The victory of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Armenia’s parliamentary elections held on June 7, 2026 reinforces his political mandate for the rapprochement with Turkey that his government has pursued in recent years. As a further sign of the improved relationship, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a congratulatory message to Pashinyan following this victory, while the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its hope that Armenia would continue to take "steps toward peace and normalization" in the South Caucasus. The two countries have also recently taken practical steps to advance this objective, including reopening border crossings and launching direct trade, paving the way for the possible establishment of full diplomatic relations.

Signs of Rapprochement

In recent months, there have been growing signs of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia following years of estrangement and strained relations. The most notable indicators of this shift include the following:

1. Adopting Political Rhetoric in Support of Normalization: Both Turkey and Armenia have adopted political rhetoric supportive of normalizing relations between the two countries. On June 1, 2026, during his election campaign, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that normalizing relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan was essential to Armenia's policy of balanced foreign relations. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan likewise expressed confidence that Armenia and Turkey would soon achieve full normalization.

On June 8, 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan likewise praised the remarkable progress achieved in normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia over the past four years. He further emphasized that the normalization process would continue in close coordination with Azerbaijan to achieve lasting peace in the South Caucasus while developing regional transport infrastructure and expanding economic cooperation.

Pashinyan also spoke on the telephone with Erdoğan on June 3, 2026, during which the two leaders discussed developments in the bilateral normalization process. Erdoğan welcomed the launch of direct trade between the two countries and reaffirmed that Turkey is making efforts to promote peace and stability in the region. In a related development, the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament called for Armenia to be included in the trilateral dialogue mechanism comprising Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

These statements reflect both countries' departure from the confrontational rhetoric that had long characterized their relations and underscore Ankara's willingness to deepen rapprochement with Yerevan.

2. Expanding High-Level Official Visits: In May 2026, Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz paid an official visit to Armenia to attend the Eighth European Political Community Summit, marking the first official visit by a senior Turkish official to Armenia in nearly eighteen years.

During the visit, Yılmaz met Pashinyan and described their discussions as "productive," covering cooperation in transportation, customs, energy, and digital infrastructure in order to strengthen regional connectivity. Yılmaz received a warm welcome in Armenia, where the visit was viewed as further evidence of Turkey's commitment to advancing the normalization process.

The two sides also signed a memorandum of understanding to restore the historic Ani Bridge over the Arpaçay (Akhurian) River, which links Anatolia with the South Caucasus. It is also worth noting that Pashinyan had also visited Turkey in June 2025. These visits reaffirmed both sides' commitment to overcoming their longstanding historical differences.

3. Electronic Visas and Border Reopening Discussions: Turkey and Armenia have taken several practical steps to facilitate cross-border travel. On January 1, 2026, the two countries introduced an electronic visa system for holders of diplomatic, special, and service passports.

The first direct Turkish Airlines flight from Istanbul to Yerevan was launched in March 2026. In April 2026, both countries agreed on the importance of rehabilitating the Kars–Gyumri railway in preparation for its reopening.

The two sides also began discussions on reopening their main shared border crossing at Alican–Margara. Armenia subsequently opened the crossing with Turkey for ten days—from June 12 to June 22, 2026—to transport Armenian humanitarian aid shipments to Lebanon through Turkish territory.

4. Launching Direct Bilateral Trade: On May 11, 2026, Ankara announced the launch of direct trade with Yerevan without routing through a third country, as part of confidence-building measures aimed at normalizing bilateral relations.

This marks the first time in the history of Turkish-Armenian relations that direct trade has been officially implemented. Previously, commercial exchanges had been conducted through a third country—most often Georgia.

The decision is expected to significantly increase bilateral trade by reducing administrative obstacles for freight transport and allowing goods to be officially registered as Turkish or Armenian imports and exports without indirect customs procedures through intermediary countries, although freight shipments will continue to transit through a third country until the technical work and border infrastructure required for reopening the border crossings are completed.

On June 2, 2026, Turkish and Armenian business leaders also met in the Turkish border city of Kars to discuss expanding bilateral economic cooperation. The discussions focused particularly on the shared border regions, a step expected to improve infrastructure and promote local economic development.

Geopolitical Drivers

Several geopolitical factors are driving Turkey and Armenia to intensify their efforts toward normalizing bilateral relations.

1. Armenia's Changing Foreign Policy Orientation: Armenia's efforts to pursue rapprochement and normalization with Turkey form part of a broader shift in its foreign policy that Pashinyan began to pursue more visibly following Armenia's defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan has increasingly linked Armenia's security and prosperity to several key foreign policy objectives, particularly normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, reducing dependence on Russia, and deepening ties with the European Union and the United States. Since Armenia's independence, Russia had long been regarded as the country's principal guarantor of security and sovereignty. However, a strategic reorientation took place after Yerevan accused Moscow of failing to provide adequate military support during the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Russia's involvement in the war in Ukraine from 2022 onward further accelerated the implementation of this policy shift.

Armenia has sought to diversify its foreign relations, expand opportunities for economic cooperation, and strengthen its security partnerships to safeguard its borders against any future Azerbaijani attacks.

2. Promoting Peace in the South Caucasus: Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought several wars in a prolonged conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, culminating in Azerbaijan's restoration of full control over the region in 2023.

