InterRegional for Strategic Analysis

Russia has shown particular interest in strengthening its role in ongoing contacts between Iran and the United States and in efforts to resume negotiations to end the war between the two countries, which began on February 28, 2026. Moscow’s interest is driven not only by its desire to use these efforts to improve the prospects for a settlement to the war in Ukraine on terms consistent with its own calculations and interests. On October 31, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump raised this possibility&nbsp;when he said that "a major political <a href="https://www.albayan.ae/news/world/1561965" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">deal</a> and a comprehensive agreement involving Iran, Russia, and Ukraine could be reached during the G20 summit to be held in Florida." Russia’s interest also reflects a set of strategic interests that play a decisive role in shaping its policy toward developments in the conflict between Iran and the United States.Ongoing Diplomatic EffortsRussian mediation efforts featured prominently in the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the eighth summit of gas-exporting countries, held in Moscow on October 27, 2026. During the meeting, Putin stated he believed that "<a href="https://asharq.com/politics/201105/%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">developments</a> in the Middle East would take a positive turn," apparently referring to ongoing efforts to resume negotiations between Iran and the United States.Earlier, on October 19, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Iran as part of ongoing Russian-Iranian consultations on important bilateral and regional issues related to both countries.&nbsp;In addition to 14 telephone conversations between the Iranian and Russian foreign ministers during the same year, Lavrov’s meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, was their <a href="https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/1199912/%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%81-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AB%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">fourth</a> in 2026.Along with Lavrov’s earlier trip to Tehran, Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow gained particular significance against the backdrop of developments on the regional and international stages. These included continued efforts to reduce tensions and escalation between Iran and the United States, which could develop into a direct military confrontation in the coming period. Another important development was the noticeable rapprochement between Russia and the United States, reflected in an <a href="https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0/a-79685531" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">executive order</a> exempting Russia from sanctions and tariffs targeting its oil revenues, issued by President Donald Trump on October 16, 2026. The rapprochement was also reflected in an agreement under which the United States would import hundreds of thousands of tons of diesel fuel from Russia.In a further development reflecting continued Russian-Iranian coordination, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/putin-met-iranian-security-council-chief-rezaei-moscow-2026-11-05" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">visited</a> Moscow, where he met President Vladimir Putin and delivered a message from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, on November 5, 2026. Their discussions addressed developments in the war and postwar security arrangements, alongside efforts to strengthen energy cooperation, including a proposal to build pipelines to transport Russian natural gas to Iran. Rezaei stated that Putin affirmed Russia’s readiness to provide all possible assistance to end the war. This suggests that Moscow seeks to maintain an active role in managing the crisis and strengthening its involvement in any negotiations aimed at ending the conflict, while simultaneously expanding its strategic partnership with Tehran.Key ObjectivesRussia is seeking to achieve five main objectives by strengthening its role in efforts to reach an agreement between Iran and the United States:1. Becoming a Key Party to a Potential Agreement: On October 10, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that he <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1897528-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">conveyed</a> Iran’s position on the negotiations to U.S. President Donald Trump during a telephone conversation between the two leaders. This followed Putin’s meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian two days earlier, on the sidelines of the summit of Commonwealth of Independent States leaders and the Caspian environmental summit held in Turkmenistan. During that meeting, Putin expressed his willingness to participate in mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington.Putin also reiterated Russia’s readiness to receive Iran’s enriched uranium if the two sides reach an agreement in the coming period. The issue of enriched uranium remains one of the principal unresolved disputes that have contributed to the failure of mediation efforts and the continuation of the current escalation.This indicates that Russia wants to play a role similar to the one it assumed under the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015, which provided for the transfer of most of Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia. However, this approach faces several obstacles, including Iran’s refusal to accept the proposal. Given President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018, during his first presidential term, Tehran remains skeptical about the possibility of reaching a lasting agreement with the United States.During a meeting with Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir in Tehran on October 20, 2026, Mohsen Rezaei, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, articulated the Iranian position, stating that Iran would not <a href="https://ar.irna.ir/news/86298694/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B5%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">transfer</a> even a single atom of enriched uranium abroad under any circumstances.Nevertheless, this position may not be definitive, with new proposals beginning to emerge that could help overcome the impasse. In