rationale for the strikes, saying that "Türkiye was determined to deploy forces at the targeted site," and&nbsp;"Israel will not tolerate any Turkish military buildup moving southward." He also argued that such actions by Türkiye would undermine existing security understandings between Syria and Israel.Against this backdrop, the Israeli strikes appear to have been less a tactical operation against a single Syrian facility than a strategic message directed at Türkiye via Syria. This raises broader questions about the significance of the latest strikes, their implications for Türkiye–Israel rivalry, and whether this escalation could ultimately lead to a direct confrontation between the two sides over Syria.Israeli ObjectivesThe latest Israeli strikes on Abu al-Duhur Airbase conveyed several direct messages to Türkiye, the most significant of which include the following:1. Rejecting the Expansion of Turkish Influence in Syria: The strikes, together with the Israeli statements that followed, reflected a view in Tel Aviv that further Turkish expansion in Syria represents a red line and could reshape the regional security environment in a way unfavorable to Israel. Some Israeli <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-906261" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">assessments</a> indicated that the operation was prompted by intelligence suggesting that Türkiye intended to deploy radar systems, air defenses, and Turkish forces at the airbase. The runway was reportedly targeted specifically to prevent the arrival of these capabilities or the transformation of the facility into an operational base.The Israeli move also reflects a broader regional security doctrine aimed at preventing potential threats from emerging in Israel’s immediate surroundings, particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The latest strikes therefore appear intended to prevent Türkiye from establishing reconnaissance, early-warning, and air-defense capabilities inside Syria before such a presence becomes an established reality that would be more difficult to dismantle.2. Preserving Israel’s Air Superiority in Syria: The strikes on Abu al-Duhur cannot be separated from Israel’s broader strategy of preserving freedom of action in Syrian airspace. Any Turkish deployment involving radar and air-defense systems could raise the operational cost of Israeli missions over Syria.From this perspective, striking the runway and associated facilities before they became operational can be understood as an attempt to preserve Israel’s freedom of aerial maneuver. This also helps explain why the strikes focused on the base’s infrastructure rather than targeting Turkish personnel already deployed on the ground. Israel apparently sought to disable the site’s future operational potential without triggering a direct military clash with Türkiye.3. Pressuring Damascus over Its Relationship with Ankara: The latest strikes were also directed at Damascus. In effect, Israel was signaling that Syria’s state reconstruction should not proceed through military arrangements that provide Türkiye with advanced strategic capabilities.The timing is particularly significant because Israel carried out the strikes while Israeli-Syrian channels of communication remained open. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mossad-director-syria-foreign-minister-discussed-turkish-military-deployments-2026-08-19/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Reports</a> indicated that Mossad Director Roman Gofman contacted Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani before the operation and specifically discussed Turkish military deployments. Several days after the strikes, on August 23, 2026, the two sides also <a href="https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/20260824-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">held</a> talks aimed at containing the escalation. This suggests that Israel is combining military pressure with intelligence and diplomatic engagement rather than abandoning the negotiating track altogether.4. Testing Turkish and U.S. Responses to the Strikes: Some <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/08/18/israel-syria-turkey-strike-military-buildup" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">reports</a> indicated that Israel informed the U.S. administration in advance of the strikes and that the objective was to prevent Türkiye from consolidating its military presence in the area and deploying advanced weapons systems to Abu al-Duhur.The operation can therefore also be seen as an Israeli attempt to gauge the extent to which Türkiye and the U.S. will react to contain Israel’s freedom of action in Syria. Türkiye’s response thus far has remained focused on diplomatic and political channels, suggesting that Israel may have gained an important strategic clue: Ankara is prepared to respond politically and diplomatically, but is unlikely, at least in the short to medium term, to shift toward a direct military response. Washington, meanwhile, appears intent on containing the escalation and preventing two of its key regional partners, Türkiye and Israel, from sliding into direct confrontation.Potential