Elina Treyger

Samantha Perez Davila

Since invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has faced isolation from the West and seen its resources come under increasing strain. Nevertheless, this has not prevented Moscow from deepening its involvement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, where it is able to leverage historical ties dating back to the Soviet era and its alignment with governments in the region that oppose U.S. influence.These developments are examined in a RAND study published in September 2026, entitled "Russia’s Enduring Role in Latin America and Its Implications for U.S. Hemispheric Interests." This paper, authored by Elina Treyger and Samantha Perez Davila, explores the nature of Russia’s presence in the region, its political, economic, and security objectives, the tools Moscow uses to strengthen that presence, and the implications for U.S. interests.Strategic ObjectivesThe study indicates that Russia’s engagement in Latin America is driven by overlapping political, economic, and security objectives, even though the region does not constitute one of Moscow’s core areas of vital interest. Russian engagement has gradually expanded since the beginning of the century and deepened further following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, as Moscow has sought to maintain its global presence and broaden its partnerships in response to growing Western pressure and efforts to isolate the country internationally.Treyger and Perez Davila note that the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, followed by its increased pressure on Cuba, represented a major setback for Russia’s most established partnerships in the region. Nevertheless, Russia’s military, media, and economic investments in the region have continued. In this context, Russia’s main strategic objectives can be outlined as follows:1. Promoting a Multipolar International Order: Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has sought to frame its confrontation with the West in quasi-ideological terms, portraying itself as a defender of sovereignty and a leader of the Global South, or what it describes as the "World Majority." Latin America and the Caribbean occupy a prominent place in Russian discourse as part of Moscow’s vision of a new multipolar world order that rejects U.S. dominance, helping Russia build broader global alliances in its confrontation with the West.2. Projecting Power and Counterbalancing U.S. Influence: According to the study, Russia uses its engagement in the region to demonstrate the reach of its influence and its ability to operate as a great power despite the isolation imposed by the war and sanctions. This approach is rooted in the Primakov Doctrine, which holds that U.S. influence in Russia’s "near abroad" justifies Moscow’s involvement in the Western Hemisphere. Russia’s leadership therefore seeks to demonstrate its ability to operate the U.S.’s backyard and reinforce Russia’s image as a global actor capable of exercising influence beyond its immediate neighborhood.3. Challenging U.S. Influence and Interests: Russia’s presence is not limited to power projection; Moscow also seeks to weaken U.S. influence and credibility in the region whenever opportunities arise. Strengthening relations with governments that are at odds with Washington is therefore one of the tools Russia uses to broaden its strategic competition with the United States and establish a foothold in a region traditionally regarded as lying within the U.S. sphere of influence.4. Seeking to Reduce the Dominance of the Western Financial System: Despite Western sanctions, Russia has sought to preserve and expand its economic ties in ways that mitigate the impact of sanctions and reduce dependence on the Western financial system. Latin America provides opportunities in this regard, particularly through the expansion of BRICS+, the development of payment mechanisms outside the U.S. dollar system, and stronger commercial ties with energy companies, agricultural exporters, and emerging markets in the region. These efforts align with broader Russian and Chinese efforts to develop alternative economic mechanisms.Diverse ToolsThe study indicates that Russia does not rely on a single instrument to pursue its strategic objectives in Latin America. Instead, it employs a combination of political, media, cultural, military, security, and economic tools, with its involvement particularly concentrated in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Brazil. The most significant of these tools include the following:1. Intensifying Diplomatic and Political Engagement: Moscow has bolstered its political and diplomatic presence in the region through high-level visits, engagement with governments and parliaments, and the use of multilateral frameworks. In April 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov toured Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, meeting the leaders of all four countries at the time and emphasizing solidarity in confronting U.S. dominance.Similarly, Russian presidential security adviser Nikolai Patrushev visited the same countries in early 2024, stressing that relations with Latin America had become one of Moscow’s priorities. Russia also uses multilateral frameworks, particularly BRICS, to reinforce its narrative of a multipolar world order.2. Leveraging Media and Information Influence Operations: Russia relies extensively on state-run media outlets, particularly RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo, both of which have broad reach across Latin America. Moscow also draws on local media outlets and figures to amplify Russian narratives.Russian embassies and diplomatic officials help strengthen this presence, while Moscow also uses social media, local influencers, and networks and companies involved in information influence operations to disseminate messages aligned with Russian interests.3. Expanding Cultural and Educational Diplomacy: Moscow uses cultural and educational institutions such as Russkiy Mir and the Russian House to strengthen its cultural and academic presence in the region. These organizations have opened Russian cultural centers or offices in several Latin American countries, including some of Russia’s key partners, such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.Russia’s cultural and educational engagement in the region also builds on the legacy of educational ties with the Soviet Union, which trained thousands of students from Latin American countries. Russia continues to attract students from the region and organize cultural events.4. Maintaining Military and Security Cooperation: In recent years, Russia has once again used its military and security relationships in Latin America to project power and test Washington’s willingness to push back against its