On 5 February 2025, InterRegional for Strategic Analysis held a discussion panel on "The Case of Pristina: The Reality and Future of Political Stability in Kosovo." The panel featured Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, head of research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), where he is team leader of the work package for online and offline (de)radicalization as part of the EU’s PAVE project (Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism through Community Resilience in the Western Balkans and the MENA) project. The discussion panel highlighted key developments in Kosovo’s political and electoral spheres and the political and security dynamics during the 9 February 2025 elections for the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. In these elections, the party of current Prime Minister Albin Kurti—Vetëvendosje ("the self-determination movement")—came in first with about 41 percent of the vote. However, this does not give this democratic socialist party a majority in the Assembly.

Political Implications

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections have been seen as a crucial political turning point, not only because they came at a decisive moment for the internal stability of the country, but also because they constituted an opportunity to determine Kosovo’s political and economic trajectory going forward. This was particularly important in light of escalating tensions with Serbia. The February 2025 elections marked the first time since Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 that the Assembly completed its full four-year mandate, which reflects a significant improvement in the country’s political system following a period of upheaval and successive changes in government. In this regard, Dr. Ramadan Ilazi discussed various circumstances pertaining to Kosovo’s electoral and political situation, including the following points:

1- For the first time since independence, Kosovo held elections after its Assembly completed a full four-year term: Ilazi affirmed that these Assembly elections were of particular importance because they marked the first time since Kosovo’s independence in 2008 that elections had been held after the Assembly completed its full mandate. Previous Assembly elections had usually been held as the result of the collapse of the government or premature resignations.

The current government led by Albin Kurti is the first in the country’s history to have completed its full mandate of four years after Vetëvendosje won 50 percent of the vote in the 2021 Assembly elections. Ilazi also noted that Kosovo’s most recent elections were well-organized and set an example for the region to follow.

2- Kosovo’s Assembly uses a system of open-list proportional representation: Ilazi clarified that Kosovo’s elections were held using a system of multi-member electoral districts, which means that the country as a whole is considered a single constituency. The open-list proportional representation system has an electoral threshold of 5 percent. In other words, a party must receive at least 5 percent of the total votes in order to win a seat in Kosovo’s Assembly.

Ilazi added that people essentially vote for a single party, although it is possible to choose up to ten candidates from the same party. These candidate choices cannot be affiliated with different parties. He noted that Kosovo’s Assembly has 120 seats, of which 20 are reserved for national minorities, with the Albanian majority parties competing for the other 100 seats.

3- Major and new parties vied for Assembly seats: Ilazi noted that five major Albanian-led parties competed in Kosovo’s Assembly elections for 100 seats. These parties included Vetëvendosje, which is led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, and which first ran in elections in 2010 and grew out of the Kosova Action Network (KAN), a grassroots group that had advocated for Kosovo’s right to self-determination. KAN had also criticized the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which governed Kosovo from 1999 to 2008.

Other parties that ran in the 2025 elections included the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), led by Bedri Hamza, former governor of the Central Bank of Kosovo and current mayor of South Mitrovica; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Lumir Abdixhiku, who represents the young political class that arose after changes in leadership in 2021; and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by Ramush Haradinaj, former prime minister and a former commander in the Kosovo Liberation Army.

4- Security and relations with Serbia were among voters’ top concerns: Ilazi indicated that security affairs and ties with Serbia were priority issues for voters in Kosovo. He said that the ruling party had made these issues the center of their campaign, and had focused particularly on policies that reaffirmed Kosovo’s sovereignty, especially in the north. Meanwhile, the opposition focused primarily on economic issues, healthcare, education, and the diplomatic isolation Kosovo has weathered.

Ilazi added that votes from diaspora communities are a significant factor in Kosovo elections, since voters living abroad tends to support nationalist policies and prefer that the government take a more severe stance towards Serbia. However, critics of the government argue that it has not achieved sufficient progress in spheres beyond the north, and that the government’s policies have led to deteriorating foreign relations for Kosovo.

