InterRegional for Strategic Analysis

Interregional for Strategic Analysis held a panel discussion entitled "Tehran's Vision: How Does Iran Deal with the Escalation in the Gaza Strip?", featuring Dr. Mohamed Abbas Nagi, Editor-in-Chief of the Iranian Selections Journal issued by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. The panel discussed the most important policies adopted by Iran in dealing with the war in Gaza, in addition to the opportunities and threats it faced, and future scenarios in Iran's foreign policy.Key TrendsFirst off, Dr. Mohamed Abbas Nagi reviewed a number of key trends in Iranian foreign policy towards the war in Gaza, as follows:1- Tehran distancing itself from Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood": Iran was keen, from the first moments of Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood", to deny its involvement in the operation and its prior knowledge of it, stressing that the operation was fully planned by Hamas. The Iranian Supreme Leader highlighted this matter about a month after the operation on November 15, 2023, during his meeting with the movement's delegation that visited Tehran.2- Avoiding engagement in a direct confrontation: Iran did not engage in any direct military confrontations after the war it fought against Iraq in the 1980s, explaining that it now prefers the proxy war model, especially in dealing with Israel or the United States, with the exception of some cases in which it was forced to respond directly.3- Maintaining a degree of continuous coordination with the United States: Despite the escalation in the region as a result of the war in Gaza, Iran has pressured its proxies to control the scope of escalation with the United States and Israel, adding that even the attacks launched by Iran against Israel in April 2024 in response to the targeting of the Iranian consulate in Damascus were coordinated with the United States. This stems from Tehran's desire to avoid triggering a violent military response from Israel.Elites' PositionsThe stances of Iranian political elites regarding the war in Gaza, and the extent of their agreement on the country's foreign policy on this issue can be reviewed as follows:&nbsp;1- Elites' agreement on the Supreme Leader's position on the "Al-Aqsa Flood": Iranian foreign policy positions are usually the subject of intense controversy among various political elites in Iran. This stems from differing positions and calculations among key political institutions. However, they all agreed with the Supreme Leader's statements of denying Iran’s involvement in the operation.2- Increasing divisions over potential alternatives to prevent direct conflict: The consensus among Iranian elites regarding the necessity of avoiding involvement in a direct war does not negate the existence of major differences in the positions of these elites regarding the options that Tehran can alternatively adopt. There are two trends in this context, first of which sees the policy of "proxy war" as the best mechanism through which Iran’s interests can be promoted abroad, along with protecting its stability and national cohesion at home. The other trend doubts that proxy wars are ideal for promoting Iranian interests in the region, for its many negative repercussions.3- Growing discontent over militia support draining Iranian resources: Some liberal forces in Iran, as well as Iranian opposition forces abroad, believe that supporting armed militias in the region has contributed to draining Iranian resources, which has played a role in exacerbating the impact of US sanctions, escalating the country's economic crisis, rising local currency exchange rate, spreading unemployment rates, and declining oil exports.4- Rising concerns of Western sanctions against Tehran: There are growing concerns inside Iran about the expansion of Western sanctions imposed on Tehran, and their direct repercussions on Iranian citizens, whether these sanctions are related to Iran's foreign policies and its proxy activities, or sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear program.Iranian GainsTehran initially succeeded in leveraging "Al-Aqsa Flood" and some consequences of the Gaza war to enhance its gains, as follows:1- Exposing Israel's security flaws: The "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation revealed significant weaknesses in Israel's security system, highlighting various intelligence and security gaps. This damaged Israel's regional reputation as a major military power, benefiting Iran, as Israel poses a key threat to it.2- Reduced Israeli Focus on Iran: Israel's involvement in the Gaza war distracted its attention from Iran's regional ambitions and its nuclear program, even if only temporarily.3- Advancing Iran's Nuclear Program: Iran took advantage of the international and regional focus on the Gaza war and the escalation in the Red Sea to continue developing its nuclear program. A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in February 2024, indicated that Iran's uranium enrichment levels had reached 27 times the amount stipulated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), warning