Scenarios<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-and-turkey-have-covert-backchannel-to-avoid-syria-friction-source-says/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Reports</a> have indicated that Israel and Türkiye have opened covert communication channels aimed at "avoiding friction," suggesting that both sides are seeking to contain tensions following the latest escalation in Syria. Against this backdrop, several possible scenarios could emerge:1. Escalation Is Contained Through a Deconfliction Mechanism: This scenario assumes that the parties will eventually establish a new security mechanism to regulate the balance of influence and military activity in Syria. Such an arrangement could involve Türkiye, Israel, and Syria under U.S. sponsorship, particularly following the resumption of Israeli-Syrian security talks in Jordan. In this context, on August 23, 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and Mossad Director Roman Gofman reportedly <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/08/23/syria-israel-turkey-airbase-bombing" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">met</a> in Amman.This scenario rests on three main considerations: first, the covert communication channels that have been opened between Türkiye and Israel; second, the apparent desire on both sides to avoid direct confrontation; and third, U.S. pressure on both Ankara and Tel Aviv to contain the situation.2. Israeli Strikes on Infrastructure Continue: Under this scenario, Israel would continue targeting Syrian assets and infrastructure that might serve as instruments for Türkiye to expand its military influence. The strikes on Abu al-Duhur would therefore mark the start of a precedent rather than remain an isolated incident, thus raising the possibility of further attacks on Syrian airports, bases, storage facilities, and command centers being developed with Turkish assistance.In such a scenario, Israel’s objective would be to impose qualitative limits on the capabilities of the Syrian armed forces, particularly in aviation, air defense, reconnaissance, and command-and-control systems.If Israel remains committed to preventive strikes against an expanding Turkish presence in Syria, Ankara could respond by redistributing rather than reducing its military footprint. Türkiye could move away from large, visible bases toward a more dispersed model embedded within Syrian institutions and facilities, making potential targets more difficult for Israel to identify and increasing the risk of accidental clashes.More specifically, Türkiye could focus on training, arms provision, the rehabilitation of selected facilities, the deployment of advisers, and an expanded intelligence role rather than establishing clearly identifiable Turkish bases. Ankara may also come to favor this approach in light of developments involving the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). On August 25, 2026, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1888146-%D9%85%D8%B8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">announced</a> the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military force, alongside the dissolution of the Autonomous Administration and its military and civilian structures, with all of these entities to be fully integrated into Syrian state institutions. This would reduce the level of the "Kurdish threat" that had been one of the principal drivers of Türkiye’s military presence in Syria in recent years.3. Direct Military Confrontation Between Israel and Türkiye: This scenario would involve a shift from indirect deterrence and strikes on Syrian infrastructure toward direct military clashes between Israeli and Turkish forces inside Syria. Such an escalation could result from an Israeli strike on a site where Turkish forces are stationed, or from Türkiye activating radar or air-defense systems at a facility Israel considers a red line, potentially triggering a limited aerial or missile exchange.The risks associated with this scenario have become more apparent after U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack revealed that the Abu al-Duhur strike had already come close to sparking a direct confrontation and that Türkiye might have responded by deploying aircraft.In conclusion, Israel’s latest strikes on Abu al-Duhur Airbase appear to represent more than just another effort to disrupt the rebuilding of Syrian military capabilities. Rather, they signal the onset of a more complex phase in the contest over Syria’s future, where Israeli security calculations play out alongside Türkiye’s ambitions to rebuild its military influence, Damascus’s efforts to regain control over sovereign decision-making, and U.S. attempts to prevent this rivalry from escalating into open conflict.The core message that Israel wished to send was apparently not about the airbase itself, but about the need to impose limits on the scale of Turkish military involvement and the types of capabilities that can be developed inside Syria. Ankara, by contrast, may view Israeli restrictions on the rebuilding of Syria’s military institutions as an attempt to recreate a regional security order that sharply curtails Türkiye’s room for maneuver.

What Messages Is Israel Sending with Its Strike on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur Airbase?