Ammar Yasin

On January 3, 2026, the United States carried out an exceptional military operation that resulted in the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who was then transferred to the United States and brought before a federal court in Manhattan. He faces charges of "heading an illegitimate government that for decades exploited its authority to protect and promote illegal activities, including drug trafficking," according to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/05/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-new-york-court" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">indictment</a>.This episode—and the rapid conclusion of a major oil agreement between Washington and Caracas that followed—has begun to reshape key aspects of relations between the United States under President Donald Trump and Latin American states. It is therefore an opportune moment to look more closely at the emerging contours of U.S. policy toward the region, as well as the broader implications of these developments and their potential impact on China’s presence in Latin America.Washington’s StrategyThe new approach adopted by President Trump toward Latin America since the beginning of 2026 reflects several notable shifts, most prominently the following:1. Trump’s Revival of the Monroe Doctrine: Speaking to reporters on the morning of Maduro’s arrest, President Trump said the operation formed part of a revival of a U.S. political vision dating back nearly 200 years, historically known as the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine was named after former U.S. President James Monroe, who in 1823 inaugurated a policy of opposing European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.Trump has now revived the concept, claiming the United States would pursue what he called the "<a href="https://time.com/7343795/trump-venezuela-monroe-doctrine-history/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Donroe Doctrine</a>"—in reference to himself—arguing that Venezuela under Maduro had hosted what he described as "foreign enemies." Trump further stated that he would not allow threats to "U.S. security," indicating that Washington may be entering a new era in its approach to the region’s most pressing issues.2. Trump Signaling Possible Military Intervention in Mexico: Trump sparked renewed controversy following Maduro’s arrest by stating: "Something must be done about Mexico; then no one will question American dominance in the Western Hemisphere again."The remark opened the door to the possibility of renewed U.S. intervention, albeit in a form different from the Venezuelan case. Washington might consider direct security support, including the deployment of personnel or military assets to bolster Mexican efforts against narcotics trafficking, crime, and migration.Any such measures are likely to encounter substantial domestic resistance in Mexico and would be viewed with deep suspicion regarding U.S. intentions, particularly given the progress reportedly achieved by President Claudia Sheinbaum on those issues. Moreover, the prospect of Washington resorting to unilateral "<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/perspectives-on-the-us-mexico-relationship-what-next/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">law-enforcement operations</a>" inside Mexican territory would almost certainly have implications for the future of the USMCA.3. Political Shifts in Latin America Driving Washington Toward Greater Engagement: Several domestic political developments across Latin America prior to the U.S. operation in Venezuela have appeared to favor Washington’s new regional strategy. These include the removal of the left from power in Bolivia after more than two decades, the election in Chile of a far-right candidate described as a supporter of former dictator Augusto Pinochet, and right-wing victories in Argentina and Honduras.These latter two election results followed reports of direct and explicit intervention by President Trump, who made public appeals to voters in both contests. Collectively, these developments created <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/01/latin-america-trump-left-imperialism" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">political momentum</a> that encouraged the United States to pursue deeper engagement in Latin America compared with the previous period.4. Washington Seeks to Reduce Beijing’s Regional Role: Strategic competition between the United States and China—alongside Washington’s effort to reassert its military presence in Latin America—has increasingly drawn many Latin American and Caribbean countries into that rivalry.Since the publication of the <a href="https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/2026-outlook-china-latin-america/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">U.S. National Security Strategy</a> on December 4, 2025, Washington’s position has become more explicit, viewing the Western Hemisphere as falling within America’s sphere of influence. This naturally encourages efforts to curb Chinese influence.At the same time, U.S. monitoring of elections in countries such as Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, and Chile during 2025 demonstrated that relations with Beijing had become a central political issue in domestic discourse across several Latin American states. This is likely to push Washington toward exterting increased pressure on China’s regional footprint.In this context, estimates by the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University suggest that one of the defining features of the current phase is a <a href="https://dialogue.earth/en/energy/minerals-evs-and-us-tensions-what-next-for-china-and-latin-america-in-2026/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">contraction</a> in Chinese financing to the region. Chinese lending—particularly from the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China—has declined after peaking in the mid-2010s.In recent years, the volume of new loans has remained limited, despite a modest rebound in 2024. While