In recent years, Colombia has witnessed growing activity by armed groups, accompanied by shifts in patterns of violence and crimes against civilians. These developments have unfolded as the "Total Peace" policy pursued by former President Gustavo Petro’s government has shown limited effectiveness in containing security threats through negotiations. Against this backdrop, President Abelardo de la Espriella has adopted a tougher stance toward armed groups, pledging to expand military deployments, intensify efforts to combat drug trafficking and illicit economies, and end open-ended negotiations with armed groups. This signals a shift in the Colombian government’s approach from prioritizing negotiations with armed groups toward deterrence and increased security and military pressure.

Furthermore, on August 23, 2026, Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella announced that all illegal armed and criminal organizations in the country would be treated as terrorist groups. His government would no longer draw a distinction between criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, smuggling, and other illicit activities. This effectively places all such criminal and armed organizations under a single designation as "terrorist groups."

Drivers of the Shift

During the first days of the de la Espriella administration, a new security approach began to emerge, centered on deterrence and intensified military pressure against armed groups. This shift has been driven by several factors, most notably the following:

1. Stalled Negotiations and Their Failure to Contain Violence: Former President Gustavo Petro’s government adopted the "Total Peace" policy as its principal framework for containing armed groups through negotiations. The policy resulted in temporary and fragile ceasefire agreements but failed to produce sustainable settlements or effective arrangements for disarming armed groups and dismantling their structures. Instead, these groups took advantage of the fragility of such arrangements to strengthen their territorial influence and expand activities linked to coca cultivation. They also increasingly employed different forms of violence, including displacement, kidnapping, child recruitment, and the use of explosives and drones.

Amid growing criminal activity by some armed groups, the previous government suspended negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) in January 2025 following an escalation of violence in Catatumbo. The breakdown of negotiations left the new government facing a worsening security threat. Just one day after de la Espriella’s inauguration, a car bomb targeted a toll station on the Pan-American Highway on August 8, 2026, with the military attributing the attack to dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The attack underscored the scale of the security challenges inherited by the new administration, as the "Total Peace" approach had failed to end the violence or significantly constrain the military and economic capabilities of armed and criminal groups. The new government has therefore placed greater emphasis on deterrence through security and military pressure.

2. Changing Patterns of Violence Amid Continued Illicit Activity: Armed violence in Colombia has undergone a relative shift in recent years. Although incidents of violence against civilians declined by 20% in 2024, the total number of people exposed to violence expanded. The population exposed to organized violence increased by 24% during the first 30 months of former President Gustavo Petro’s term, while kidnappings rose by 122%, alongside increases in extortion, restrictions on civilian movement, and forced recruitment.

Similarly, more than 137,000 people were subjected to forced confinement and compelled to remain within their communities between January and August 2025. The number of civilians killed or injured by explosive devices also rose by 145% over the same period compared with 2024. These trends point to escalating violence against civilians and a partial shift in the conflict toward coercive methods designed to control populations, assert influence, and extract resources. This transformation has been associated with intensifying competition among armed groups for territorial control and access to illicit economies, amid a relative decline in direct confrontation with state institutions.

3. Efforts to Restore State Control and Boost Its Security Presence: One of the most significant challenges facing the new government is the state’s limited effective presence in peripheral and violence-affected areas. Armed groups have exploited security and institutional vacuums to expand their influence and strengthen control over local populations and strategic routes, particularly in Catatumbo and Cauca.

Against this backdrop, the de la Espriella government’s move toward a tougher security policy is linked to efforts to restore effective state control and reduce armed groups’ ability to administer quasi-autonomous areas of influence. The government also seeks to reassert state authority, consolidate the presence of official institutions, strengthen their ability to protect civilians and enforce the law, restore public confidence in the state’s capacity to provide security, and curb the influence of armed groups challenging state authority.

4. A Focus on Weakening the Capabilities of Armed Groups: The military capabilities and economic resources available to armed groups are among the main factors enabling them to continue to perpetrate violence and expand, even as they have come under security pressure and engaged in negotiations. Accordingly, the new government is seeking to weaken their military, economic, and logistical capabilities by targeting command centers, supply and smuggling networks, and sources of financing linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, money laundering, and the collection of illicit levies.