5- The ruling party is likely to fail to achieve an absolute majority: Ilazi said that he expected voter turnout in the Assembly elections to be lower, which is a crucial factor for results. He predicted that this low turnout would have negative consequences for the ruling Vetëvendosje party. Although opinion polls indicate that the party is still in the lead and indeed captured more than 40 percent of the vote in some polls, none of this indicates that Vetëvendosje will secure an absolute majority, as was the case in 2021.

At the international level, Ilazi observed that it was unclear to what extent the government’s foreign policies shaped voter behavior, especially in light of growing fears about deteriorating ties with the US and EU. This is particularly true in light of recent statements by US officials who expressed a lack of confidence in Prime Minister Albin Kurti.

Security Dimensions

Kosovo has faced a variety of complex security and political challenges that significantly shape its current electoral space. These challenges include ongoing tensions with Serbia, diplomatic and economic crises, and internal issues linked to demographic changes and government policies. These issues are seen as pivotal in molding Kosovo’s political future and its internal stability. The next government will need to grapple with these challenges and find solutions that contribute to strengthening sovereignty and achieving lasting stability in the country. Ilazi highlighted the following issues in particular:

1- Kosovo faces growing demographic challenges: According to Ilazi, Kosovo is facing profound demographic challenges that will significantly impact the country’s political and economic stability. The 2024 national census indicated that Kosovo’s population had fallen from 1.8 million to 1.6 million people as a result of major demographic shifts. Albanians comprise 90 percent of the country’s population, followed by Serbs and other minorities such as Bosniaks, Turks, Iranians, and Romani. This has exacerbated ethnic tensions and contributed to the complex political circumstances in Kosovo. With regard to religion, 93 percent of Kosovo’s population is Muslim, while Orthodox Christians and Catholics each make up 2 percent of the population. The Catholic community in Kosovo is mostly comprised of ethnic Albanians or Croats.

This religious and ethnic diversity has shaped complex social and political dynamics in Kosovo and made it more difficult to manage this diversity and promote peaceful coexistence among different segments of society. In addition, the unemployment rate has risen to 10 percent while the average income has fallen to around 600 dollars per month. These are some of the economic factors that have exacerbated social challenges. The lack of demographic stability has obstructed sustainable development in many critical sectors, including education, health, and economic development, and could threaten Kosovo’s long-term stability.

2- Pristina has adopted oppressive policies against Kosovo Serbs: Ilazi stated that the 2021 elections had resulted in a major political shift in Kosovo in which traditional parties had been replaced by Vetëvendosje, which won a historic 50 percent of the vote. This marked the first time that a political party in Kosovo had won an outright majority. After this victory, the government adopted hardline policies that had a significant impact on the Serb-majority North Kosovo region.

One of the first steps that the government took was to ban Serbian-issued vehicle license plates, which Kosovo saw as a critical step in preserving its own sovereignty. These stringent policies led to the mass resignation of Kosovo Serbs from government institutions in November 2022, which in turn produced a security vacuum. Following the resignation of mayors, local elections were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs, which meant that the mayors of Albanian origin who were elected in their place had weak electoral support. Despite opposition from the international community, the government of Kosovo insisted on confirming these mayors at the municipal level, a move which exacerbated tensions between Kosovo and both the EU and US.

3- The EU has imposed restrictive measures on Kosovo: Ilazi indicated that the EU and US have imposed restrictive measures on the government of Kosovo, including suspending high-level visits between Kosovo and the EU. No such visits have occurred during the past two years. The EU also withheld financial support and halted official dialogue with Kosovo in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). In addition, Washington excluded Kosovo from NATO military exercises in 2023. These steps were taken because the EU and US did not consider the government of Kosovo to be a reliable partner in the international community.

Ilazi stated that these restrictive measures had a very negative effect on Kosovo’s economy, with financial losses estimated around 600 million euros over the past two years. He added that Kosovo had failed to obtain new international recognition or to join other global organizations, which had deepened its diplomatic isolation.

Ilazi continued that Kosovo had not been able to join the Council of Europe as a result of the government’s refusal to comply with conditions set for joining. These conditions included establishing a Community of Serb Municipalities in order to grant Serbs in Kosovo a greater degree of autonomy in some regions. As a result, Kosovo was unable to join the Council, and became further politically isolated as tensions with the EU rose.