Although the two sides announced in March 2025 that they had agreed on the text of a draft peace agreement and later signed a joint declaration in August 2025, the peace process has yet to be implemented in any meaningful way. Nor have Baku and Yerevan formally normalized relations because of continuing technical disagreements.

Turkey attaches considerable geopolitical importance to completing the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process as a means of strengthening its regional influence. On June 8, 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reaffirmed that Turkey was supporting the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, wished to address Azerbaijan's "legitimate concerns," and favored the prompt conclusion of a peace agreement.

These statements underscore the structural linkage between Armenian-Azerbaijani reconciliation and Turkish-Armenian normalization, given the strategic partnership between Ankara and Baku. Armenia recognizes this reality and therefore seeks closer cooperation with Turkey in the hope that Ankara could serve as a guarantor of a future peace agreement with Azerbaijan. At the same time, normalization with Turkey would strengthen Armenia's economy by opening Turkish markets as a potential alternative to Russian ones.

3. Turkey's Pursuit of Regional Transport Corridors: Turkey is seeking to develop several regional transport corridors linking Central Asia with Europe, most notably the Middle Corridor, which connects China with European markets via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Ankara also supports the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) initiative.

The success of these projects depends on several regional factors, particularly the normalization of Armenian relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. Such progress would facilitate the infrastructural development required for these transport corridors while reducing the risk of renewed military confrontations that could disrupt regional logistics and transportation networks.

Future Challenges

The Turkish-Armenian normalization process continues to face several geopolitical challenges, including the following:

1. Armenia's Domestic Political Landscape: On June 7, 2026, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's ruling Civil Contract Party secured victory in Armenia's parliamentary elections. However, his efforts to deepen relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan are expected to face significant domestic resistance.

For example, just days before the parliamentary elections in June 2026, several Armenian opposition groups accused Turkey of interfering in the electoral process. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan had made remarks that appeared to underscore Ankara's preference for Pashinyan and the ruling party to remain in power. Opposition forces in Armenia could play a role in slowing the pace of rapprochement with both Turkey and Azerbaijan.

2. Turkey's Refusal to Recognize the Armenian Genocide: Turkey continues to grapple with the historical legacy of the mass killings of Armenians during the Ottoman era while attempting to ease the tensions associated with the issue. For example, on April 24, 2026, Erdoğan sent a message to the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul marking the anniversary of the 1915 events, expressing condolences for the Armenian victims.

However, Ankara continues to reject characterizing those events as genocide, a position that has been strongly criticized by Armenian historians and Armenian diaspora communities, which continue to demand compensation for those crimes. Consequently, this issue is likely to remain one of the principal factors shaping the future of Turkish-Armenian relations.

3. Russian Criticism of Armenia's Foreign Policy Shift: Russia has repeatedly criticized Armenia's evolving foreign policy orientation. During Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's visit to Moscow on April 1, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed that Armenia could not simultaneously pursue membership in both the European Union and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Moscow also claimed that Armenia's parliamentary elections had taken place under "unprecedented pressure" on pro-Russian opposition forces amid interference by the European Union.

Russian officials further warned Armenia against "repeating the Ukrainian scenario." These statements suggest that Moscow could seek to prevent Armenia's rapprochement with the West by supporting pro-Russian political forces or encouraging domestic instability. At the same time, Russia and Turkey continue to cooperate strategically on several regional issues, meaning that Ankara might prefer to proceed cautiously with normalization in order to avoid provoking Russian objections while carefully managing its broader competition with Moscow in the South Caucasus.

4. Azerbaijan's Continued Influence Over Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Turkey continues to link normalization with Armenia to the successful implementation of a peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan. Numerous political, logistical, and historical obstacles still stand in the way of Armenian-Azerbaijani reconciliation, given their decades-long conflict.

Azerbaijan also remains central to Turkey's approach toward Armenia. Ankara is determined to ensure that closer ties with Yerevan do not come at the expense of its longstanding strategic alliance with Baku. Moreover, Azerbaijan is a major investor in the Turkish economy, while energy cooperation remains a cornerstone of bilateral relations. On June 1, 2026, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a long-term strategic natural gas supply agreement while simultaneously announcing ambitious plans to establish a regional electricity and clean-energy corridor modeled on the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP).

5. Intensifying International Competition in the South Caucasus: The South Caucasus has witnessed growing regional and international competition in recent years. The United States expanded its regional engagement following the signing of the joint declaration between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2025. Washington also introduced the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) initiative, which serves U.S. strategic interests in the region.

France remains Armenia's principal European partner. On May 5, 2026, during President Emmanuel Macron's visit to Yerevan, the two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement covering defense, the economy, and artificial intelligence. The European Union has also welcomed Armenia's bid for membership.

These developments suggest that geopolitical competition for influence in the South Caucasus is likely to intensify, despite the fact that Washington, Paris, and even Moscow have all publicly welcomed the ongoing Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

Conclusion

Although the ongoing rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia has been widely welcomed, several challenges continue to hinder the full normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Chief among these are the reservations of both Russia and Azerbaijan, while meaningful progress also remains contingent upon the implementation of a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku.

For the time being, it appears that Turkey will continue to pursue economic cooperation with Armenia, while it defers full diplomatic normalization until the political and security arrangements between Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan are finalized.

Will Turkey and Armenia Continue on the Path to Normalization?