On 28 June 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan affirmed that he was willing to work with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to normalize relations between the two countries, after al-Assad expressed his openness to any initiative for normalization between Damascus and Ankara. This suggests that the two sides want to restart negotiations on normalization after Russian-sponsored talks began two years ago were halted due to major differences between the two sides. For Damascus, normalization hinges upon ending the Turkish military presence in northern Syria, which is a step Ankara refuses to take, since the latter claims it is combatting terrorist organizations including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Other than Russian pressure, the main driver for both sides in restarting talks is a shared fear about the establishment of a US-backed autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Syria. This became a matter of particular concern after it was announced that municipal elections would be held in seven districts in northeastern Syria under SDF control. If these elections take place, they would constitute a threat to Syrian and Turkish national security. Given current regional geopolitical variables, normalization talks between Ankara and Damascus are expected to be complex. The outcomes of these negotiations will have implications for security arrangements and the balance of power within Syria and across the entire Middle East.

Various Factors

On 26 June 2024, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with Alexander Lavrentiev, the Russian president’s special envoy to Syria. During the meeting, al-Assad indicated that he was open to all initiatives related to ties between Syria and Turkey which were based on the sovereignty of all territory within the Syrian state, and which sought to combat all forms of terrorism and terrorist organizations. The Turkish president welcomed these remarks, and his reply to al-Assad included the following points:

1. The Turkish regime is open to normalization with Damascus: Following al-Assad’s comments, in which he affirmed his openness to normalizing Turkish-Syrian relations, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced on 28 June 2024 that he was prepared to meet with his Syrian counterpart. Erdoğan stated that he had previously met with al-Assad, that it was possible that the two could begin meeting again. He indicated that there was nothing stopping Turkey from restoring diplomatic ties with Syria and added that Turkey would never intend to meddle in internal Syrian affairs. This was not the first time that Erdoğan has stated his willingness to pursue normalization between Ankara and Damascus. Earlier in 2024, the Turkish president indicated that Turkey was "ready to establish dialogue, contact, and strengthen our ties with anyone who respects Turkey’s interests." He confirmed that a three-way meeting between Russian, Syria, and Turkey had taken place in 2023 to discuss normalization between Ankara and Damascus.

2. Turkish parties support normalization with Damascus: On 27 June 2024, Özgür Özel, the chairman of the Turkish Republican People’s Party (CHP)— the country’s largest opposition party—announced that he welcomed normalization between Ankara and Damascus. Özel stated that he was prepared to meet with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in order to take the initiative in solving the Syrian problem, and to open channels of communication between Ankara and Damascus. He clarified that his motivation for this was deporting Syrian refugees from Turkey and ensuring their safe return to their country. Özel also indicated that he was willing to mediate between al-Assad and Erdoğan. In May 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, the chairman of the National Movement Party (MHP)—which is allied with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)—stated that he supported launching military cooperation between Ankara and Damascus to eliminate the threat posed by the PKK in Syria. This consensus among different Turkish parties is rare, and strengthens the Turkish president’s stance on rapprochement with Damascus.

3. A return to Russian mediation: Moscow has renewed its support for all initiatives aiming for normalization between Syria and Turkey. Russia has expressed that it is ready to work towards furthering negotiations between the two sides. The Syrian conflict was one of the issues Erdoğan and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, were set to discuss during their meeting during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s summit in Kazakhstan on 3 July 2024. It is worth noting that Russian mediation between Ankara and Damascus has succeeded in arranging several previous meetings between the two sides, the first of which occurred in May 2022. That meeting was held in Moscow between the Turkish and Syrian ministers of foreign affairs, and then a four-way meeting was held in June 2023 as part of the Astana Process in the Russian capital. The latter meeting included the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. In June 2024, security talks were held between the Syrian and Turkish delegations at the Russian-operated Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia, Syria to discuss security arrangements between Ankara and Damascus.

