Naema Alshamsi

As part of cooperation between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), special units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces participated in the "Eurasia Counterterrorism 2026" exercises, the final phase of which took place in Belarus on October 8, 2026. Units from China, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan also participated.The exercises focused on countering terrorist groups in the region, responding to drone attacks, protecting critical infrastructure and public gathering places, and sharing security and operational information. Iran’s participation forms part of its broader efforts to leverage its SCO <a href="https://tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/10/07/3717067/security-cooperation-main-goal-of-sco-anti-terror-drill-irgc-general?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">membership</a> to reduce its isolation, strengthen security ties with China and Russia, and exchange expertise about how to address domestic and regional security threats. It also helps advance the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Tehran.Implications of Iran’s ParticipationIran’s participation in SCO exercises holds several important political and security implications:1. The Significance of the Timing Amid Military Tensions with the United States and Israel: Iran’s participation in the "Eurasia Counterterrorism 2026" exercises took place against the backdrop of the ongoing <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">conflict</a> with the United States and the absence of a lasting settlement. It can also be viewed as an attempt by Tehran to demonstrate its ability to maintain security cooperation with China and Russia despite the economic pressures it faces.Iran’s involvement also sends an implicit message that it remains engaged in Asian security frameworks and continues to pursue multiple avenues of <a href="https://tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/10/07/3717067/security-cooperation-main-goal-of-sco-anti-terror-drill-irgc-general?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">foreign engagement</a>. This interpretation is consistent with the IRGC’s statement that strengthening security cooperation, combating terrorism, and exchanging expertise are among the main objectives of its participation. However, participation in joint exercises is not in itself sufficient evidence that China or Russia would be willing to intervene militarily in support of Iran.2. Leveraging SCO Membership to Reduce Isolation and Strengthen Iran’s International Presence: Tehran is seeking to <a href="https://tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/10/07/3717067/security-cooperation-main-goal-of-sco-anti-terror-drill-irgc-general?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">expand</a> its participation in multilateral security cooperation frameworks as a way to mitigate the effects of its isolation and resist the external pressures it is facing. To this end, it is seeking to diversify its partnerships and solidify its ties with major Asian powers.Iran previously hosted SCO counterterrorism exercises in 2025. Its latest participation therefore builds on Tehran’s earlier efforts to consolidate its position within the organization and use its membership to enhance its regional and international standing.3. Developing Security Capabilities and Benefiting from Operational Expertise: The exercises provided Iranian forces with an opportunity to exchange expertise with Chinese, Russian, and other participating units on protecting critical infrastructure, countering drone <a href="https://tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/10/07/3717067/security-cooperation-main-goal-of-sco-anti-terror-drill-irgc-general?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">attacks</a>, and improving their readiness to protect public gathering places from security threats. They also facilitated the exchange of operational information.4. Improving Responses to Domestic Security Threats: Tehran is seeking to use the expertise gained from the exercises to improve its response to domestic security threats by enhancing the capabilities of specialized units, strengthening coordination, and improving the effectiveness of security responses.These efforts are particularly relevant given the activities of terrorist groups in southeastern Iran and a series of recent security incidents. These include an <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/news/158333-police-officer-killed-in-armed-attack-on-checkpoint-in-rask/?" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">armed attack</a> on the Ahmadabad checkpoint in Rask on September 30, 2026, and an attack reportedly carried out by terrorists in the Roudmahi area of Zahedan on October 2, 2026, in which at least five members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade were <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/ar/202610029720" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">killed</a>.In addition, reports <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202611026283" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">indicated</a> that at least seven members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade were killed and others wounded in an attack targeting a school in the village of Pir, in the Kahir area of Konarak County, Sistan and Baluchestan Province, on November 2, 2026.5. Strengthening Ties with China and Russia to Expand Strategic Options: Iran’s participation reflects Tehran’s desire to strengthen <a href="https://tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/10/07/3717067/security-cooperation-main-goal-of-sco-anti-terror-drill-irgc-general?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">security relations</a> with China and Russia, thereby expanding its strategic options amid continued international pressure.The exercises provide opportunities for direct engagement between participating units and security agencies, in line with Iran’s stated objectives of strengthening security cooperation and combating terrorism.These contacts could also lay the groundwork for future security cooperation in the short to medium term. However, participation alone does not necessarily indicate that agreements have been reached on technology transfers or the development of joint military programs.The SCO is a framework for political, security, and economic cooperation rather than a defense alliance. Participation in its activities therefore does not entail direct military guarantees. Any potential support would therefore remain dependent on bilateral understandings, as well as the strategic calculations and interests of the countries concerned.Security ImplicationsIran’s participation in SCO exercises could have several implications for the future of its security cooperation with China:1. China Reaffirms Support for Iran’s Sovereignty and Security: During a meeting with Iranian Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Bagheri Kani on November 2, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202611/t20261103_12052648.html?