InterRegional for Strategic Analysis

InterRegional for Strategic Analysis held a panel discussion titled "One Hundred Days in Office: Transformations in Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policy," featuring keynote speaker Dr. Mohammed Abbas Naji, Editor-in-Chief of Iranian Selections and expert at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, Egypt. The panel discussed expectations surrounding the foreign and domestic challenges facing the Iranian government during the first one hundred days in office of Iran’s new president.Domestic IssuesDuring his first one hundred days in office, recently elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian worked to address a number of domestic issues and faced certain challenges, which can be reviewed as follows:1- Formation of a national unity government: Pezeshkian tried to form a government that would achieve "national unity" in Iran and bring together leading political factions in order to streamline government formation. This comes amidst deepening political divisions between hardliners and reformists, coupled with political marginalization of some other factions. Despite being a reformist, Pezeshkian was determined to appoint ministers from the conservative fundamentalist movement to his government, even though some of them voted for his opponents in the presidential race.Pezeshkian also made sure to appoint three ministers from the government of the late President Ebrahim Raisi, including Esmail Khatib—the minister of intelligence appointed by Iran’s Supreme Leader, who directly selects the ministers for sovereign ministries—as well as the ministers of justice and industry. The president’s keenness to appoint hardliners to the government prompted Mohammad Javad Zarif to resign from his position as Vice President for Strategic Affairs in response to the inclusion of hardliners in the new government, while the proposals of the reformist presidential team were ignored. Some observers interpreted Zarif’s resignation as a political maneuver to form the government, given the political hostility between Zarif and the hardliners. This interpretation was borne out when Zarif returned to his position after the government was formed.2- Appointment of a female minister: Pezeshkian appointed Farzaneh Sadegh as minister of roads and urban development in his government. She is just the second female minister in the history of the government since the Iranian revolution in 1979, following Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi, who was the minister of health during the tenure of former President Ahmadinejad.3- Failed attempts to appoint Sunni ministers: In his vision for forming a consensus government, President Pezeshkian tried to refute accusations of discrimination against Sunnis in forming the government. Thus, he sought to promote the appointment of Sunni officials in his government, selecting a Sunni governor for Kurdistan province and another for Sistan and Baluchistan. The decision to appoint Sunni governors in these two regions in particular may be attributed to the tensions and unrest in these regions, which are home to various ethnic groups, most of whom are Sunni. On the other hand, President Pezeshkian failed to appoint any Sunni ministers to his government.4- Worsening power outage crisis: Iran is witnessing significant economic and social crises, most notably the electricity crisis that has resulted in a daily map of rolling blackouts in several regions. The crisis was caused by a collapse of power and electricity infrastructure, a shortage of fuel needed to operate power plants, and the exit of foreign companies that were investing in that sector of the Iranian market due to US sanctions. Moreover, the inability of local companies to fill that gap and the prevalence of corruption in the country are exacerbating the crisis.5- Declining currency exchange rate: Iranian currency (in tomans) continues to face a decline, especially with the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections and expectations of a return of his policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian economy. The price of the US dollar on the black market has reached about 70,000 tomans, according to the latest estimates, while the inflation rate in Iran is still more than 40%.6- Failure to secure necessary investment: President Pezeshkian announced that his country needs USD 250 billion to achieve its goals, especially its goal of 8% growth. He noted that Iran has obtained USD 100 billion of that target, which means that it needs an additional USD 150 billion in investments to achieve his government’s goals. This goal seems overly ambitious, given the current US sanctions and Iran’s refusal to join the FATF.7- Failure to convince the hardliners to join the FATF: President Pezeshkian’s attempts to convince the Shura Council, the Guardian Council, other major bodies and institutions inside Iran, and the fundamentalist movement in particular, to agree to join the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering and terrorist financing have failed so far. The president is aware of the difficulty of solving the economic problems facing his government without joining the FATF.Pezeshkian defends his position by stressing that joining the FATF could help activate partnership agreements with other countries, similar to the strategic partnership agreement with China signed in March 2021, which enables China to pump USD 400 billion worth of investments into Iran over 25 years. Joining FATF could also facilitate the signing of a similar agreement with Russia, in addition to facilitating negotiations with Western countries.By contrast, hardline conservatives believe that agreeing to join the FATF could restrict the support Iran provides to its loyal proxies in the region, thereby preventing Tehran from financing these militias and undermining Iran’s tools of regional influence.Foreign MovesDuring his first one hundred days in office, Pezeshkian made some notable moves in the foreign policy domain, as follows: 1- Fostering of ties with countries of the region: Tehran’s trend towards continuing to develop bilateral relations with the countries of the region was highlighted. