Dr. Mona Soliman‏‏

Over recent years, Türkiye has sought to deepen cooperation with a range of international organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In this context, Erdoğan’s remarks following the SCO Plus meeting held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on September 2, 2026, signaled a potential new phrase in Ankara’s engagement with the organization. At the meeting, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/ar/world/WYZQ4RTS6JOJXFLZ45HKPSOO44-2026-09-02/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">announced</a> that Türkiye would consider taking its relations with the organization "to a higher level," while also indicating that Ankara was exploring the possibility of full membership. However, given Ankara’s current membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its longstanding strategic relationship with the United States, Erdoğan’s remarks have raised questions about Türkiye’s motivations for seeking closer ties with an organization often viewed as a rival security bloc to NATO. As Türkiye cultivates these overlapping ties and commitments, it may face a range of geopolitical challenges that could complicate efforts to balance its relationships with the SCO, NATO, and its Western partners.Multiple DriversTürkiye’s interest in strengthening its engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is driven by several key considerations:1. Expanding Economic Cooperation with SCO Members: Economic considerations may be the main driver behind Ankara’s interest in strengthening relations with the SCO. Speaking at the SCO Plus meeting on September 1, 2026, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/president-erdogan-says-turkiye-will-deepen-cooperation-with-shanghai-cooperation-organization/4043721" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">said</a> Türkiye would seek to deepen cooperation with the organization because it is a "rising star in all fields," adding that SCO countries have a combined population of 3.5 billion and a total GDP of $35 trillion.Against this backdrop, Türkiye may seek to expand economic cooperation with SCO members, particularly major economies with large populations, such as China and India. Closer engagement with these countries could open new markets for the Turkish economy and create broader opportunities for cooperation. Ankara’s ambitions, however, extend beyond conventional economic ties, as it is also seeking to expand the export of its defense products, including Turkish drones, whose production has expanded significantly and which have already been supplied to some SCO member states.2. Supporting Regional Transport Corridors: During his address to the SCO Plus meeting, Erdoğan highlighted the organization’s potential role in supporting regional transport corridors. He <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/ENGLISH/Haberler/detay/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-is-one-of-the-indispensable-elements-of-the-multipolar-order" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">stated</a> that Türkiye sees the SCO as capable of contributing "not only to restoring peace and stability, but also in areas such as energy supply security, through the establishment of safe and uninterrupted transport corridors that are vital to the prosperity of peoples."Regional connectivity is a particularly important element in Ankara’s efforts to link SCO countries with Western markets. In this context, Türkiye appears to be seeking greater alignment between the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.3. Leveraging Closer SCO Ties in Relations with the European Union: Türkiye could also seek to leverage closer relations with the SCO as a way to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the European Union. Ankara’s EU accession process remains stalled, as Brussels has indicated that any further progress toward EU membership will depend on Türkiye addressing concerns over democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and judicial independence. Ankara, however, has rejected these criticisms as interference in its domestic affairs.By contrast, the SCO provides Türkiye with an additional framework for diversifying its political, economic, and security partnerships while strengthening its ties with powers such as China and Russia and with Central Asian countries. Given this dynamic, Erdoğan could use the prospect of closer involvement with the SCO as a means of strengthening Ankara’s position in its relations with both the European Union and the United States, particularly if Türkiye moves toward full SCO membership.4. Expanding Türkiye’s International Role: Türkiye’s interest in strengthening relations with the SCO also <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiyes-sco-membership-perspective-never-means-turning-its-back-on-west-president-erdogan/4045249" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">reflects</a> a foreign policy centered on two principles: "strategic autonomy" and a "multidimensional foreign policy." Ankara has sought to demonstrate that its foreign policy decisions are not dependent on any single international bloc, while simultaneously expanding its partnerships with a range of international organizations.In this context, Erdoğan has <a href="https://aa.com.tr/en/politics/president-erdogan-says-turkiye-will-deepen-cooperation-with-shanghai-cooperation-organization/4043721" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">described</a> the SCO as having become "one of the indispensable elements of a multipolar order over the past 25 years," adding that Türkiye views the organization, which brings the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East together on the same platform, as "a supporter and complement to the UN." Expanding cooperation with the SCO could therefore give Ankara greater room for maneuver on the international stage.Geopolitical ChallengesTürkiye’s efforts to deepen relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization face several challenges, most notably the following:1. A Conflict of Interests Across Multiple Alliances: Türkiye is <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/mecca-pact-sco-natoturkiyes-multilateral-foreign-policy" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">part</a> of a complex network of international alliances and partnerships. It is a member of NATO and the Organization of Turkic States, a candidate for European Union membership, and is simultaneously seeking to upgrade its relations with the SCO while also showing interest in developing ties with BRICS.Although Ankara has stressed that closer relations with the SCO are not intended as an alternative to its ties with the West, its expanding network of partnerships could make it increasingly difficult to balance the interests and commitments of actors whose positions diverge on a range of international issues. The United States and European Union, for example, have imposed sanctions on some SCO member states, particularly Russia and Iran, while Western relations with China are characterized by growing strategic competition. Ankara could therefore find it challenging to deepen its political, economic, and security cooperation with SCO members while still preserving its strategic interests and commitments within NATO and its relations with the European Union.2. Competing Interests with Some SCO Members: Türkiye became an SCO dialogue <a href="https://eng.sectsco.org/20260306/2185663.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">partner</a> in 2012 and signed a dialogue partnership memorandum with the organization in April 2013. It has retained this status even as the organization subsequently expanded to include India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus as full members.While Ankara has shown growing interest in strengthening its relationship with the organization, these efforts could be complicated by divergent strategic interests between Türkiye and some of the SCO’s major powers, particularly Russia. Despite close cooperation between Moscow and Ankara in several areas, their relations have also been characterized by strategic rivalry and competing interests across a number of regional issues in recent years, particularly in Syria and Libya.Similarly, Ankara’s efforts to expand its presence in Central Asia overlap with established Russian and Chinese footprint in the region, creating potential competition over political, economic, and cultural influence, as well as the use of transport corridors.3. Potential U.S. Concerns over Türkiye Engagement with the SCO: Although Erdoğan indicated following the latest SCO Plus meeting that Türkiye intends to develop its relations with the organization, he also <a href="https://www.zamanarabic.com/2026/09/03/%d8%a3%d8%b1%d8%af%d9%88%d8%ba%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b6%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%83%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%84%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%b4%d9%86%d8%ba%d9%87%d8%a7%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a7/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">stressed</a> that "the possibility of Türkiye joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not mean separating from any other bloc or from the West." These remarks underscore how Ankara is trying to avoid giving the impression that its engagement with the SCO entails a shift away from its Western alliances.This balancing act is particularly significant given the tensions that have affected Türkiye-U.S. relations in recent years following Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. In this context, Türkiye’s efforts to deepen its ties with the SCO could spark concerns in Washington over the direction of its foreign policy.4. Growing Pressure from International Polarization: Following the conclusion of its summit in Kyrgyzstan, the SCO <a href="https://eng.sectsco.org/images/07ea/09/0c/2512843.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">issued</a> the "Bishkek Declaration," in which member states expressed support for a more representative, democratic, equitable, and multipolar world order while opposing unilateral coercive measures that contravene the UN Charter and international law. These positions reflect, in particular, the broader Russian and Chinese vision of reshaping the international order and strengthening multipolarity.Intensifying competition among major powers could therefore place increasing pressure on Turkish foreign policy and narrow Ankara’s room for maneuver as it seeks to strengthen relations with Russia, China, and the SCO while preserving its strategic alliance with the United States and NATO. Such pressures could become particularly pronounced during international crises in which Western positions diverge sharply from those of Russia and China, making it increasingly difficult for Ankara to maintain its balancing act between the two sides.Overall, Türkiye’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represent a significant geopolitical initiative that could reshape some aspects of its foreign policy by expanding its presence in Asia, broadening its economic opportunities, and diversifying its international partnerships. However, closer engagement with the SCO could also expose Ankara to greater geopolitical pressures as competition intensifies between Western powers on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. The main challenge for Türkiye will therefore be to deepen its ties with the SCO without undermining its commitments within NATO and its strategic partnership with the United States and other Western countries. &nbsp;Moreover, it will need to manage this balancing act while protecting its national interests in an increasingly volatile international environment.

Why Is Türkiye Seeking Closer Ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?