particular, several <a href="https://www.albayan.ae/news/middle-east/iran/1561282" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">reports</a> published on October 28, 2026, discussed proposals described as possible precursors to a second memorandum of understanding, or "MoU 2," between Tehran and Washington. These proposals envisage international guarantors for any agreement, potentially including China and Russia.2. Preventing the Collapse of the Iranian Regime: Russia believes that a diplomatic failure to reach an agreement ending the war between Iran and the United States could prompt Washington to launch another round of military operations, potentially in cooperation with Israel, that might ultimately lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime.For Moscow, the consequences of such a development would extend beyond the loss of another allied government. In this scenario, Iran would become the second Middle Eastern allied regime to fall within two years, following the collapse of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024.Russia is also concerned about the potential negative repercussions for security and stability in Central Asia and the Caucasus, regions bordering Russian territory. In turn, as Moscow remains engaged in the war against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, instability in these areas could have adverse consequences for Russia’s own domestic stability.3. Expanding Bilateral Economic Cooperation: Reviewing ways to implement the strategic partnership treaty signed by Russia and Iran on January 17, 2025, was a central item on the agenda during Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow and Lavrov’s visit to Tehran.This issue is of particular importance to Tehran, which increasingly relies on relations with neighboring countries as part of its efforts to contain the consequences of the U.S. blockade of its ports in the Arabian Gulf and Washington’s implementation of an "economic ostracism" strategy beginning on August 24, 2026.From Tehran’s perspective, its land borders with neighboring countries could help it withstand the pressures imposed by the U.S. blockade, thereby prolonging the current confrontation in a manner inconsistent with President Donald Trump’s interests and calculations.Several Iranian <a href="https://www.irna.ir/amp/86296477/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">estimates</a> indicate that freight transported through the International North–South Transport Corridor reached 8.9 million tons between January and September 2026. While transportation activity along the corridors increased by 87% in the first four months of 2026, grain shipments through Astara also quadrupled in the first half of the year.Although Russia seeks to strengthen the role of these transportation corridors in developing bilateral relations with Tehran, Moscow also believes that helping improve the prospects for an agreement between Iran and the United States could further enhance those relations, particularly as such an agreement would include the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran.4. Expanding Coordination on Caucasus-Related Issues: A settlement ending the war between Iran and the United States could facilitate broader coordination between Tehran and Moscow on security and strategic issues of particular importance to both countries.This shared interest has been evident in their efforts to activate the so-called "<a href="https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1405/07/24/3724028/%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-3-3-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">3+3 Platform</a>," which aims to establish a regional security dialogue in the Caucasus without external interference by bringing together Russia, Iran, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.Moscow and Tehran also attach particular importance to preventing the expansion of U.S. influence in the region, especially through the Zangezur Corridor connecting Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan exclave. Consultations on developments in Afghanistan are another area of shared interest.5. Strengthening Russia’s Role in Arabian Gulf Security Arrangements: During the ninth ministerial meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council–Russia Strategic Dialogue, held in Manama on October 18, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called for the development of a collective security <a href="https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC/5330924-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%A7" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(70, 120, 134);">system</a> in the Arabian Gulf.This initiative suggests that Russia is seeking to strengthen its role in shaping the security arrangements that could emerge after the war between Iran and the United States ends.Consequently, security-related issues featured prominently in Lavrov’s discussions in both Manama and Tehran, including developments on the ground in Yemen and continuing Iranian threats to commercial shipping and maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.ConclusionRussia’s interest in participating in efforts to resolve the Iran–U.S. crisis is not driven solely by its desire to contain military escalation and prevent the conflict from expanding. It also reflects Moscow’s efforts to use the crisis to strengthen its position in regional and international power balances and expand its room for maneuver in relations with both Iran and the United States.On the one hand, mediation offers Moscow an opportunity to reestablish itself as an influential actor in managing international crises and shaping the arrangements that could govern the postwar period. On the other hand, it would allow Russia to protect its strategic interests associated with the survival of the Iranian regime, strengthen economic and security cooperation with Tehran, and expand its presence in the Arabian Gulf and the Caucasus.Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to achieve these objectives will depend on Iran’s and the United States’ willingness to respond to its proposals. It will also depend on Moscow’s ability to help resolve one of the principal issues that has obstructed mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington: Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%.

Why Is Russia Seeking a Role in Efforts to Resolve the Iran–U.S. Crisis?