In the Sahel region, the terrorist organizations ISIS and Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have competed to establish both a financial hub and a platform for regional expansion. Developments on the ground indicate a renewed phase of direct confrontation between the two groups as they compete for control over strategically important territories, particularly in fragile border areas.

Both organizations are seeking to boost their local legitimacy by recruiting additional fighters, cultivating relationships with community leaders, and increasingly leveraging technology—including artificial intelligence—to enhance the capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and attack operations. These dynamics have contributed to an escalation in violence and heightened terrorist activity across the region.

The future trajectory of this rivalry will depend largely on the ability of governments and international organizations to coordinate effective counterterrorism strategies capable of limiting their expansion and disrupting their financing networks, which rely heavily on exploiting the region's natural resources and threatening existing investments.

Terrorist Tactics

The current dynamics between ISIS and JNIM have been shaped by a series of recent developments, including the following:

1. A Shift Toward Direct Clashes and Open Conflict: The relationship between JNIM and ISIS in the Sahel has evolved into one of open confrontation. Direct clashes erupted between the two groups in October 2025 in Yagha Province in eastern Burkina Faso, the Tillabéri region in western Niger, and Ménaka in eastern Mali, driven by competition for territorial control. These confrontations marked a significant shift after a period of cautious calm. While rivalry between the two organizations has persisted since their emergence in the region, they had previously exercised relative restraint and focused primarily on consolidating their own territorial influence.

As hostilities resumed in May 2026, both groups launched repeated retaliatory attacks across the Tillabéri and Dosso regions in southwestern Niger in an effort to gain control of the strategic border corridor stretching from Benin to northwestern Nigeria.

2. Pragmatic Truce Collapses and Competition Returns: The period of relative de-escalation between ISIS and JNIM from late 2023 to mid-2025 contributed to reducing direct confrontation as both groups prioritized attacking local security forces rather than expending resources fighting one another. This temporary convergence of interests enabled both organizations to strengthen their foothold across the Sahel.

During this period, ISIS consolidated its presence in the region by improving its military capabilities and expanding recruitment efforts in Niger, benefiting from Al-Qaeda's comparatively limited presence there.

Meanwhile, JNIM intensified its operations throughout Mali and Burkina Faso, even as underlying tensions between the two organizations persisted, particularly in strategically important contact zones. As ISIS bolstered its position in Niger during the undeclared truce, JNIM increasingly viewed this expansion as a direct threat to its own influence, prompting it to leverage its stronghold in eastern Burkina Faso to counter ISIS's advance and reignite the competition on the battlefield.

3. Targeting Critical Infrastructure to Challenge State Authority: Attacks on critical infrastructure have become a key arena of competition between ISIS and Al-Qaeda, serving both to demonstrate operational capabilities and to undermine state authority.

In June 2026, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger, killing 35 people, including several of the attackers. In January 2026, ISIS had claimed responsibility for a similar attack targeting Niamey's international airport.

Such operations are designed to increase political pressure on governments, fuel public discontent, and undermine confidence in the effectiveness of security and military institutions. Terrorist organizations subsequently exploit these narratives through their media platforms to facilitate expansion and strengthen their influence.

4. Economic Pressure Through Attacks on Strategic National Assets: In recent years, terrorist groups operating in the Sahel have increasingly incorporated economic warfare into their broader operational strategies by targeting critical national assets and economic infrastructure. These attacks aim to weaken governments economically and undermine their ability to provide essential public services while also generating illicit financial gains.

This strategy has included attacks on key transportation routes, commercial convoys, and fuel supply chains. In September 2025, JNIM imposed a commercial and economic blockade on Mali by disrupting supply routes in the country's western regions, abducting drivers, and preventing cargo trucks and fuel tankers arriving from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire from entering the country. Between the onset of the blockade and December 2025, more than 130 fuel tankers bound for Bamako were reportedly destroyed.

In February 2026, at least 15 people were killed in an attack on a fuel tanker convoy in western Mali. Two months later, in April 2026, JNIM intensified its economic blockade by launching a series of deadly attacks targeting several cities, including Bamako.

These economic disruption efforts also included attacks on strategic natural-resource sites and mining operations across the Sahel and West Africa. Gold, lithium, and uranium mining activities have faced growing security threats, while commercial facilities operated by foreign investors have been targeted through extortion schemes and kidnapping-for-ransom operations. At the same time, ISIS has sought to exploit governance vacuums in these areas to build up its financial resources and expand its operational footprint.

5. Leveraging Technology and Expanding Drone Capabilities: Terrorist organizations are increasingly integrating advanced technologies—including artificial intelligence applications—into their military capabilities, particularly in the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and attack missions.

Recent analyses suggest that ISIS employed drones to transport explosive devices during the attack on Niamey's international airport and adjacent airbase in January 2026. Meanwhile, JNIM has enhanced its operational capabilities to conduct increasingly sophisticated drone-enabled attacks.

The United Nations Security Council has reported a marked increase in JNIM's use of drones in Mali, raising concerns over the use of unmanned systems as a factor that could further destabilize the Sahel and facilitate regional expansion by terrorist groups. At the same time, ISIS continues to refine its use of drones for intelligence gathering while equipping them with improvised explosive devices or hand grenades to carry out precision attacks.

6. Exploiting Internal Conflicts and Diplomatic Tensions: Rising levels of violence across the Sahel have been driven by domestic conflicts, political instability, and the reshaping of regional and international alliances following changes of government.

For example, during the coordinated attacks in Mali in April 2026, JNIM cooperated with the Azawad Liberation Front, which is led by Tuareg separatists, to launch simultaneous attacks targeting Bamako International Airport, military barracks, and other sites across four cities in northern and central Mali.

