Mohamed Fawzy‏‏

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s recent visit to Türkiye, which comes on the heels of a visit by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to Ankara earlier in July, marks an important turning point in Türkiye–Lebanon relations. The rapprochement comes as Türkiye is seeking to expand its regional role following gains at the latest NATO summit and amid repeated Turkish statements that the country’s security begins in Syria and Lebanon. Aoun’s landmark trip to the United States and his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump provide an additional backdrop for these developments, particularly given their implications for the future of U.S. support for Lebanon, security arrangements in the south, and the rebuilding of state institutions. Against this backdrop, the recent high-level contacts between Ankara and Beirut could signal a broader expansion of Türkiye’s political, economic, and security role in Lebanon.Multiple IndicatorsRecent developments point to a significant shift in Türkiye–Lebanon relations. The most notable indicators include the following:1. An Increase in High-Level Visits Between the Two Countries: Political engagement between Türkiye and Lebanon has accelerated markedly in recent months. On July 10, 2026, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam <a href="https://www.syria.tv/%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">made</a> an important visit to Türkiye, where he met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the Vahdettin Mansion in Istanbul. The two sides discussed strengthening bilateral relations and trade, as well as a number of regional issues of mutual interest.Salam’s visit, which preceded the Lebanese president’s latest trip, can be viewed as a preliminary effort to gauge the scope of Türkiye’s potential engagement in Lebanon and assess the tools Ankara could bring to bear as the Lebanese state undergoes a period of institutional restructuring. Significantly, the talks were not limited to the usual economic issues, but also included strategic affairs such as reconstruction, support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, security cooperation, and developments in Syria. These issues are directly linked to the evolving balance of power within Lebanon rather than merely the management of bilateral relations. The visit can also be understood as part of the Lebanese government’s broader effort to build a balanced network of international partners spanning the United States, Arab countries, Türkiye, and the European Union.During his visit to Türkiye on July 30, 2026, President Joseph Aoun <a href="https://www.ajnet.me/news/2026/7/30/%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">emphasized</a> the longstanding ties between the two countries and their shared determination to deepen cooperation in ways that serve the interests of both peoples and contribute to regional stability. Aoun noted that the visit had been long overdue and said he had seen a clear political willingness on the Turkish side to elevate bilateral relations.The visit and the statements surrounding it hold several implications. First, Türkiye appears to be gradually positioning itself to play a role in Lebanon’s post-war arrangements. Ankara recognizes that reconstruction will not be merely an economic process but is also likely to be accompanied by a reconfiguration of political and security influence. Türkiye is therefore seeking an early role in this phase to help shape the emerging balance of power. Second, Lebanon views Türkiye as a regional power with a diverse range of capabilities—from its defense industry and construction companies to logistical and diplomatic resources—making it a potential partner across several areas critical to the recovery of the Lebanese state.Third, the visit came after Aoun’s talks in Washington with U.S. President Donald Trump, which may also reflect Lebanon’s interest in leveraging Türkiye’s current strategic relationship with the Trump administration to support the country’s broader recovery.2. Lebanon’s Growing Importance in Türkiye’s National Security Calculations: Türkiye’s recent <a href="https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2026/06/10/erdogan-criticizes-israels-actions-lebanon-syria" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">rhetoric</a> on Lebanon points to a notable shift in Ankara’s security doctrine. Lebanon is increasingly being viewed not simply as a country neighboring Syria or as a traditional arena for diplomatic engagement, but as part of Türkiye’s broader national security environment. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has stressed that Türkiye’s security does not begin at its geographical borders but extends into its regional surroundings, particularly Syria and Lebanon. This suggests a shift in Turkish strategic thinking from defending national borders toward managing potential sources of threats beyond them. From this perspective, stability in Lebanon is no longer merely a foreign policy concern for Ankara but an increasingly important factor in safeguarding Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab Levant.This shift in Türkiye’s rhetoric and security thinking cannot be separated from recent regional developments and escalating Israeli actions. From Ankara’s perspective, Israeli operations are no longer confined to confronting non-state actors but increasingly appear aimed at reshaping the security environment in the Arab Levant in ways that could secure Israel’s long-term strategic superiority. This could involve entrenching Israel’s freedom of military action in Syria and Lebanon, influencing post-war arrangements, and expanding its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye appears to view these developments as potentially creating a new regional order that could constrain its influence and undermine its strategic interests, particularly as developments in Syria and Lebanon increasingly intersect with issues of energy, maritime transport routes, and the security balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.3. Recovering Bilateral Trade and the Growing Economic Ties: The latest official <a href="https://beirut-emb.