Dr. Mohammad Salami‏‏

In August 2021, following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban returned to power. However, Russia was not worried about this development: It did not close its embassy in Afghanistan ​and was the third country (after Pakistan and Turkmenistan) to accept Taliban-appointed diplomats. As Russian President Vladimir Putin <a href="https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/world/20240529/relationships-with-the-taliban-movement-must-be-built-based-on-reality-says-putin" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">said</a>, relations with the Taliban "must be established somehow—these are the people who control the country and its territory."Although Russia’s Supreme Court classified the Taliban as a terrorist organization in 2003, Russia is now considering removing the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations. It&nbsp;<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-invites-afghanistans-taliban-major-economic-forum-2024-05-27/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">invited</a> the Taliban to participate in an international economic forum in St. Petersburg and has included the Taliban in regional negotiations in Central Asia.Moscow would like to see international recognition of the Taliban from the United Nations, which would lend the current Afghan government greater legitimacy. In the meantime, Russia will still move ahead in including the Taliban in its regional plans for Central Asia.Diplomatic InroadsOn 27 May 2024, at the beginning of his fifth presidential term, Putin embarked on a third visit to Uzbekistan. Moscow sees Tashkent as a valuable economic and political partner. During the visit, the two countries decided to increase trade volume to 30 billion USD and to&nbsp;<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/russia-to-build-central-asias-first-nuclear-power-plant-in-uzbekistan/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">establish</a>&nbsp;a joint investment fund of 500 million USD to finance projects in Uzbekistan. Key bilateral initiatives include cooperation on bringing Russian gas to Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan, and constructing a small nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan.In addition to developing economic relations through this trip, Russia also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cw44g70zwq9o" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">intends</a> to bolster Afghanistan’s standing on the world stage through its ties with Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan, which neighbors Afghanistan, has good relations with the Taliban, unlike countries such as Tajikistan. Moscow and Tashkent have almost the same stance towards the Taliban government. This has provided opportunities to encourage other Central Asian countries to adopt a similar openness in engaging with the Taliban.Many Central Asian countries have been suspicious of or cautious towards Afghanistan under Taliban rule. This is due to key challenges such as the cultivation of narcotics, refugee problems, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, and instability. However, almost all Central Asian countries have started engaging with the Taliban, even if they have not officially recognized the government.All Central Asian countries have accepted Taliban-appointed representatives in their Afghan embassies and consulates. Most recently, on 17 April 2023, Kazakhstan <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-accredits-taliban-envoys-without-recognizing-government" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">agreed to Taliban-appointed diplomatic representation</a> in the Afghan embassy in Astana. Kazakhstan also plans to open a business liaison office in Kabul, while a foreign ministry spokesperson announced that Kazakhstan intended to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-taliban-afghanistan-terrorist-groups/32752347.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">remove</a> the Taliban from its list of banned organizations. Even Tajikistan, which has given shelter to Ahmad Massoud, the Taliban’s most prominent opponent, and has declared the Taliban a terrorist organization, has still <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-taliban-take-control-of-consulate" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">allowed</a> the Taliban to appoint representatives to the Afghan consulate in the Tajik city of Khorog, which is located on the border between the two countries.Russian InfluenceDespite developing political and economic relations between Central Asia and Afghanistan, progress in building these ties remains slow. Central Asia is more concerned about the security situation caused by the chaos within Afghanistan than it is with benefiting from commercial interests. Russia understands this and has used its regional clout to push Central Asia to further engage with the Taliban.Russia sees Central Asia as its backyard and has considerable influence in various countries in the region. The chaotic situation caused by the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan has given Moscow greater security and military influence over Central Asia.Moscow has a military presence in many Central Asian countries, including military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and an anti-ballistic missile testing range in Kazakhstan. Tajikistan is directly exposed to security pressures from the conflict in Afghanistan and is also a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance consisting of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Belarus. Following the recent developments in Afghanistan, Russia <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-complex-afghan-diplomacy-prioritises-its-central-asian-interests" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">moved</a> its forces to the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border and announced that the CSTO was ready to use all its military power to back Tajikistan if the situation in Afghanistan worsened.The CSTO has enabled broader Russian involvement in member countries, and Afghanistan’s instability provides the additional <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/the-strategic-logic-of-russias-embrace-of-the-taliban/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">justification</a> of counter-terrorism efforts for expanded Russian military and security cooperation with these countries. Russia’s cross-border military-intelligence activities have also been used to explain Moscow’s involvement in military conflicts with non-CSTO countries, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.In addition, Russia has used Afghanistan as leverage for greater involvement in Central Asian countries through signing bilateral defense, security, and military agreements. On 27 April, after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Tajikistan, an agreement was <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/russia-central-asian-states-worry-about-instability-in-afghanistan/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">signed</a> to create joint air defense systems. This was clearly due to Russia recognizing the potential threat that Afghanistan posed to Tajikistan. On the same day, the Russian minister had visited&nbsp;Uzbekistan; it was announced that the two countries’ defense ministries had developed a strategic partnership plan for 2021-2025.By adopting a multilateral approach, Russia can provide the groundwork for wider Afghan engagement in Central Asia through the alliances it has already established. These include the CSTO; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (in which most Central Asian countries have either member or dialogue partner status, and Afghanistan has been an observer country); the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); and the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, which has included <a href="https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&amp;level=3&amp;ls_id=10028&amp;lid=6393" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">five rounds</a> with Afghanistan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These initiatives collectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-and-the-taliban-heres-why-putin-wants-to-get-closer-to-afghanistans-current-rulers-227287" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">provide</a> opportunities for Russia to exert pressure on Central Asian countries to engage more with the Taliban.At the national strategy level, Russia aims to integrate Afghanistan into Central Asia with the help of other countries in the region. The new Russian foreign policy concept adopted in March <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/the-strategic-logic-of-russias-embrace-of-the-taliban/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">emphasizes</a> Afghanistan as vital for ensuring peace and stability in Central Asia. This March 2024 policy document refers to "the establishment of the broad Greater Eurasian Partnership integration contour" and focuses on building a stable Afghanistan and prioritizing the integration of Afghanistan "into the Eurasian space for cooperation."Russia’s international isolation after its invasion of Ukraine, including the lack of Central Asian backing for the Russian invasion, has spurred Moscow to pursue closer relations with the Taliban. To this end, Russia intends to integrate Afghanistan into Central Asian infrastructural and commercial projects in order to provide a basis for broader Taliban involvement in the international community. However, the reluctance of other Central Asian countries remains an obstacle, and Moscow will need to evaluate how it might utilize incentives or exert further pressure to bring Central Asia countries in line with its regional goals.

How is Russia Developing its Ties with Taliban?