Cooperation between Al-Qaeda affiliates and certain Azawad factions has steadily evolved since the Malian authorities announced the termination of the 2015 Algiers Accords in January 2024, while simultaneously resuming military operations against separatist groups.

JNIM has capitalized on these developments by recruiting fighters from Azawad armed groups, drawing on tribal ties and ideological affinities to facilitate its expansion. These developments coincided with growing diplomatic tensions following disagreements over the Tuareg issue. In April 2025, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso recalled their ambassadors from Algeria following allegations related to the downing of a drone.

At the same time, Sahel governments have increasingly ended military partnerships with Western powers, including the United States and France, in favor of new security partnerships. This strategic realignment has created security gaps that terrorist organizations have sought to exploit to expand their presence during the ongoing military repositioning.

7. Exploiting Security Instability to Strengthen Logistical and Operational Support: Persistent insecurity and weak border control have created favorable conditions for deeper logistical and operational cooperation between terrorist organizations and transnational organized crime networks.

The expansion of human trafficking networks has facilitated the recruitment and cross-border movement of militants, while thriving illicit arms markets have improved terrorists' access to weapons and ammunition. These criminal activities also include oil smuggling and the exploitation of energy resources, kidnapping for ransom, and the extortion of local communities and business owners.

Together, these diverse revenue streams provide terrorist organizations with sustainable sources of financing, enabling them to maintain operations, expand their territorial reach, and sustain sophisticated attacks. At the same time, these approaches have intensified territorial competition between ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Key Variables Shaping the Rivalry

The future trajectory of competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel will be shaped by several key variables, including the following:

1. Containing Political Conflicts and Reducing International Polarization: The ability of Sahel governments to ease both internal and external political tensions while mitigating ethnic conflicts would play a pivotal role in curbing terrorist activity and undermining extremist groups' efforts to exploit political instability and economic grievances for recruitment and military escalation. Greater political stability would also weaken these organizations' ability to capitalize on social divisions and promote alternative narratives to different segments of society.

At the same time, if Sahel governments can strengthen international cooperation and maintain engagement with a broad range of external partners, this would enhance intelligence-sharing and improve the capabilities needed to counter the growing militarization of terrorist groups and their expanding use of advanced technologies across the region.

2. Competition Over Economic Resources: As long as security conditions remain fragile, the Sahel is likely to continue providing fertile ground for terrorist organizations to generate new sources of financing. According to estimates by the World Gold Council, the combined annual gold production of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali is approximately 230 metric tons. Niger also possesses significant reserves of uranium and oil that constitute a major source of its export revenues. More broadly, sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to hold around 30 percent of the world's critical minerals, including lithium, manganese, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements, in addition to timber and wildlife products. Competition over these resources is expected to reinforce both ISIS's and Al-Qaeda's determination to preserve their operational presence, potentially leading to higher levels of violence.

3. The Effectiveness of Military Operations Amidst Technological Innovations: The effectiveness of regional security partnerships such as the Confederation of Sahel States (AES) as well as broader international cooperation remains a critical factor in determining the outcome of the conflict and limiting terrorist groups' ability to survive or expand.

However, the resilience of these organizations and their capacity to adapt to mounting pressure by modifying battlefield tactics could prolong the conflict and impede the recovery of state institutions. This challenge is further compounded by terrorist groups' increasing reliance on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, cryptocurrencies, and decentralized digital platforms, all of which also intensify competition for technologically skilled recruits and enhance the groups’ operational capabilities.

4. Expanding Recruitment While Preserving Organizational Cohesion: JNIM relies on an extensive network of alliances with other militant organizations across the region. These include the Macina Battalion in Mali, Ansar al-Islam in northern and eastern Burkina Faso, the Hanifa Battalion along the Benin–Burkina Faso border, and Al-Mourabitoun. JNIM has also built operational partnerships with local communities, particularly Tuareg tribes.

While these partnerships expand JNIM's operational reach, they also present significant challenges for Al-Qaeda in maintaining cohesion within such a diverse coalition, especially given overlapping loyalties, shifting alliances, and temporary cooperation with Tuareg rebel factions.

At the same time, ISIS is seeking to preserve its own organizational cohesion following a wave of defections within its West Africa branch, while simultaneously attempting to weaken Al-Qaeda through propaganda campaigns designed to attract recruits and erode its rival's human capital.

5. Geographic Expansion and Stronger Coordination Among Regional Branches: Both ISIS and Al-Qaeda continue to pursue broader geographic expansion while improving coordination among their regional affiliates.

To this end, ISIS has relied on local militants, including the Lakurawa Group, to establish logistical links between its camps in Nigeria and Niger. Meanwhile, JNIM has concentrated on securing supply routes for weapons, ammunition, and vehicles across northwestern Niger in order to maintain communication and logistical links among its Sahel branches. The latter group has also expanded toward Benin, seeking access to the Gulf of Guinea coastline, creating additional sources of revenue and reshaping the region's security landscape. More recently, Al-Qaeda has also begun expanding its activities into Nigeria as part of its broader regional expansion strategy.

Growing Ambitions

In conclusion, competition between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in the Sahel is likely to intensify as both organizations seek to consolidate their areas of influence and expand their geographic reach in order to secure new sources of financing that can sustain both their local operations and their wider organizational networks.

As these groups continue to exploit insecurity for economic gain, the region is likely to experience a further escalation in violence, driven by each organization's determination to defend its territorial foothold and pursue expansionist ambitions. This trend is also driven by increasingly pronounced political aspirations, especially on the part of JNIM.

Why ISIS and al-Qaeda Are Clashing in the Sahel?