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made multiple visits and held intensive talks in many countries of the region, especially during the military escalation between Iran and Israel.2- Continued military escalation with Israel: Iran launched air strikes on Israel in early October 2024, in response to the assassinations of the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, on 31 July 2024; the Secretary-General of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah; and the commander of the Quds Force in Lebanon, Abbas Nilforoushan. Prior to that, Iran was hesitant to respond to the assassination of Haniyeh for many reasons, including avoiding a broad Israeli response, reducing the chances of Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections, and de-escalating domestic disputes in Iran over the extent and limits of a military strike, with an emphasis on Tehran’s inferiority when it comes to a direct war with Tel Aviv. However, Tehran ultimately found that the cost of responding might be less than the cost of not responding. Pezeshkian considered halting Israeli operations in Lebanon an important requirement to prevent Israel from moving against Iran, especially given Netanyahu’s insistence on extending and expanding the Israeli war. The Iranian government decided to intensify its response to the assassinations of Nasrallah and Nilforoushan, given that their deaths were a strong blow to Iranian influence in the region. Iran’s response also aimed to prevent Israel from achieving its goals of eliminating the military capabilities of Iran’s proxies in the region.3- Inability of Iranian authorities to fill security gaps: Iran has been unable to fill the security gaps it has been experienced, the most prominent examples of which are the assassination of Hamas political head Ismail Haniyeh at an IRGC-run guesthouse in Tehran, as well as the wounding of the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon in the so-called "pager" attacks. Some reports also hold Iran responsible for leaking information on the locations of militia and group leaders to Israel, with the involvement of elements inside the offices of major Iranian leaders. 4- Iranian frustration with Trump’s presidential victory: Tehran would have preferred Kamala Harris to become US president over Donald Trump, given Iran’s negative experiences during Trump’s first presidential term. For example, Trump’s killing of Qasem Soleimani is considered the strongest blow directed against Iran—one which Tehran has not yet been able to address. Soleimani’s death is considered the origin of the ongoing setbacks that Iran’s regional role continues to face.5- IAEA criticism of Iran for its lack of cooperation: Iran did not rule out that the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency would issue a decision condemning its nuclear activities and its lack of cooperation, following the IAEA director’s recent visit to Iran’s nuclear reactors. Therefore, according to the panel’s keynote speaker, Iran offered to put an end to increasing levels of enrichment were the IAEA’s Board of Governors to decline to issue a condemnation resolution. However, on 21 November 2024, the Board in fact adopted a resolution officially criticizing Iran for its insufficient cooperation regarding its nuclear program and calling on Tehran to improve cooperation with the IAEA as soon as possible. The IAEA report issued on 19 November 2024, revealed that the amount of uranium enriched at different rates had reached 6604.4 kilograms, which is equivalent to 32 times the amounts agreed upon in the Iranian nuclear agreement (202.8 kilograms). According to the IAEA, Iran has developed its nuclear capabilities and achieved a major leap during the last three months, with the amount of enriched uranium increasing by 60%, to 182.3 kilograms, which is theoretically enough to produce four nuclear bombs. 6- Growing Iranian disagreements with Russia on several issues: The keynote speaker pointed out that many voices inside Iran are critical of Russia, due to Iranian-Russian disagreements over the Syrian war and a number of other major issues. Russia has not condemned Israel’s military operations against Iran, nor has it delivered new Russian air defense systems to Tehran, including the Sukhoi Su-35 fighters that Iran wants. The two parties are also at odds over the Zangezur corridor.Potential TrajectoriesSeveral expectations regarding Iranian politics and potential challenges were raised during the discussion, the most important of which are the following:1- Renewed social protests in Iran: The possibility of renewed social protests in Iran still exists, given the standard-of-living crises Iran is experiencing. The issues of power outages is likely to worsen during the summer, and fuel prices are expected to rise.While social groups facing such crises could be motivated to oppose the regime, the