On 1 January 2026, the Philippines assumed the annual rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the slogan "Navigating Our Future, Together." Manila presented a guiding framework built around three pillars: reinforcing peace and security, expanding avenues for prosperity, and empowering peoples and communities.

As chair, the Philippines will host more than 650 ASEAN-related meetings over the year, including two leaders’ summits and 24 ministerial meetings. This places Manila in a position to shape the bloc’s priorities and steer discussions toward issues it considers strategically important.

The 2026 agenda spans a wide range of priorities: strengthening peace and security, enhancing humanitarian cooperation and disaster preparedness, addressing climate change impacts, deepening economic integration and safeguarding supply chains, and accelerating digital transformation—including investment in artificial intelligence (AI). Together, these priorities aim to boost ASEAN’s competitiveness and sustain long-term growth. Despite this ambition, the chairmanship faces both external and domestic constraints that may limit tangible progress on key issues.

An Ambitious Agenda

The Philippines’ 2026 chairmanship agenda includes political, economic, humanitarian, and technological priorities, most notably:

1. Advancing a South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC): The Philippines has pledged to conclude a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea during its 2026 chairmanship. This objective has remained on ASEAN’s agenda since 2002, with formal negotiations launched in 2018. Manila hopes talks can be completed in 2026 as part of a broader effort to strengthen maritime security, ensure safe navigation, and promote confidence-building among the parties.

Leaked details from a draft text suggest ASEAN is considering additional compliance-related measures, including commitments to peaceful dispute settlement, incident-management mechanisms, and forms of joint monitoring to support adherence to the CoC.

Several obstacles, however, continue to complicate progress. The most significant is disagreement over legal enforceability: Manila insists on a binding agreement backed by ASEAN oversight mechanisms, while Beijing strongly resists. Differences also persist over proposed restrictions on military exercises and resource exploration. ASEAN members have rejected Chinese ideas aimed at banning joint exercises with external partners and limiting oil-and-gas exploration. These frictions are further compounded by intra-ASEAN divisions, which make it difficult to sustain a unified negotiating posture.

Given recurring confrontations at sea and continued Philippines–China tensions, it remains unlikely that CoC negotiations will be concluded during Manila’s chairmanship. Many analysts therefore argue that a more pragmatic approach would focus on laying the groundwork for Singapore, the next ASEAN chair, given its closer ties with Beijing and potential capacity to manage negotiations more effectively. In parallel, the Philippines could leverage the upgraded ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement to deepen economic cooperation and strengthen supply-chain connectivity. It could also intensify confidence-building steps such as direct coast-guard communication channels, advance notification of military exercises, and joint search-and-rescue arrangements during crises. These measures could help create conditions for future progress even if a final CoC is not achieved in 2026.

2. Promoting Ethical AI Governance: Manila aims to build on recent momentum in regional AI policy by elevating this issue within the chairmanship agenda. It views AI governance as an opportunity to strengthen its standing in the region’s AI landscape and attract foreign investment in line with the National AI Strategy Roadmap 2.0.

However, pushing toward a comprehensive regional legal framework is likely to face delays, given the time required to negotiate such an agreement and the uneven readiness of national frameworks across ASEAN. A more feasible approach may involve developing practical, sector-specific ethical AI guidance—particularly in healthcare and financial services—building on existing regional principles. This would allow measurable progress without becoming tied to lengthy negotiations.

3. Establishing an ASEAN Semiconductor Roadmap: Semiconductor supply chains have gained heightened strategic salience. In this context, the Philippines seeks to develop an ASEAN semiconductor roadmap by mapping member states’ strengths and capacities across the chip supply chain. Such a roadmap could help ASEAN direct domestic and foreign investment more efficiently.

This objective aligns with the Philippines’ domestic priorities and reflects ASEAN’s 2026–2030 strategic direction. It also builds on the recently announced ASEAN Framework for Integrated Semiconductor Supply Chains (AFISS), which—though non-binding—seeks to develop the sector and position ASEAN as a vertically integrated production base.

