Asmaa Refae

Relations between the Taliban and European states entered a new phase in June 2026, when the European Union <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghan-taliban-brussels-eu-deportations-migration-f5053fa8c915bf19d0f483ac55fea86e" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">hosted</a> a five-member Taliban delegation in Brussels headed by Abdul Qahar Balkhi, spokesperson for the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was the first meeting of its kind hosted by the EU on European soil for representatives of the movement since its return to power in 2021.The meeting highlighted the growing gap between Europe’s official position toward the Taliban and its growing engagement with the movement. Although the European Union later stressed in a <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/five-years-after-kabul-takeover-eu-support-afghan-people-continues_en" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">statement</a> issued on August 13, 2026, that it "does not recognize the de facto Taliban authorities, nor does it confer legitimacy upon them," the same statement noted that the EU continues to maintain practical engagement with those authorities on issues related to its core values and interests, including the rights of women and girls.These contradictions were also evident in another episode involving the June 2026 delegation. Although Belgium, which issued visas to the Afghan delegation, had instructed its members not to use them to visit any other country, a report published by <a href="https://www.intelligenceonline.com/europe-russia/2026/07/16/afghan-taliban-delegation-s-strange-paris-stopover,110841732-art" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Intelligence Online</a> indicated that the delegation left Brussels by train for Paris without official escort in an attempt to meet officials from France’s ministries of foreign affairs and justice. The Taliban’s efforts to arrange those meetings were unsuccessful, however, and the delegation eventually flew from Paris to Istanbul before returning to Kabul.Drivers of RapprochementThe recent rapprochement between Europe and the Taliban is driven by a convergence of overlapping interests, most notably the following:1. Gradual Efforts by the Taliban Government to Break Out of International Isolation: Recognizing that formal Western recognition of its government in Afghanistan is unlikely in the foreseeable future because of a range of legal and political <a href="https://www.ceps.eu/by-normalising-the-taliban-the-eu-is-trading-its-soul-for-a-migration-deal/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">constraints</a>, the Taliban has adopted a pragmatic approach aimed at gradually reducing its international isolation and establishing an implicit form of "political normalization" without formal recognition.Although the European Commission has been careful to characterize its relationship with the Taliban as falling within the framework of "operational coordination," while emphasizing that hosting a Taliban delegation does not amount to recognition of its government, the fact that representatives of the movement were received inside European institutions itself constitutes a significant diplomatic breakthrough for the Taliban. It provides the movement with a platform for direct negotiations while also delivering a significant propaganda boost that could strengthen its domestic image.2. Undermining Afghan Embassies in Europe That Do Not Recognize Taliban Rule: The Taliban government is seeking to consolidate its control over Afghanistan’s diplomatic representation abroad, including missions that continue to be administered by diplomats appointed by the former government. In doing so, it is attempting to push European governments and Afghan communities toward dealing exclusively with newly appointed Taliban representatives.Such a shift would strengthen the movement’s control over &nbsp;Afghan communities abroad and Afghan diplomatic missions, while undermining the legitimacy of alternative representation and helping the movement gain access to vital foreign-currency revenues from passport and document-certification fees.In this context, in late <a href="https://amu.tv/113500/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">July 2024</a>, the Taliban-run Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a decisive step by announcing that it would no longer recognize consular services provided by a number of Afghan missions in Western countries. This decision, which was communicated to <a href="https://amu.tv/117980/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">13 Western countries</a>, has created challenges for Afghan citizens in Europe seeking consular services and added further legal complications for European authorities.The decision also places pressure on Afghan diplomatic missions in Europe to establish contact with the Taliban government in Kabul and comply with the new organizational and leadership structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while allowing the Taliban to expand its control over other governmental diplomatic and political structures outside Afghanistan.3. European Plans to Deport Afghan Asylum Seekers: Afghan nationals constitute one of the largest groups of asylum seekers in Europe. In 2025, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/SEPDF/cache/5777.pdf?utm_source" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">63,830</a> first-time asylum applications were submitted by Afghans, accounting for approximately 9.5% of the total and making them the second-largest nationality among first-time asylum applications in EU member states.Although the recognition rate for Afghan applications stood at approximately <a href="https://ecre.org/joint-statement-afghan-and-european-civil-society-oppose-eu-engagement-with-the-taliban-on-deportations/https:/ecre.org/joint-statement-afghan-and-european-civil-society-oppose-eu-engagement-with-the-taliban-on-deportations/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">73.3%</a> during the year, the rise of right-wing and far-right parties, particularly Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the increasing prominence of anti-immigration and anti-asylum rhetoric have pushed European governments to explore new mechanisms for managing high asylum volumes and deportation challenges, especially as thousands of applications continue to be rejected each year.Under mounting political and public pressure, European governments have faced growing demands to tighten deportation policies and address potential security risks. This prompted around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/23/eu-faces-fierce-criticism-plans-host-taliban-brussels" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">20 European states</a> to call for mechanisms allowing for the deportation of Afghans who lack legal residence permits or who are considered security threats, even if doing so requires opening direct channels of communication with the Taliban.While the Afghan delegation’s talks in