Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan

*This article has been featured in the State of the World publication, Issue No. 01, April 2023Since Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, political and academic experts have debated Moscow’s motives and calculations for going to war. Given the Russian president’s overwhelming power over his country’s foreign policy, Putin’s personal views and beliefs have been central to these debates: What were President Putin’s initial calculations in deciding to launch the war on Ukraine, and what is his vision for Ukraine’s future? Russia’s choices in Ukraine can be best understood by examining Putin’s other foreign policy decisions and his broader vision for Russia’s future.Putin’s Worldview Putin became president on 31 December 1999, after the surprise resignation of Boris Yeltsin. Russian’s first president. The 1990s were tumultuous years for modern Russia, and included the collapse of the Soviet Union, the "shock therapy" of market reforms, rampant corruption, and infiltration of the state apparatus by criminal elements. This ushered in an era of instability and a steep decline of in standards of living as a new ultra-wealthy class emerged. These oligarchs wielded significant economic and political influence. The Russian defeat in the First Chechen War as well as growing demands for autonomy from other subjects of the Russian Federation led some to predict that Russia might soon succumb to the same fate as the Soviet Union.In the 1990s, Russia also faced significant foreign policy setbacks. Its stances were often overlooked, including during the NATO enlargement process and NATO decision to use force against Serbia in 1999. Many Russians felt humiliated by declining standards of living at home and significantly decreased influence abroad. This contributed to the demand for a strong leader to restore order and stability and bring Russia back to the forefront of international relations.Early PresidencyPutin came to power under these circumstances after many years working for the Soviet KGB. He adopted a two-pronged strategy to reestablish stability and restore Russia its rightful place among the world’s great powers. Putin spent his first two presidential terms (2000-2008) pursuing these goals. He succeeded in achieving political and economic stability and significantly increased the standard of living, in addition to bringing Chechnya back under Russian control in the Second Chechen War.For Putin, the road towards restoring Russia as a great power required reimposing Russian influence in post-Soviet states. In October 2000, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC).<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[1]</a> In 2002, Russia transformed the Collective Security Treaty into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a NATO-style military alliance comprised of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[2]</a> Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine also signed the Single Economic Space Agreement (SES) in 2003; the agreement was ratified in 2004. Deepening integration with Belarus and Ukraine based on shared Slavic history and culture was at the core of Russian efforts.Meanwhile, Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 brought pro-Western forces to power in those countries. Both Georgia and Ukraine expressed clear interest in joining the EU and NATO. Russia saw these developments as Western interference to prevent the restoration of Russian influence in post-Soviet states and to create obstacles to Russia-led integration processes. The continuing NATO and EU enlargement process, which brought both eastern European and Baltic countries into NATO and the EU only heightened Russian fears.Putin cast these revolutions as Western and US-backed attempts to contain Russia, thwart Russia’s ambitions to become a great power again, and preserve a unipolar world order with uncontested US primacy. Putin publicly voiced his concerns during his famous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, in which he articulated Russia’s vision for a multipolar world in which Russia would have a seat at the negotiating table.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[3]</a>When Putin became prime minister in 2008 and Dmitry Medvedev was elected president, hopes emerged that Russia and the West could navigate their disagreements together. Even the 2008 Russia-Georgia war did not prevent the Obama administration from launching a "Russia reset" policy in spring 2009.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[4]</a> However, growing Russia-West disputes on issues such as Syria and Libya, as well as the role of Russia in post-Soviet states, prevented any meaningful dialogue.Escalating Tensions Tensions between Russia and the West in post-Soviet states peaked in late 2013 and early 2014 in Ukraine. Russia put pressure on Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych not to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Yanukovych’s decision to postpone signing ushered in large-scale protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. These demonstrations turned violent and led to Yanukovych’s ouster.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[5]</a> President Putin viewed these events as a second West-orchestrated coup in Ukraine following the Orange Revolution. As fears grew in Russia that the new Ukrainian leadership would accelerate the process of joining NATO and remove the Russian Black Sea fleet from its base in Crimea, Putin decided to annex the Crimean Peninsula by referendum. At the same time, Russia backed rebels in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which declared their independence in May 2014. The ensuing war in eastern Ukraine ended with the signing of the Minsk agreements in February 2015, which effectively froze the conflict.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[6]</a> The West accused Russia of annexing Crimea and supporting rebels in Donbas, and consequently imposed sanctions on Russia, although these sanctions were not very strict.The Concept of the "Russian World"Between February 2015 and February 2022, President Putin’s views on Ukraine continued to evolve. Putin had expressed certainty that the West was behind what he saw as the illegal 2013 coup to pull Ukraine back from Russia and transform Ukraine into a launchpad for anti-Russian activities. He also started to circulate the idea that Ukrainians were the same as Russians. He rejected the notion of Ukraine as a separate nation and argued that it was an artificial state created by the Bolsheviks under Lenin’s leadership. Putin elaborated on this vision in a lengthy article published in 2021.