These efforts are being pursued alongside a stronger security presence in areas under the influence of armed groups, as the government seeks to reduce their ability to recruit fighters, acquire weapons, and finance operations. This could, in turn, weaken their ability to maintain areas of influence and rebuild their combat capabilities, supporting Bogotá’s broader efforts to restore state control.

Indicators of the Shift

Several developments point to a clear shift in the government’s approach toward greater security and military pressure:

1. De la Espriella’s Pledge to Tighten Security Measures: The policies and positions announced by Colombia’s new president, Abelardo de la Espriella, indicate a clear shift toward a tougher security approach in confronting armed groups. During his election campaign, de la Espriella pledged to reject open-ended negotiations with armed groups, expand military deployments, and tighten security measures against organized crime. His proposals included establishing a security bloc in the departments of Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño; intensifying efforts to combat coca cultivation; increasing mass arrests; and building 10 high-security mega-prisons in remote areas of the country, inspired by El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT). The aim would be to isolate members of criminal and armed groups and limit their ability to continue their activities, particularly extortion operations directed from inside prisons.

Notably, on July 13, 2026, shortly before taking office, de la Espriella announced his intention to abolish the position of High Commissioner for Peace and eliminate the unit responsible for implementing the 2016 peace agreement, transferring its functions to a National Security Commissioner. This reflects an effort to reorient the institutions responsible for managing the peace process toward a security-first approach centered on deterrence and restoring control over areas where groups such as the ELN, FARC dissident factions, and the Clan del Golfo operate.

De la Espriella also chose Cali rather than the capital, Bogotá, for his inauguration ceremony, and after the ceremony, he visited a military base in Cali to boost troop morale. The move held both political and security significance, underscoring the priority attached to security in areas affected by armed-group activity while sending a firm message that a refusal to disarm would be met with military action.

2. Early Security and Military Operations by the New Government: The de la Espriella administration moved quickly to increase pressure on armed groups. During its first 48 hours in office, it carried out at least seven security and military operations against armed groups, including the seizure of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Clashes also resulted in the arrest and killing of armed-group leaders and members, including six individuals in Meta and Antioquia during the first two days of de la Espriella’s presidency. At the same time, 117 prisoners associated with previous negotiating processes were transferred to high-security prisons.

These measures are consistent with de la Espriella’s pledge to intensify military and security operations during his first 90 days in office, restore control over areas under the influence of armed groups, tighten punitive measures, and capture or kill 10 senior leaders of criminal organizations. Taken together, these measures reflect a clear shift from prioritizing negotiations toward imposing deterrence and restoring security control.

3. Moving to Strengthen Operational Cooperation with the United States: On August 7, 2026, the United States announced plans to provide approximately $1 billion in security assistance to Colombia’s new government, signaling Washington’s willingness to strengthen its support for President de la Espriella in confronting criminal organizations and drug-trafficking networks. Furthermore, on August 12, 2026, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that Colombia had agreed to conduct joint operations with the United States against the ELN and FARC remnants, as Bogotá seeks to strengthen its capacity to combat organized crime, curb the influence of armed groups, and restore state control.

Potential Repercussions

As President de la Espriella’s government moves to implement its new security strategy, this could lead to several potential consequences:

1. Armed Groups Adapt and Decentralize Their Activities: The new Colombian government’s move toward greater security and military pressure could drive armed groups to escalate their operations in an effort to preserve their influence, demonstrate their ability to confront the state, and undermine the government’s strategy. This is particularly likely in areas that serve as hubs for armed activity and sources of financing, including Cauca, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander, Cesar, and Antioquia.

Such escalation could take multiple forms, including intensified armed attacks against security forces and government facilities, greater use of explosives and drones, kidnappings, extortion, and restrictions on civilian movement. Armed groups possess significant military and economic capabilities that could enable them to withstand sustained security pressure.