4. Proposing Iraqi mediation: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia‘ Al Sudani announced that his country would serve as a mediator between Ankara and Damascus in normalizing relations between the two countries. Turkish sources indicated that a meeting will soon be held between Syrian and Turkish delegations in Baghdad to discuss resuming security and political talks between the two countries. This depends greatly on security cooperation between the three countries that share borders with the "Kurdish triangle." This is why these three nations are working to combat PKK elements, which constitute a terrorist threat and security challenge for them.

Turkish Policy Drivers

Anyone following the trajectory of Turkish foreign policy will see that there have been major shifts in recent years towards a policy of regional reconciliation. The current rapprochement with Syria falls within the framework of these efforts. Turkey has many reasons for pursuing this policy, including the following:

1. Deport Syrian refugees: The issue of Syrian refugees has become a key question for Turkey due to the economic burden and demographic shift this is causing. Both ruling and opposition parties agree on the need to deport Syrian refugees back to Syria, although they differ on the means by which this should happen. The number of Syrians who have voluntarily returned to Syria from Turkey is around 650,000 people, but there are still 3,114,099 Syrians with temporary protection status in Turkey, and an additional 2 million with residency permits. Opposition parties accuse the Turkish government of not following through in returning refugees to Syria so that the ruling party can take advantage of their votes in elections. There are 41 non-governmental organizations in Gaziantep that have warned against the social, economic, health, and educational consequences if the around half a million Syrians living there stay in the city. The number of Syrians in Gaziantep is the second highest in Turkey after Istanbul.

2. Ease societal violence in Turkey: In recent years, there has been an escalation in societal violence in Turkey. Much of this violence has been directed against Syrian refugees, as has been seen recently in the attacks and violence on the evening of 30 June 2024 targeting Syrians’ homes, shops, vehicles, and possessions in the city of Kayseri in central Turkey. The Turkish regime’s efforts to express openness to the Syrian regime can be understood as a tool for Turkey to return Syrians to their country, and therefore to reduce violence against Syrians.

3. Prevent the establishment of a separatist Kurdish entity: Ankara described the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)’s announcement that it would hold municipal elections in seven districts under its control in August 2024 as a national security threat for Turkey. In early June 2024, Turkish Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler warned that Turkey needed to recommit to building a "corridor" along its borders with Syria and Iraq to confront the threat posed by Kurdish militants. Damascus likewise opposes these elections, since Syria and Turkey are both concerned about the establishment of a US-backed separatist Kurdish entity in northern Syria. This also has implications for the conditions of Kurds inside Turkey. Kurds make up 15 percent of the 80 million people in Turkey, which is why Ankara needs to cooperate with Damascus across security and intelligence spheres to confront Kurdish organizations and protect national security. This is especially true in light of Russian, American, and Syrian opposition to Turkey launching new operations within Syria under the pretext of combating Kurdish organizations, as previously occurred during Turkey’s Operations Peace Spring (2019), Olive Branch (2018) and Euphrates Shield (2016).

4. Establish control of the Turkish-Syrian border: The southern Turkish border has been fluid and unregulated, which has created an environment conducive to drug and human trafficking operations and terrorist organizations. Ankara controls only 63 percent of this border, and this lack of control is a source of instability and a threat to Turkish national security. Ankara is working to control the border through cooperation with Damascus and Moscow, and recently dismissed a number of Turkish officers who were involved in the aforementioned crimes.

5. Increase Erdoğan’s popularity: The Turkish president has dealt with fluctuating popularity after his party lost the local elections in March 2024. If normalization occurs between Ankara and Damascus, this would make it possible to deport Syrian refugees and bring back huge Turkish exports to Syria, which would have positive ramifications for the Turkish economy and Erdoğan’s popularity. It would also alleviate societal tensions in Turkey and give Erdoğan the opportunity to propose the constitutional amendments that he wants, and which the opposition opposes.