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[7]</a>Another central concept in Putin’s approach to Ukraine is the notion of a "Russian world." According to this concept, the Russian world has a much broader scope than the territory of the Russian Federation, since it encompasses any areas where ethnic Russians live. The term "compatriots" has been used to refer to ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking populations outside Russia to further the idea that Russia should support and defend the rights of these populations. This concept of a "Russian world" was formalized in September 2022, when Putin signed a decree on the Russian Federation’s "humanitarian policy" abroad into law.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[8]</a> The document is over 30 pages long and outlines principles for promoting Russian culture—broadly defined—outside Russia. Russian cultural policy continues to cast Russia as a unique civilization distinct from other regions and countries. It identifies Western states as the main threat to Russian culture and, by extension, Russian statehood. According to the decree, Russia’s critical task is to promote and defend the foundations of Russia’s "traditional values," particularly family values, which Putin claims are threatened by "neo-liberal governments."Putin’s vision of Ukraine as an artificial state propped up by Western attempts to turn Ukraine against Russia was central to Russian justifications for launching the war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and recognizing the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[9]</a> Putin likely hoped that Russian troops would quickly reach Kyiv and enact regime change in Ukraine. According to this plan, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would resign or leave the capital and a new Russian-friendly government would be installed. At the same time, Russia calculated that most of the population in eastern, southern, and central Ukraine would welcome a pro-Russian government.However, despite some successes in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in southern Ukraine, Russia’s initial war plan failed. This was primarily due to faulty strategic calculations and flawed strategic intelligence. Ukrainian forces decisively fought back the Russian army as it approached Kyiv and stopped the Russian advancement towards Kharkiv, As a result, Russia decided to withdraw from the areas around Kyiv and to concentrate its efforts on the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[10]</a> From April to June 2022, the Russian army made some progress, including taking over Mariupol and almost the entire Lugansk region. However, growing Western military aid for Ukraine and shortages of Russian forces effectively halted Russian advancement. In early September 2022, Ukraine launched a counteroffensive and pushed Russian troops out of parts of the Kharkiv region. Facing the prospect of losing more territory in Ukraine, Putin declared a partial mobilization of military reservists on 21 September 2022.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[11]</a> Russia also organized referendums on joining Russia in four Ukrainian oblasts (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) on 23-27 September of that year.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[12]</a> Putin signed agreements with the leaders of those regions, resulting in the annexation of the four oblasts on 30 September.<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[13]</a>Russia believes that making these territories part of Russia could change the narrative of the war to a defensive battle in which Russia is protecting its territorial integrity against Ukraine. This framing of the conflict increases the likelihood that Russia might use tactical nuclear bombs as part of its military doctrine. The prospect of even limited nuclear war in Europe could force European countries to rethink military support for Ukraine and instead focus on reaching a compromise with Russia. Russia’s likely objective is to freeze the conflict with Ukraine within the current lines of contact, although the fate of territories in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions that Russia does not control remains unclear. <a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[1]</a> Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/glossary/21<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[2]</a> "History of Creation, Fundamentals of Activity, Organizational Structure," https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[3]</a> Speech and&nbsp;the&nbsp;Following Discussion at&nbsp;the&nbsp;Munich Conference on&nbsp;Security Policy, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/24034<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[4]</a> Clinton, Lavrov Push Wrong Reset Button on Ties," https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN06402140<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[5]</a> "Ukraine Parliament Removes Yanukovich, Who Flees Kiev in ‘Coup,’" https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-parliament-idINDEEA1L04L20140222<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[6]</a> "What are the Minsk Agreements on the Ukraine Conflict?" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-minsk-agreements-ukraine-conflict-2022-02-21/<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[7]</a> Vladimir Putin, "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[8]</a> "Putin Approved Concept of Russian Humanitarian Policy Abroad — Decree," https://tass.com/politics/1503075<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[9]</a> Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s Televised Address on Ukraine, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[10]</a> "Pentagon: Russia has Fully Withdrawn from Kyiv, Chernihiv," https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/06/pentagon-russia-withdraws-kyiv-chernihiv/<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[11]</a> Executive Order on Partial Mobilization in the Russian Federation, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/2<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[12]</a> "Ukraine ‘Referendums’: Full Results for Annexation Polls as Kremlin-backed Authorities Claim Victory," https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/27/occupied-areas-of-ukraine-vote-to-join-russia-in-referendums-branded-a-sham-by-the-west<a href="about:blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">[13]</a> "Signing of Treaties on Accession of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson Regions to Russia," http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465

What Are the Dimensions of Russia’s Policy Towards Ukraine?