Brussels in June 2026 focused heavily on the return of Afghan refugees, Germany had already taken steps in this direction in <a href="https://www.intelligenceonline.com/europe-russia/2026/07/16/afghan-taliban-delegation-s-strange-paris-stopover,110841732-art" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">2025</a>. After accepting the appointment of a chargé d’affaires representing the Taliban government, Berlin subsequently organized several flights to return Afghan refugees to Kabul and hand them over to the Taliban authorities.4. European Hopes for a Taliban Role in Countering ISIS: European capitals remain concerned that Afghanistan could once again become a safe haven or active base for terrorist organizations, particularly ISIS-Khorasan. Some European strategic and security <a href="https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/eu-and-taliban-gordian-knot-risks-and-opportunities-selective-re-engagement-2026" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">assessments</a> argue that, as the effective governing authority on the ground, the Taliban could play a role in containing the group’s activities inside Afghanistan.From this perspective, intelligence sharing, technical cooperation, and forms of joint monitoring with the Taliban are viewed by some European assessments as a security necessity for containing threats before they reach European cities.5. EU Concerns over Growing Russian Influence in Afghanistan: European concerns are also increasing over the strategic vacuum created by the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan, which competing powers—most notably Russia—have moved quickly to exploit.Russia became the first country to sign an economic agreement with the Taliban government in 2022 for the supply of oil, gas, and wheat. It was also the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cp3lvzjwv43o" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">first</a> country to formally recognize the Taliban government after accepting the credentials of a new Afghan ambassador representing the Taliban administration in July 2025. This followed Moscow’s removal of the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations in April of the same year. In May 2026, the two sides also signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation.6. Concerns That Afghanistan Could Become a Hub for Synthetic Drug Production: Reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2025 and 2026 indicated a substantial decline in opium production in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation. Opium output fell by <a href="https://kabulnow.com/2026/06/afghanistan-opium-stockpiles-likely-to-last-until-end-of-2026-despite-sharp-production-drop-un-says/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">95%</a>, from 6,200 tons in 2022 to just 296 tons in 2025.Although this development may appear beneficial for Europe by reducing heroin flows, the United Nations has warned of potentially more serious consequences. Afghan opium stockpiles are expected to be depleted by the end of 2026, potentially increasing European dependence on highly lethal synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine, production of which has already expanded since the Taliban banned poppy cultivation in 2022.These concerns have been reinforced by an alarming increase in the frequency of synthetic drug seizures—particularly methamphetamine—in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, with seizures approximately 50% more frequent at the end of 2024 than in the third quarter of 2023. This trend raises the prospect of Afghanistan emerging as a major global center for synthetic drug production and could encourage European capitals to deepen cooperation with the Taliban while supporting alternative-development programs to contain the growing threat.Main ObstaclesDespite the strong incentives driving both sides toward cooperation on selected issues, several legal and political obstacles continue to hinder a broader rapprochement between Europe and the Taliban, particularly amid negative perceptions of the movement and its domestic policies among some European actors.Recent European engagement with the Taliban has also triggered significant opposition both within and outside European institutions. In May 2026, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/23/eu-faces-fierce-criticism-plans-host-taliban-brussels" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">European Parliament</a> adopted a resolution by 480 votes to five, with 83 abstentions, calling on the European Commission and EU member states to maintain their policy of non-recognition and avoid normalizing relations with the Taliban regime. The Parliament also expressed regret over the decision to invite a Taliban delegation to Brussels.The Taliban itself also faces internal divisions, according to some assessments. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg7vdpy1l2vo" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Reports</a> point to sharp differences between two groups at the top of the movement’s leadership over how Afghanistan should be governed and how it should engage with the outside world.The first group is closely aligned with Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, who governs from Kandahar, and includes conservative religious figures. This faction remains committed to establishing what it describes as an "Islamic Emirate" in Afghanistan based on a highly conservative model of governance and only limited openness to the outside world.The second group consists of influential Taliban members and government ministers, many of whom are based in Kabul and appear more open to relations with the international community, economic development, and allowing girls and women access to education. While this divide may create opportunities by suggesting the existence of a more flexible faction within the movement, it also points to potential shifts and inconsistencies in Taliban policy that could affect any understandings reached with the European Union.In conclusion, relations between the Taliban and the European Union are likely to evolve toward a pattern of cautious cooperation driven by mutual interests and practical necessities, without reaching the level of formal recognition. European states are expected to maintain security and technical channels with the Taliban, driven by migration pressures and security concerns, while seeking to expand consular cooperation and arrangements for returning Afghan nationals in ways that do not appear to conflict with Europe’s international obligations.For its part, the Taliban is likely to continue using issues such as migration and counter-ISIS cooperation to strengthen its legitimacy and secure political and economic gains. Nevertheless, this rapprochement is likely to remain fragile and susceptible to reversal because of international legal constraints and continued pressure from the European Parliament and civil society organizations.

What Are the Prospects for Common Understandings Between the Taliban and European States?