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">support</a> for Iran’s efforts to safeguard its sovereignty and security.The meeting took place amid Chinese diplomatic efforts to expand Beijing’s presence in the Middle East, against a backdrop of ongoing regional tensions and the repercussions of the U.S.-Iran war.For his part, Bagheri Kani expressed Iran’s hope that China would play a greater role in promoting peace at both the regional and international levels. This suggests that Tehran is eager for closer diplomatic coordination with Beijing on regional security issues.2. Potential for Expanded Security Cooperation and Information Sharing: Iran’s participation in SCO exercises could help promote stronger channels of communication between the <a href="https://cisatc.org/en/sovmestnye-antiterroristicheskie-ucheniya-kompetentnykh-organov-gosudarstv-uchastnikov-sng" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">relevant agencies</a> in China and Iran, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism and addressing cross-border threats.These interactions could pave the way for discussions on further training activities or broader institutional cooperation in the future.However, any move toward sharing more sensitive intelligence would depend on the level of mutual trust between the two countries, the bilateral understandings they reach, and their respective security calculations. Such an outcome cannot be assumed on the basis of participation in the exercises alone.3. Using the Comprehensive Cooperation Plan to Strengthen Security Relations: The 25-year comprehensive cooperation plan signed by Iran and China in March 2021 could provide a political <a href="https://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202103/t20210329_9130479.htm?utm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">framework</a> for expanding bilateral relations across a number of areas, including economic and cultural cooperation.Iran’s decision to exempt Chinese commercial vessels from the restrictions it has imposed on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz also appears consistent with Tehran’s <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/iran-challenges-us-naval-blockade-by-granting-china-and-3-other-countries-passage/p40q1dm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">efforts</a> to coordinate more closely with Beijing on regional security issues.Such coordination could help advance the shared interests of both countries and promote broader economic and trade ties, particularly in the energy sector and maritime trade.4. Prospects for Expanding Technical Cooperation and Protecting Critical Infrastructure: Participation in the exercises provides opportunities for Iran and China to explore expanded technical cooperation, particularly in protecting critical infrastructure and countering drone attacks.These developments fit into a broader context of bilateral cooperation. The two countries have previously announced an agreement to expand cooperation in cybersecurity, science, and technology, while Tehran has expressed interest in <a href="https://cisatc.org/en/sovmestnye-antiterroristicheskie-ucheniya-kompetentnykh-organov-gosudarstv-uchastnikov-sng" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">drawing on</a> Chinese expertise and technology.Nevertheless, any expansion of cooperation into sensitive technologies would be dependent on bilateral understandings, Beijing’s political and commercial calculations, and the restrictions governing the transfer and use of specific technologies.5. China Likely to Maintain a Cautious Approach Toward Iran: Despite the opportunities to strengthen security cooperation with Iran, Beijing may remain cautious about expanding military ties with Tehran, given its <a href="https://www.arabnews.jp/en/opinion/china-between-the-gulf-and-iran-177022" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">economic interests</a> with Gulf countries and its interest in maintaining stable energy supplies and maritime traffic.Providing direct military support to Tehran could also heighten tensions with the United States, potentially undermining other Chinese interests.Beijing may therefore prefer to expand cooperation in multilateral security frameworks and technical fields while continuing to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/11/02/beijing-launches-diplomatic-flurry-amid-threat-renewed-us-war-with-iran/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">efforts to de-escalate</a> tensions between Iran and the United States.This approach would allow China to preserve its relations with Tehran while staying out of any bilateral defense commitments or becoming directly involved in the confrontation between Iran and the United States and Israel.ConclusionOverall, Iran’s participation in SCO exercises reflects Tehran’s efforts to consolidate its position within Asian security frameworks amid its ongoing military conflict with the United States and Israel and growing domestic security challenges, particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan Province.Politically, the exercises demonstrate that Iran is continuing to engage in security cooperation with China and Russia despite Western pressure. At the operational level, they provide opportunities to develop security capabilities and exchange information and expertise.Iran’s participation in these exercises could also help deepen Iran-China security ties within the framework of their comprehensive partnership. However, any move toward more advanced forms of military cooperation would depend on Beijing’s strategic calculations, particularly its efforts to balance relations with Tehran against its interests with Gulf countries and the United States.

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