While the Philippines is a semiconductor exporter, its role is less prominent than Malaysia’s or Singapore’s, suggesting significant growth potential. The Tatak Pinoy (Proudly Filipino) initiative targets the creation of around 15,000 jobs and ten local chip-design firms by 2030. The chairmanship can be used to advance "semiconductor diplomacy" by encouraging partnerships between Philippine firms and regional counterparts and developing common supplier certification standards. This would strengthen local capacity while deepening ASEAN-wide supply-chain integration.

4. Strengthening Regional Security Dialogue and Cooperation: The Philippines aims to deepen cooperation on regional peace and security while emphasizing responsible, ethical use of emerging technologies, including AI. These tools could support early warning, maritime-domain awareness, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response—particularly in Myanmar.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. appointed Foreign Minister Maria Theresa Lazaro as special envoy to pursue a comprehensive approach aimed at supporting the people of Myanmar and advancing peace, stability, and reconciliation under ASEAN’s mandate and the Five-Point Consensus. Manila has emphasized that instability in any member state has spillover effects for regional security.

The chairmanship also prioritizes non-traditional, cross-border threats, including fraud and scam networks operating in border areas. Such networks harm ASEAN’s reputation and undermine confidence in regional tourism and governance. Manila therefore seeks stronger law-enforcement coordination to address this shared challenge.

5. Deepening Economic Integration: The Philippines frames deeper integration through innovation and sustainability, including building a more connected digital ASEAN that uses AI to facilitate trade, accelerate digital transformation, and stimulate innovation. A major focus is supporting micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), which often struggle to navigate complex trade rules under agreements such as RCEP and the upgraded ACFTA. Capacity-building is therefore central to expanding MSMEs’ ability to benefit from multilateral frameworks.

6. Finalizing Key Agreements: The Philippines is pushing to finalize two major initiatives: the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) and an ASEAN–Canada free trade agreement. DEFA is expected to be finalized in Q1 2026, with signing envisaged in November, and is intended to become a landmark legally binding regional digital-economy agreement. It seeks to harmonize e-commerce rules, govern cross-border data flows, strengthen cybersecurity, and promote digital payments.

These initiatives are particularly significant given the rapid expansion of ASEAN’s digital economy, which is expected to triple and approach USD 1 trillion by 2030. A more coherent regulatory framework could further amplify growth while addressing persistent constraints such as intra-ASEAN trade remaining at roughly one-fifth of total trade, despite tariffs falling close to zero.

In parallel, the ASEAN–Canada FTA would be the bloc’s first agreement with a North American country, supporting partnership diversification amid global trade disruptions and intensifying geopolitical tensions.

7. Advancing a Regional Strategy on Critical Minerals and Dual-Use Commodities: Manila is also promoting a leaders’ declaration on governance of dual-use commodities, given uneven regulatory preparedness across ASEAN’s 11 members. It is likewise pushing for a regional strategy on critical minerals. The region’s production profile is significant: Indonesia accounts for roughly half of global nickel output; Malaysia has major rare-earth processing capabilities; and the Philippines ranks among leading global producers of copper and cobalt. Harmonizing definitions and establishing a regional registry could strengthen investment attractiveness and reinforce ASEAN’s strategic position in the emerging global economy.

8. Improving Living Standards Across ASEAN: Finally, Manila emphasizes people-centered outcomes: improving living standards and resilience by supporting responsible AI use in healthcare and education, empowering youth, and improving delivery of essential services. The Philippines also presents its chairmanship as a contribution to ASEAN Community Vision 2045—a prosperous, people-centered region advancing toward sustainable development.

Persistent Challenges

Several challenges may constrain Manila’s ability to deliver across this agenda:

1. Domestic Pressures in the Philippines: The Philippines is taking on the chairmanship amid mounting domestic challenges. GDP growth slowed to 4% in Q3 2025, the weakest since Q1 2021, amid reported corruption allegations, destructive typhoons, and tariff-related disruptions. International financial institutions reduced 2026 growth projections to 5.0–5.3%, down from 5.6%, expecting continued pressure in the first half of 2026.