this decline does not imply that Chinese financing is evaporating or that China is withdrawing from Latin America, it nonetheless presents an opportunity for the United States to expand its engagement across the region.Potential ImplicationsThe tactical shifts underpinning the new U.S. approach toward Latin America are likely to entail a number of consequences, most notably the following:1. U.S. Military Intervention in Mexico Remains Unlikely: Mexico and the United States maintain a far closer relationship than Washington historically did with Venezuela. Bilateral ties are rooted in deep economic integration, particularly after Mexico became the largest export market for the United States in 2025, in addition to cooperation across multiple areas of strategic overlap.This makes it unlikely that Washington would resort to military or quasi-military options in Mexico during the coming years, despite President Donald Trump’s continued preference for what he has framed as the "Donroe Doctrine," under which core U.S. interests override other competing considerations. Trump also appears to retain a firm belief that both Venezuela and Mexico are principal exporters of the same two core challenges facing the United States: <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-wants-to-send-troops-into-mexico-the-land-grab-of-the-mexican-american-war-makes-this-politically-untenable-273767" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">migration and narcotics trafficking</a>.2. Accelerating U.S. Pressure on Cuba: Cuba presents a markedly different case for Washington in several respects. The country continues to suffer from the effects of long-standing sanctions and an overall environment of strangulation. This is compounded by a prolonged economic deterioration, severe electricity shortages, and a large-scale exodus that exceeds previous migration waves seen in the 1980s.Even so, the apparent objective of the United States does not seem to be forcing the government of President Miguel Díaz-Canel into surrender. This is evidenced by the continued arrival of oil shipments from Mexico, which currently account for roughly 40% of Cuba’s oil supply. In this context, the emerging U.S. strategy appears primarily aimed at <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/01/latin-america-trump-left-imperialism" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">intensifying pressure</a> on Havana in order to extract greater flexibility in negotiations.3. Washington Awaits Internal Shifts in Colombia: Colombia was among the Latin American states explicitly threatened by Trump following the ouster of Maduro. Given that Colombian President Gustavo Petro has not achieved the same electoral successes or political accomplishments associated with former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez during his first decade in power, and has only been in office for a short time, U.S. threats toward Colombia are more likely intended as a form of psychological pressure.The objective appears to be encouraging Bogotá to adopt a policy of strategic distance from any future escalation involving Washington. This is particularly relevant as Colombia is scheduled to hold presidential elections in May 2026. Iván Cepeda, an ally of Petro, is expected to run against a right-wing candidate strongly favored by Washington: <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/01/latin-america-trump-left-imperialism" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Abelardo de la Espriella</a>. U.S. expectations reportedly center on a strong first-round performance by De la Espriella, followed by hopes of victory in a runoff against Cepeda.4. Diverging Latin American Responses to the New U.S. Policy: Maduro’s arrest triggered broad divisions across Latin America, including in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Some political actors do not oppose Washington’s new regional posture and view it as a form of "calibrated intervention," while others regard it as evidence of an expansionist policy that began with Venezuela and could extend to an open-ended list of regional states.As a result, divergent responses to U.S. policy are likely to persist, reflecting enduring ideological splits between left and right. On one side of the political spectrum, Trump’s move in Venezuela was denounced by several leftist leaders in the region, including Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Even Chilean President Gabriel Boric, who in general&nbsp;has sought to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/world/americas/latin-america-venezuela-us-raid-maduro-polls.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">distance himself</a> from other socialist governments in the region, strongly condemned the U.S. military operation.At the same time, many Latin American governments are likely to move beyond <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/world/americas/latin-america-venezuela-us-raid-maduro-polls.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">older ideological loyalties</a> in favor of pragmatism, particularly to avoid direct confrontation with Trump. This is especially relevant given Washington’s current preference for resolving outstanding disputes either through rapid deal-making or military escalation. Trump has repeatedly stressed that the issue of confronting what he describes as "drug and weapons gangs" in the region remains unresolved.ConclusionUltimately, President Donald Trump’s growing involvement in Latin America is raising the political stakes for the U.S. administration. In this context, any unsuccessful American attempt to replicate the "Venezuela model" elsewhere could backfire, potentially pushing Washington to rethink its regional policy and reduce its footprint.This is particularly significant as left-wing movements across Latin America may seek to capitalize politically on the current environment in upcoming elections scheduled for 2026, framing their campaigns around the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Expected Trends in U.S. Policy Toward Latin America