Moreover, intensified military pressure is likely to encourage armed groups to adapt and redeploy rather than confront the state directly. This could involve changing tactics, redistributing fighters, shifting operations to areas exposed to less pressure, relying more heavily on kidnapping, extortion, and illicit economies, and forging temporary alliances with rival groups. They could also carry out retaliatory attacks designed to pressure the government, potentially including road blockades, disruptions to transportation, and attacks on economic interests.

Although the new security strategy could weaken some armed groups, Colombia’s vast territory, the large number of armed organizations, entrenched illicit financing networks, and the state’s limited presence in some rural areas could allow these organizations to reconstitute themselves as smaller and more decentralized groups. This could transform the conflict from one centered on targeting specific organizations into a more fragmented and geographically dispersed pattern of violence, unless security pressure is accompanied by a stronger state presence and efforts to disrupt illicit sources of financing.

2. A Deterioration of Humanitarian and Security Conditions in Conflict-Affected Areas: As the government intensifies security and military operations against armed groups, it could worsen humanitarian conditions in violence-affected areas in the short term, particularly if these groups retaliate against civilians by tightening restrictions on movement, increasing the use of mines and explosive devices, or expanding forced recruitment.

The experience of Catatumbo in 2025 illustrates the fragility of humanitarian conditions. A violent ELN campaign in the region displaced more than 64,000 people between January 16 and April 28, 2025.

Accordingly, increased military pressure may not immediately improve Colombia’s security situation. Instead, in the short term it could lead to higher levels of displacement and worsening humanitarian conditions, particularly in areas where the state has a limited presence. Sustainable security gains will therefore depend on the government’s ability to complement military operations with measures to protect civilians, mitigate the risks posed by explosives, and ensure access to essential services.

3. A Tougher Security Approach Could Pave the Way for a New Negotiating Track: The new government could use security and military pressure to weaken the military and economic capabilities of armed groups and reduce their territorial influence, potentially paving the way for renewed dialogue from a stronger negotiating position. In June 2026, the ELN had already expressed an initial willingness to enter into negotiations with President-elect de la Espriella, despite his stated opposition to open-ended negotiations with armed groups.

However, if violence continues and armed groups manage to adapt to heightened security pressure, this might prevent de la Espriella’s intensive security campaign from achieving the decisive results he is seeking. This could eventually lead the government to put negotiations back on the table once security pressure has altered armed groups’ calculations and raised the cost of continued confrontation.

Any renewed negotiating process would likely be more restrictive and tied to clear security conditions, including an end to violence, withdrawal from illicit economies, and disarmament. Under such circumstances, military pressure could become a tool for reshaping the balance of power and creating the conditions for a settlement more closely aligned with the government’s priorities, rather than serving as a permanent alternative to dialogue.

4. Potential Escalation of Retaliatory Attacks in Response to U.S. Involvement: Closer cooperation between Bogotá and Washington could pave the way for expanded intelligence, military, and operational cooperation, strengthening Colombia’s ability to target armed groups and their sources of financing and restore control over violence-affected areas. However, such cooperation could also intensify confrontation between armed groups and Colombian forces. Armed groups may perceive expanded U.S. involvement in security operations as a direct threat to their capabilities and interests, potentially prompting them to broaden and intensify attacks against government forces as well as U.S.-linked interests and companies.

In conclusion, the Colombian government’s adoption of a tougher approach centered on deterrence and increased security and military pressure is likely to weaken some of the capabilities of armed groups and reduce their influence. However, the strategy’s effectiveness will ultimately depend on the government’s ability to translate operational gains into sustainable territorial control that limits these groups’ ability to preserve their influence and redeploy. Closer security and military cooperation with the United States could strengthen the government’s ability to implement its new approach, while potentially causing the confrontation to escalate during its initial phase. Over time, the conflict could move toward gradual containment, potentially strengthening the government’s negotiating position if it manages to alter the balance of power and enhance state presence. Conversely, a failure to achieve decisive results could leave room for armed groups to adapt and for violence to spread, particularly if state institutions remain weak in areas under the influence of those groups, thereby creating an environment that allows their activities to continue.

Shifts in Colombia’s Security Strategy Toward Armed Groups