Dr. Mohammad Salami‏‏

In late 2023, the Indian Navy announced that it would <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/india-deploys-warships-amid-attacks-in-arabian-sea-red-sea/3092313" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">send</a> three stealth-guided destroyers to the Arabian Sea and Red Sea to protect its commercial interests. This deployment was in response to an attack on a chemical tanker associated with Israel off the coast of India. New Delhi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/26/indias-navy-deploys-warships-to-arabian-sea-after-tanker-attack" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">indicated</a> that it intended to "maintain a deterrent presence."India has previously prioritized pursuing economic interests over developing a military presence or becoming involved with political conflicts in other regions. The current shift suggests that New Delhi is now moving beyond securing commercial interests. India’s long-term goals include global ambitions for geopolitical supremacy and establishing its standing in a multipolar world.India’s involvement in the Red Sea could destabilize trade networks and the supply of oil resources that are essential for the country’s economic ambitions. India aims to become the world’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-be-worlds-third-largest-economy-by-2030-sp-global-ratings-2023-12-05/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">third-largest</a> economy by 2030 and is sensitive to threats to its economy and energy resources.The Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Suez Canal are essential for the global economy, and India could suffer greatly from insecurity in those regions. Twelve percent of global trade passes through the Red Sea and its adjacent straits, as well as <a href="https://www.ttnews.com/articles/red-sea-conflict-global-trade" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">30 percent</a> of global container traffic, more than one million barrels of crude oil per day, and 40 percent of Asia-Europe trade.The Indian economy stands to lose a great deal from regional insecurity. The country has a&nbsp;maritime trade <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-india-is-treading-cautiously-on-us-led-naval-coalition-in-red-sea-2483826-2024-01-03" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">volume</a> of approximately $200 billion that flows through the Suez Canal-Red Sea route every year. The alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/03/what-is-the-red-sea-crisis-and-what-does-it-mean-for-global-trade" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">add</a> about 3,000-3,500 nautical miles (6,000 km) and 10 days to voyages connecting Europe with Asia. Since bypassing the Red Sea would triple the shipping cost, regional crises could <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2024/01/23/india-plays-a-central-role-in-unfolding-red-sea-crisis_6459411_19.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">cost</a> India $30 billion USD and cut exports by 6.7 percent.Regional crises could also put India’s energy supply in jeopardy. Oil consumption in India is increasing at an unprecedented rate, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/715241/india-consumption-volume-of-petroleum-products/#:~:text=The%20consumption%20volume%20of%20petroleum,energy%20consumption%20across%20the%20globe." rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">making</a> it the third-largest consumer of oil in the world. India consumed 205 million tons of petroleum products in 2022.The security of the Red Sea and its waterways is of concern to New Delhi. India is a major importer of Russian crude oil and a major player in the export of petroleum products to Europe via the Suez Canal. According to <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/data/attacks-in-the-red-sea-by-the-houthis-may-hit-indias-oil-trade-data/article67704710.ece#:~:text=In%20the%20first%20half%20of%202023%2C%20the%20Netherlands%20was%20the,per%20day%20of%20oil%20shipments." rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">the US Energy Information Administration</a>, India was the third-largest player in terms of volume of crude oil and petroleum products sent north to Europe via the Suez Canal in the first half of 2023. A&nbsp;bigger concern for India is its record crude oil imports from Russia. In the first half of 2023, India was importing just under 4 million barrels of crude oil daily from Russia through the Suez Canal. Insecurity in this region will seriously damage the oil supply that India’s growing economy needs.India’s Red Sea presence marks the end of an earlier passivity, lack of military commitment, or political engagement in other regions. Under Narendra Modi’s new foreign policy, India has made the economy its priority. It knows that in order to preserve its economic interests, the country will have to give up its non-interventionist policy and take the risk of using military force in other regions to maintain the status quo and economic stability.India’s foreign policy and new strategic orientation under Modi <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0974928419901187" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">suggest</a> a shift from self-righteous idealism to pragmatism. According to [C. Raja?] Mohan, a leading commentator on strategic diplomacy, Modi’s new approach includes putting diplomacy at the service of economic development, deepening ties with the diaspora, and ending New Delhi’s defensiveness on the world stage. Under Modi, India is seeking more flexible foreign policy positions and aims to construct a new framework of pragmatic internationalism.India understands that the future multipolarity of the international system offers an opening for it to become a key global economic and political pillar alongside China, Russia, and other emerging powers. India’s active engagement at the present moment is key to ensuring political and economic security and integration within the international community while still maintaining strategic independence.India is involved in regional and international organizations such as the I2U2 Group (which consists of India, Israel, the UAE, and the US), the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This attests to New Delhi’s plans to actively engage in the international arena and abandon its former risk-averse foreign policy.The Middle East supplies almost two-thirds of India’s crude oil and is its largest trading partner. The region also hosts an Indian diaspora of around 7 million people, who are a valuable source of remittance income. India has established political, economic, and even security ties with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Iran. In 2017, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/17/india-modi-israel-netanyahu-uae-saudi-middle-east-strategy-takes-shape/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">visit</a> Israel. To maintain India’s diplomatic balance, he also visited Ramallah in the West Bank in 2018. Modi hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2019 at the height of the Jamal Khashoggi murder. Finally, Modi has visited the UAE five times since taking office in 2015, and often refers to UAE President HH Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan as his "brother."Another goal of India’s presence beyond the Indian subcontinent is to neutralize China’s regional maneuvers. Indian analysts <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-larger-message-to-new-delhi-from-the-red-sea/article67769621.ece" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">believe</a> that China is increasing working with Pakistan to contain India on both continental and maritime fronts. China has a military base in Djibouti, close to the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and which makes the territorial waters of the Middle East part of China’s siege on New Delhi.China’s growing activities in the Pakistani port of Gwadar and Sri Lankan port of Hambantota are setting off <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-larger-message-to-new-delhi-from-the-red-sea/article67769621.ece" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">warning</a> signals in India. The Kyaukpyu port that China is constructing in Myanmar also brings China closer to the Indian Navy in the Bay of Bengal, which India previously controlled without competition. China’s development of an artificial island in the Maldives, expansion of a naval base in Ream, Cambodia, and other activities on the small island of Comoros in the Indian Ocean have all raised concerns for New Delhi.India’s presence in the Arabian and Red Sea is a response to these steps by Pakistan and China. India seeks to curtail its rivals’ spheres of influence and to show them that New Delhi can also generate a geopolitical sphere of influence for itself and expand its presence beyond its traditional arenas of control.India’s increasing military activities reflect the country’s expanding global ambitions. New Delhi’s presence in the Red Sea seeks to counter Houthi attacks and pirates, but more importantly to establish its standing in the future multipolar world and as a security partner for countries in the region. These bold steps stem from a gradual shift from a passive and non-committal foreign policy to an active, cooperative, and pragmatic approach. As Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/05/india-sends-warship-after-hijacking-of-liberian-flagged-vessel-in-arabian-sea.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">said</a>: "India&nbsp;plays the role of a net security provider in the entire&nbsp;Indian Ocean region. We will ensure that maritime trade in this region rises from the&nbsp;sea&nbsp;to the heights of the sky."

What Drives India’s Military Presence in the Red Sea?