growing influence in the region. Although Russian arms sales have declined due to Western sanctions, production constraints, and the need to prioritize Russian forces fighting in Ukraine, Moscow has continued to pursue military and technical cooperation with its partners in Latin America, particularly through the maintenance and modernization of Russian-made systems already in service.Russia has also resumed symbolic military deployments to the region, including the June 2024 visit to Havana by the Admiral Gorshkov frigate and the Kazan nuclear-powered submarine, in addition to naval visits and exercises in Cuba and Nicaragua.5. Expanding Intelligence and Surveillance Activities: According to the study, Russia’s security infrastructure in the region includes GLONASS stations established in some Latin American countries to expand its intelligence-gathering and surveillance capabilities, alongside reported intelligence activities in Cuba, Mexico, and elsewhere.The study also points to Moscow’s use of intelligence networks operating under diplomatic cover, covert identities, and surveillance, interception, and communications technologies. These include facial-recognition systems and surveillance technologies based on the Russian System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), a system used to intercept and monitor communications.6. Strengthening Economic and Trade Relations with Countries in the Region: Russia has expanded its trade and economic relations with countries across the region, focusing on fertilizers, oil and gas, nuclear energy, and natural resources. Russian petroleum-product exports to Latin America have increased significantly, while Russia has also become involved in nuclear energy, uranium, lithium, and mining projects in several countries.Russian companies, particularly Rosneft, also strengthened their presence in Venezuela’s energy sector before the developments that unfolded in the country in early 2026 and the removal of President Nicolás Maduro. Following Maduro’s removal, Washington moved to exclude Russian entities from Venezuela’s oil sector, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov acknowledged that Russian companies were being "forced out of Venezuela."Broader ImplicationsThe study argues that Russia’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean remains limited compared with that of other major powers. However, its implications extend beyond the scope of Russia’s direct involvement in the region, particularly in light of the growing cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran. This convergence allows each country to draw on the capabilities of the others, amplify their collective influence, and increase their ability to challenge U.S. interests and exert simultaneous pressure on Washington both within the region and beyond. The main implications include the following:1. Undermining U.S. Economic Pressure and Sanctions: One of the most significant implications of Russia’s role is its ability, in cooperation with China and Iran, to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions by providing economic and financial alternatives to countries under U.S. pressure.This was particularly evident in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro, where Russian and Chinese cooperation helped sustain oil production and provided alternative markets and financial channels, while Iran offered support in oil refining and shipment transfers. Shipping networks, intermediaries, and front companies also helped conceal the origins of shipments and circumvent sanctions, making action against any single actor insufficient to disrupt these networks on a sustained basis.2. Using Economic Influence to Pressure Countries in the Region: The economic implications extend beyond sanctions evasion, as trade relationships and interdependence can also become instruments of political pressure. The study notes that Russia could leverage some countries’ dependence on fertilizers, energy, and other commodities to influence their political decisions. Disrupting fertilizer exports to Brazil or Mexico, for example, could reduce agricultural production and raise food prices, generating domestic pressure on their governments.3. Affecting Supply Chains and Access to Energy and Mineral Resources: According to the study, Russian-Chinese cooperation could extend to control over certain strategic resources and supply chains linked to U.S. interests. The study highlights the importance of lithium, particularly in Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile, given that the Lithium Triangle contains some of the world’s most important reserves of the mineral.The study argues that expanded Chinese and Russian investment in the extraction and processing of these resources could limit U.S. companies’ access to them and increase Washington’s dependence on external sources of critical minerals.4. Potentially Diverting Washington’s Attention During Crises and Conflicts: Russia’s capabilities in the region could enable Moscow to exert additional pressure on the United States when Washington is preoccupied with a crisis or conflict in another theater, potentially diverting U.S. military and intelligence resources.The study suggests that Russia could use its naval and intelligence presence in the region—including ships, submarines, and long-range aircraft—to compel Washington to allocate resources to surveillance, reconnaissance, and protection. This could reduce its ability to concentrate resources on other theaters of conflict, such as the Indo-Pacific.In conclusion, the study finds that Russia’s continued presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, although limited compared with that of other major powers, poses a range of challenges to U.S. interests, particularly amid growing cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran. These challenges are not confined to the economic and security spheres but also extend to Moscow’s ability to divert U.S. attention, support anti-U.S. actors, and expand Russia’s intelligence and information capabilities across the region. In light of these developments, the study recommends that the United States prepare for scenarios involving competition across multiple theaters, strengthen security and intelligence cooperation with regional partners, and enhance its monitoring, surveillance, and intelligence-gathering capabilities. According to the study, such measures would boost Washington’s ability to detect Russian activities at an early stage and limit Moscow’s opportunities to expand its influence and exploit regional crises.Source:Elina Treyger and Samantha Perez Davila, "Russia’s Enduring Role in Latin America and Its Implications for U.S. Hemispheric Interests," RAND, September 8, 2026.

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