4- Kosovo has struggled with international recognition since its independence: According to Ilazi, Kosovo has worked hard to establish internal sovereignty over all its territories, including Serb-majority North Kosovo. This region is a key stumbling block for international recognition of Kosovo, because Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent country and considers North Kosovo to be party of Serbian territory.

Major powers such as Russia and China as well as EU member states have refused to recognize Kosovo, the main justification for which is the Serbian presence in North Kosovo. These countries believe that the stability of the region depends upon reaching a final settlement with Serbia, which continues to complicate the process of international recognition for Kosovo.

Although Kosovo has been recognized by more than 100 states, including the US and some EU member states, the refusal of other major powers to recognize it remains an obstacle to joining the EU and other international organizations. This has continued to heighten Kosovo’s diplomatic isolation at the international level.

With regard to the potential for Kosovo to normalize relations with Serbia, Ilazi observed that since 2011 the EU has facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. This has produced more than 35 agreements, most notably the Brussels Agreement of 2013 and the Ohrid Agreement of 2023. These agreements have sought to integrate North Kosovo within Kosovo’s legal framework.

However, a key issue that remains to be addressed in these agreements is the establishment of a Community of Serb Municipalities, a step that the ruling party in Kosovo opposes. The party feels that this could produce a semi-autonomous entity within Kosovo, similar to what has occurred with Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo ruled that this mechanism would need to be implemented in such a way as would not harm the central government. This has made it difficult to implement these agreements and complicated the political situation and the question of international recognition.

5- Security unrest and ethnic conflict escalates in Kosovo: Ilazi stated that there had been heightened instability in Kosovo, especially during the past three years. In September 2023, an armed attack resulted in the killing of a police officer in Kosovo. The attackers were linked to Serbs and wanted to undermine regional stability and provoke an international response. The EU and US both condemned the attack as a terrorist act and Kosovo accused Serbia of having been directly involved. For its part, Serbia had sent forces near the border with Kosovo.

Ilazi also indicated that in November 2024, a plot to attack critical infrastructure in Kosovo was foiled. A blast occurred in a canal and could have created a severe crisis, because this canal provides water to the country’s main power plants and is also a source of drinking water. This incident demonstrates the scope of ongoing security tensions that Kosovo faces.

In this regard, Ilazi highlighted that there was still a NATO presence in Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which serves as a deterrent against any potential Serbian military activity and contributes to mitigating military escalation in the region.

Future Trends

As the main speaker on the panel, Ilazi outlined the potential implications of Kosovo’s domestic and foreign policy trajectory, including the following points:

1- Kosovo is headed for political stalemate after its most recent elections: It is projected that the results of the most recent Assembly elections in Kosovo will reshape the country’s political scene. Complex challenges lie ahead with regard to forming the government and the extent to which it can achieve stability. According to current data, it is unlikely that Vetëvendosje can achieve a victory that will allow it to form a single government. This means there are two main possible scenarios: either the party will need to negotiate to form a political coalition with non-Serbian minority parties, or it will face a political impasse that could lead to a deadlocked political process. This could disrupt the work of governmental institutions and limit the ability of these institutions to carry out necessary policies.

In light of growing international pressures, forming a coalition government between the ruling party and the opposition is the most acceptable outcome, especially with regard to reaching consensus solutions to pending issues such as the Community of Serb Municipalities. A failure to reach a balanced political accord could open the door to an opposition-led government, even though this remains the least likely outcome. If none of these scenarios are successful, continuing political stalemate could produce internal political challenges.

2- It is unlikely that Serbia and Kosovo will reach a lasting agreement: Ilazi also noted that the chances of reaching a permanent agreement between Serbia and Kosovo remain slim. This is due to the lack of a clear definition of what normalization between the two countries would look like. Each side has divergent interpretations of what normalization means. In addition, the EU’s stance on the issue is shaped by internal political shifts in its member states, as some far-right parties such as Alternative for Germany and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France are sympathetic to Serbia. This could make it difficult for the EU to reach a united vision on this issue.