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/ShowInfoNote/417817" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">figures</a> underscore the significant commercial ties between the two countries, with bilateral trade recording a notable recovery in 2025. Total trade between Türkiye and Lebanon increased from approximately $1.19 billion in 2024 to around $1.30 billion in 2025, an increase of about 9.8%. This growth was driven primarily by Turkish exports to Lebanon, which rose from $1.03 billion to $1.17 billion, an increase of approximately 13.4%. By contrast, Turkish imports from Lebanon declined from around $154 million to approximately $132 million, widening Türkiye’s trade surplus from about $879 million in 2024 to approximately $1.04 billion in 2025.These developments mark a return to growth in bilateral trade following its decline in 2024, underscoring the continued importance of the Lebanese market for Turkish exports. They also provide a foundation for further economic cooperation, particularly in reconstruction, energy, transportation, and infrastructure. Given Lebanon’s growing needs in these sectors, expanded bilateral engagement could create additional opportunities for Turkish companies.Mutual InterestsThe growing rapprochement between Türkiye and Lebanon is being driven by a number of key considerations related to recent regional developments and Lebanon’s domestic transformations. The most significant factors include the following:1. Converging Positions on Israeli Policies and Actions: Türkiye and Lebanon have shown notable convergence in their positions toward Israeli actions in the region, particularly those affecting Lebanon, with both countries viewing these developments as a threat to their interests. This brings the broader Türkiye–Israel rivalry back into focus, as competition between the two countries increasingly extends across the Arab Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean and into questions surrounding the future of the regional security architecture and strategic balance.From this perspective, strengthening ties with Lebanon could give Türkiye greater capacity to protect its interests amid its ongoing competition with Israel, particularly given the continued Israeli military presence in parts of southern Lebanon. Ankara may therefore seek to secure a role in any future understandings between Lebanon and Israel, including arrangements for an Israeli withdrawal, security along Lebanon’s southern border, and the nature of any international or alternative force that could assume security responsibilities in the country.2. Capitalizing on the Declining Influence of Iran and Hezbollah: The decline in Iran’s regional influence and Hezbollah’s reduced freedom of action compared with the pre-war period represent important developments that have opened new space for Türkiye to expand its engagement in Lebanon. With its political and military influence and extensive social and economic networks, Hezbollah has long been one of the principal constraints on the expansion of other regional powers within Lebanon. This did not necessarily take the form of direct confrontation, but rather reflected Hezbollah’s central position within Lebanon’s political and security landscape. The weakening of this position as a result of the war, attacks on the group’s military infrastructure, and changes in Iran’s broader regional environment has created greater room for the Lebanese state and regional actors to redistribute roles and influence.In this context, Türkiye appears intent on preventing Lebanon from once again falling under the domination of a single external power while also capitalizing on the relative vacuum created by the weakening of one of the country’s traditional centers of power. Ankara is seeking to establish a direct presence through Lebanese state institutions. Its approach therefore differs from that pursued by Iran over previous decades: rather than investing in an armed force operating in parallel with the state, Türkiye appears to be placing greater emphasis on state institutions, the military, economic engagement, diplomacy, and reconstruction.3. Seeking to Consolidate Türkiye’s Strategic Gains in Syria: The changes in Syria following the overthrow of former President Bashar al-Assad’s government and the emergence of the current authorities under Ahmed al-Sharaa represent another key factor shaping the current Türkiye–Lebanon rapprochement. Given Türkiye’s strategic relationship with the current Syrian government, Ankara now has greater room to reshape its relations with Syria’s neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon. Türkiye’s outreach to Beirut can therefore be understood within a broader effort to build a stable regional environment around Syria that enables Ankara to consolidate its political, security, and economic gains there.Türkiye’s national security considerations are also particularly important in this context. Ankara views stability in Lebanon and effective border control as factors that could directly and indirectly help prevent the emergence of new smuggling routes and the movement of weapons and armed groups. Lebanese–Syrian security cooperation therefore forms part of Türkiye’s broader regional security calculations.4. The Growing Importance of the Eastern Mediterranean in Türkiye’s Strategic Calculations: The maritime dimension of the Eastern Mediterranean represents another key factor shaping Türkiye’s rapprochement with Lebanon, particularly following recent progress in delimiting the Lebanese–Cypriot maritime boundary. Lebanon and Cyprus <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1836464-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">signed</a> an agreement delimiting their exclusive economic zones in November 2025, which entered into force in February 2026 following the exchange of instruments of ratification.The Türkiye–Lebanon rapprochement therefore carries an additional strategic dimension related to Ankara’s efforts to prevent Lebanon from becoming part of an emerging Eastern Mediterranean alignment centered on Cyprus, Greece, and Israel. Türkiye has long viewed with concern the network of maritime and energy agreements developed by Cyprus with other Eastern Mediterranean countries, as well as the growing cooperation among Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.In conclusion, the Türkiye–Lebanon rapprochement goes beyond improving bilateral relations and reflects a broader effort by both countries to reposition themselves within a rapidly changing regional environment. Lebanon is seeking to diversify its partnerships, strengthen state institutions, build the capabilities of its armed forces, and benefit from Türkiye’s expertise in reconstruction and investment. Ankara, meanwhile, appears to view Iran and Hezbollah’s declining influence, the transformations in Syria, and intensifying competition with Israel as an opportunity to strengthen its presence in Lebanon and the Eastern Mediterranean.In the coming period, this rapprochement is likely to translate into greater Turkish support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and security agencies, possible Turkish involvement in arrangements aimed at stabilizing southern Lebanon, and expanded cooperation in economic development, reconstruction, energy, transportation, and ports. Greater coordination could also emerge on Syria, border security, and counter-smuggling efforts.If these political understandings develop into concrete agreements and projects, Türkiye could gradually emerge as one of Lebanon’s most important regional partners. Such a development could reshape the balance of external influence within Lebanon while adding a new dimension to Türkiye–Israel competition in the region. This scenario, however, depends on Ankara and Beirut’s ability to manage sensitivities surrounding Türkiye’s role, the positions adopted by various actors both within Lebanon and abroad, and the security and political arrangements that ultimately take shape in Syria and southern Lebanon.

What Is Driving the Rapprochement Between Türkiye and Lebanon?