of the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program.4- Demonstrating Threats to Western Interests in the Red Sea: One of the most significant consequences of the ongoing war in Gaza was Iran’s ability to demonstrate its capacity to threaten Western interests in the region, particularly through the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen, which posed threats to international maritime navigation in the Red Sea.Negative ConsequencesDespite the opportunities presented by the Gaza war for Iran to enhance its interests, there were also negative consequences for Iranian interests that stemmed from the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation and the Gaza war, which he explained as follows:1- Direct military engagement with Israel: For the first time, Iran directly launched military strikes against Israel in response to Israel's attack on its consulate in Syria, which Tehran considered an attack on its territory. Israel deliberately provoked this to expose Iran's deterrence strategy and assess its reactions.Iran’s counterstrike revealed gaps in Iran's air defense system, as Israel was able to target a radar in the Shakari base, part of the air defense system protecting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. This was seen as an indication of Israel's capability to reach key nuclear sites in Iran.2- Heightened tensions with Western powers: Besides the existing tensions between Iran and Western powers over Iran's nuclear and missile programs, as well as its military support for Russia in the Ukraine war, the Gaza war exacerbated these tensions to their peak.3- Deterioration of Iran's deterrence strategy: The recent escalation between Israel and Iran failed to inflict significant damage or casualties on Israel, while Israel's counterattack on Isfahan exposed the deterioration of Iran's 40-year-old deterrence strategy, ultimately failing its primary goal.Potential TrajectoriesIn light of the above, there are some possible trajectories in Iran's foreign policy towards the region, including:1- Possible air weapons deals with allies: Direct escalation between Iran and Israel during the Gaza war revealed significant security gaps in Iran's air force. Some reports suggested that Iran might strike arms deals with allies like Russia and China to address this gap, with reports indicating that Moscow could send Russian Su-35 fighters to Tehran.2- Continuing tensions with European countries: It is highly likely that the current escalation in relations between Iran and Western countries will continue to dominate relations in the coming period, particularly with the involvement of European countries like the UK and France in countering Iran's attacks on Israel, the issue of dual nationals facing imprisonment in Iran, and continued military support for Russia in the Ukraine war. However, a nuclear deal could be the only factor to change this trajectory.3- Unlikely revival of the nuclear deal before the U.S. elections: The participants ruled out the possibility of a new nuclear deal with Iran in the near term, especially before the upcoming US presidential elections in November 2024, noting that the current US administration has only five months left, a short time frame for significant progress on the nuclear issue. Even if Trump were to return to the White House, it remains possible that Tehran and Washington could reach a new nuclear agreement, with Iran's hardline factions likely having a stronger ability to broker such a deal.In a similar vein, the participants did not rule out the possibility that the Iranian Supreme Leader might retract the fatwa on possessing nuclear weapons, especially given its flexibility. He suggested this could either be through issuing a new fatwa or canceling it entirely, as the current fatwa has proven ineffective, particularly in light of Iran's deterrence mechanism being exposed and eroded, with all Iran-backed militias in the region, and even Iran itself, being subjected to attacks.4- Continued support for proxy militias: The current economic crisis in Iran, driven by Western sanctions, would not significantly affect the functioning of the militias it supports. Tehran had helped these militias secure their own funding resources, without relying exclusively on financial support from Iran, through taxes and smuggling.5- Rising influence of the fundamentalist conservative faction in foreign policy: The participants expected that fundamentalists and hardliners will continue to dominate the political scene, and the balance of power currently favors their faction, which already dominates the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament).Finally, the participants emphasized that the most significant development would be the rise of "radicals" who adopt a hardline stance towards nuclear negotiations, reject concessions to the international community and Western powers, and oppose working with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as cooperation with this group would impose restrictions on Iran's support for armed militias in the region.

How Does Iran Deal with Escalation in Gaza? (Panel Discussion)