Public protests have also intensified amid concerns about disaster preparedness and allegations of misused funds. Reports and claims linked to a major scandal have fueled political polarization and undermined public confidence, raising risks for domestic stability.

2. Risk of Renewed Thailand–Cambodia Clashes: Tensions between Cambodia and Thailand resurfaced sharply in 2025, producing one of the most intense episodes in decades. Although a fragile ceasefire was reached in December 2025, renewed clashes remain possible. As chair, Manila will be expected to demonstrate ASEAN’s ability to manage intra-bloc disputes through regional mechanisms rather than relying on external mediation.

3. The Myanmar Dilemma: Myanmar remains the most complex issue. Since the 2021 coup, ASEAN initiatives—including the Five-Point Consensus—have not produced a breakthrough. Although the consensus was reviewed in October 2025, implementation depends on Manila’s ability to reinvigorate a balanced, effective diplomatic track. The military council’s push for elections—widely questioned for fairness—could deepen divisions within ASEAN over recognition and engagement.

Criticism has also emerged regarding the scope of the special envoy’s outreach. Limiting engagement to regime officials without parallel outreach to detained civilian leaders or opposition forces risks perceptions of conferring legitimacy on the status quo. Manila’s credibility will be tested by whether it can pursue a more inclusive approach consistent with ASEAN’s stated objectives.

4. Integrating Timor-Leste: Completing Timor-Leste’s integration requires not only procedural steps but also alignment of legal and economic frameworks and capacity-building to meet ASEAN obligations. This process is complicated by ASEAN’s persistent development gaps, which continue to impede balanced integration.

5. Southeast Asia’s Reduced Profile in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy: The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy appears to give Southeast Asia less explicit attention than the 2017 and 2022 strategies, referencing the region only indirectly in discussions of China and Taiwan. Shifts in U.S. framing of China and the absence of direct references to South China Sea militarization add to regional uncertainty and could constrain ASEAN partners’ strategic calculations.

6. Continued Manila–Beijing Tensions: Given ongoing disputes, Beijing is unlikely to offer Manila symbolic or political wins during its chairmanship. China has continued "gray-zone" pressure, including dangerous encounters at sea. References to a "ten-dash line" claim reflect a broader effort to entrench expansive maritime assertions that conflict with UNCLOS and overlap with the maritime zones of other claimants.

7. Bilateral Tracks With Washington: ASEAN states welcome U.S. security engagement as a counterweight to China but remain dissatisfied with U.S. trade policies, including high tariffs. The Philippines’ reported 19% tariff rate has added to frustration. Failed efforts in 2025 to unify ASEAN’s negotiating position have encouraged member states to pursue bilateral arrangements, weakening collective leverage.

Concerns also persist that U.S. emphasis on security frameworks (e.g., the Quad and AUKUS) may dilute ASEAN centrality. Manila’s relative support for such initiatives may be difficult to reconcile with neighbors wary of deepening polarization.

8. China’s Expanding Regional Influence: Several ASEAN states have deepened their engagement with China-led frameworks, including the BRICS grouping—of which Indonesia became a full member in 2025—and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In parallel, Beijing has expanded its economic presence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), investing heavily in infrastructure projects to strengthen its political and economic ties across Southeast Asia.

China has also succeeded in capitalizing on growing regional concerns over tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. Following their announcement in April 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, pledging to avoid trade wars, promote stability, and reinforce existing partnerships. As a result, Beijing today appears more influential and deeply entrenched in Southeast Asia than at any other point in modern history.

Potential Breakthroughs

Despite the difficult context, prospects for limited breakthroughs remain. Manila has a draft CoC text to work from and room to recalibrate Myanmar diplomacy. Regional disputes may remain manageable if political will is sustained. Nevertheless, the inability to move core security initiatives—under continued Chinese pressure and amid uncertainty in U.S. commitments—could be interpreted as a warning sign that ASEAN’s regional order is approaching a critical juncture.

Key Priorities of ASEAN’s Agenda Under the Philippines’ 2026 Chairmanship