religious nature of the Iranian government ensures there are segments of society that continue to support it. These include religious followers and imitators of the Iranian leader, who remain loyal to his directives and policies regardless of the country’s social, economic, and political conditions.2- Limited opportunities for Khamenei's son to succeed his father: There is a great deal of ambiguity over who will succeed Khamenei, given the sensitivity of this issue. However, consultations have already taken place, prompted by Iranian concerns about Israel’s attempt to assassinate the Iranian Supreme Leader. While Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader, &nbsp;is one of the most prominent players on the scene, he has limited opportunities to inherit his father’s position due to his theological status, which does not qualify him for the position, as well as his lack of experience in managing government affairs.3- Israeli targeting of Iranian nuclear and missile facilities: It is likely that Israel will prepare for a new military round against Iran. Israeli statements indicate that Iran needs a year to rebuild its defense system, which Israel sees as a promising opportunity to continue targeting the country, especially its defense, missile, and nuclear systems.After having targeted Iran’s S-300 air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities, and nuclear research reactor at the Parchin facility, Israel may open a front to target Iranian nuclear facilities if the war in the Gaza Strip is settled. Israel may also exploit President Trump’s presence in the White House to pressure the Iranian nuclear program, given that 2025 is a decisive year in the Iranian nuclear crisis.In this scenario, Israel would work to carry out military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities or call on Washington to launch them. It could also carry out secret sabotage and espionage intelligence operations against Iranian nuclear facilities, such as its penetration of Iranian reactors at Natanz, its seizure of Iran’s nuclear archive through covert operations from within Iran, and its assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists such as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.4- Possible Iranian launch of "Operation True Promise III": After Iran carried out two military attacks, known as "Operation True Promise" in April 2024, and "Operation True Promise II" in October 2024. The keynote speaker highlighted Iran’s preparations and threats to launch "Operation True Promise III" as a way to counter exaggerated claims about the results of Israeli attacks, refute assessments of a weakening Iranian military, and retain a leverage point for negotiations with the new US administration.This anticipated attack also reflects Iran’s desire to send the message that it still plays an influential role and cannot be overlooked in either Syria or Lebanon. This explains Iran’s move to send Khamenei advisor Ali Larijani to Syria and Lebanon, in parallel with proposing ideas for a settlement in Lebanon. The Iranian government is working to ensure that it is not excluded from any regional settlements, especially in Lebanon, and it is signaling a military option to achieve this.5- Prospects of talks between Trump and Pezeshkian: The beginning of Donald Trump’s term in office would most likely be characterized by conducting a policy of maximum pressure on Iran and undermining Iranian oil-smuggling operations, in contrast to Iran’s understandings with the Biden administration, which turned a blind eye to Iranian oil-smuggling operations.However, voices inside Iran see the possibility of negotiations with the US president-elect, amid the belief that Trump’s arrival in the White House may not be the end of the road for Iran. In particular, Iran has previous experience in achieving understandings with Republicans, such as the Reagan and Bush administrations. There are already indications of indirect talks between Tehran and the Trump team, including reports that Elon Musk met with Iran’s representative to the United Nations, Saeed Iravani.6- Expected crisis in the Iranian nuclear program in 2025: The year 2025 will witness a major crisis in the Iranian nuclear program, especially with the approach of the so-called "doomsday" on 18 October 2025, when the sanctions—which were merely suspended under the nuclear agreement—are supposed to be lifted. It is likely that the Western countries will resort to activating the snapback mechanism to re-activate the sanctions, which means the collapse of the nuclear agreement. This coincides with Iranian threats to change its nuclear doctrine in the event that its existence is threatened, which may include amending the fatwa issued by Khamenei in 2003, prohibiting the storage and production of nuclear weapons.In conclusion, the Iranian president raised expectations regarding his agenda during the first one hundred days, but the actual results indicate the limited ability of the new government to address enduring economic and social problems, while clashing with regional escalation and challenging international developments, notably Trump’s electoral victory. Tehran and its allies face significant security gaps, compounding the challenges for the Pezeshkian government, which has struggled to meet its first one hundred-day pledges. The government’s inability to manage rising expectations has eroded public satisfaction, risking political and social unrest.

Changes in Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policy (Panel Discussion)