On the other hand, the US has adopted a stance that is more clearly in support of mutual recognition between the two countries. Former US President Joe Biden affirmed that the Ohrid Agreement of 2023 had provided a framework that could be developed to achieve progress in relations between the two sides. However, Serbia’s refusal to actually sign the agreement could make implementation of any political commitments uncertain. The administration of current US President Donald Trump has prioritized economic normalization over political solutions. It seeks to improve trade relations and facilitate economic cooperation and transportation infrastructure between Kosovo and Serbia, rather than focusing on direct political recognition.

Relatedly, Ilazi emphasized that although official negotiations had faltered, civil society was playing a role in bolstering unofficial dialogue between the two sides. Initiatives such as Kosovo Civic Alternative and the Kosovo Peace and Democracy Summit have brought together representatives from both sides to discuss opportunities for cooperation and reconciliation. However, these efforts lack the necessary political clout to enact influential decisions at the official level.

3- Kosovo encounters stumbling blocks to joining the EU and NATO: Kosovo has run into major obstacles in its path towards EU and NATO membership. This is due to the fact that five member countries in the EU and four countries in NATO have not recognized its independence, which constitutes a major barrier to joining European and Western security frameworks. Although there is broad political and popular support within Kosovo for joining the EU and NATO, the lack of consensus within those institutions will hinder progress in this regard.

Ilazi noted that countries that have not recognized Kosovo are committed to their stances on this issue, and that any change will be conditional on tangible progress in relations between Kosovo and Serbia. This is especially true with regard to implementing bilateral agreements and addressing unresolved issues such as the Community of Serb Municipalities.

4- Ethnic tensions continue despite popular efforts towards reconciliation: Ilazi noted that ethnic violence continues to pose a major challenge in Kosovo, since the dynamics of tensions vary in the north and south of the country. Although Kosovo Serbs live in both regions, tensions are worse in the north, where instability and unpredictability continue to make North Kosovo more vulnerable to security unrest. On the other hand, there are positive indications of ethnic cooperation in the south, where common spaces bring together Albanians and Serbs in various contexts, strengthening the potential for achieving peaceful coexistence.

Ilazi indicated that most efforts aiming to achieve reconciliation between different ethnic groups are civil society rather than governmental initiatives. Local platforms and initiatives endeavor to offer channels for dialogue and cooperation on societal issues between Albanians and Serbs. However, despite these efforts, the lack of political progress and ongoing disputes between the two governments remain a major obstacle to achieving genuine and lasting long-term reconciliation.

5- Russian influence continues to shape Kosovo via Serbia: According to Ilazi, Russia still plays a major role in preventing international recognition of Kosovo, because the former is a strategic ally to Serbia and supports the latter’s efforts in preventing Kosovo’s integration into the international community. Although Russian influence in the region has been a constant for decades, the Russia-Ukraine war has created new challenges for Moscow, which has led Serbia to seek alternative partners such as China in order to achieve its strategic and economic interests.

Nevertheless, Serbian-Russian ties remain strong, and Serbia continues to oppose EU sanctions on Russia, from which it has received security and economic aid. These close ties directly impact Kosovo, since Moscow can use its influence to prevent Kosovo from joining the EU and NATO. Moscow also continues to support Serbian communities within Kosovo, which exacerbates political and ethnic tensions.

Ilazi noted that despite the lack of official relations between the two countries, Kosovo has imposed sanctions on Russia, since Russian clout is a significant force in Serb-majority areas within Kosovo. Meanwhile, the EU and US have sought to mitigate Russian influence in the region and in particular want to weaken Moscow’s sway within Serbia. However, the political leadership in Belgrade remains a critical factor as it balances relations with Russia on the one hand and its European ambitions on the other. This could have indirect and ongoing repercussions for Kosovo.

In conclusion, although the 9 February 2025 Assembly elections in Kosovo have shaped the country’s political situation in important ways, the upcoming presidential elections in March 2026 will play a decisive role in Kosovo’s political stability. If the leading candidate in 2026 should fail to obtain a two-thirds majority, this could lead to early elections and growing political uncertainty. In addition, ethnic tensions remain a concern, especially in light of the upcoming municipal elections in October 2025. The government’s failure to form a Community of Serb Municipalities could lead to Kosovo Serbs boycotting the elections, which would exacerbate the political crisis.

The Reality and Future of Political Stability in Kosovo (Panel Discussion)