6. Strengthen Russian-Turkish relations: Over the last year, Russian-Turkish relations have cooled due to Ankara agreeing to Finland and Sweden joining NATO and as a result of Turkish-Ukrainian rapprochement. Another factor is growing Russian-Turkish rivalries in several regions of the world, including Central Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and West Africa. There are also disputes over security arrangements in Syria (including the city of Idlib and de-escalation zones). The fact that Ankara has agreed to normalizing relations with Damascus via a Russian mediator will end that coolness, and will help to strengthen Russian-Turkish ties, which have taken a major leap forward in the last decade. This is especially true with regard to the security arrangements for Syria, which will lead to expanding Russian and Turkish influence in Syria and in the Middle East as a whole.

Future Challenges

Despite Turkish and Syrian openness to normalizing relations—a step that Russia has also welcomed—this process will face various challenges, including the following:

1. For Syria, normalization depends on a Turkish withdrawal: Since talks began in 2021 on normalizing Turkish-Syrian ties, Damascus has felt that resuming negotiations hinged on a full Turkish withdrawal from its territory. Turkey has taken control of a third of the cities in northern Syria, including Afrin, Ras al-Ayn, and Tell Abyad, through military operations it launched during the last decade. Damascus announced in June 2024 that it wanted a Turkish commitment to withdrawing from its territory before beginning dialogue with its counterpart. Ankara has refused to commit to this and instead focused on the full securitization of Turkey’s southern border. Güler explained that the problems that have emerged in the region are due to a power vacuum since 2011 in the border area.

It is worth noting that Erdoğan stated last year that although al-Assad wanted Turkey to leave northern Syria, Turkey would not let this happen. The latter also proposed the idea of establishing a Turkish "safe zone" extending 30 kilometers into northern Syria in order to transport refugees and armed elements, but Damascus opposed this move. Turkey and Syria’s insistence on each of their respective positions will pose an obstacle to resuming talks. It is expected that dozens of security, military, and intelligence meetings will be held between Ankara and Damascus to continue to try to resolve these issues, especially in light of the intensive Turkish military presence in this area, including checkpoints, military bases, and dozens of officers and soldiers within Syrian territory.

2. Continuing difficulties in Idlib: The northwestern Syrian governorate of Idlib, which covers an area of about 6000 square kilometers, is considered a hotspot for terrorist organizations including Tahrir al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra Front) and the Syrian Liberation Front, as well as armed groups of various affiliations that are part of the opposition to the Syrian regime. These armed elements number around 60,000 people in all, and most receive support from Turkey as part of the 2018 demilitarization agreement between Ankara and Moscow. Idlib is now outside Syrian regime and army control, and has experienced ongoing infighting. Damascus is set on retaking the city once Turkish support for the armed groups is withdrawn, and also wants to expel armed foreign elements that are present there. This will require security arrangements with Ankara and Moscow as well as direct armed confrontations with those groups, and could lead to some of the groups carrying out retaliatory terrorist operations in Turkey or Syria.

3. Turkey’s vision for a political settlement in Syria: Turkey supports implementing a Syrian political settlement in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which stipulated the establishment of a "transitional governing body" and aimed to "convene representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition to engage in formal negotiations on a political transition process." The regime in Damascus rejected this resolution. This also angered Ankara-backed Syrian opposition factions, which organized protests criticizing the Turkish stance on these areas. In late June 2024, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan urged Damascus to make the most of this Turkish-Russian achievement in stopping the fighting between the Syrian army and opposition factions. Ahmet Yıldız, the Turkish permanent representative to the United Nations, called on the Syrian government to create a true national consensus and to take steps towards a settlement in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. These remarks were criticized by his Syrian counterpart Qusay al-Dahhak, who accused Turkey of causing the suffering of millions of Syrian children. This has created political conflicts between Ankara and Damascus that will be difficult to resolve.

4. US support for the SDF: Although the US opposes holding the municipal elections in SDF-controlled regions of northern Syria, it also provides ongoing logistical and military support to the SDF as a partner in the global coalition to defeat the terrorist group ISIS. On 25 June 2024, Turkey criticized the support that some of its NATO allies—specifically France, the UK, and the US—were providing to the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which are the largest subgroup within the SDF. Ankara characterized US support for the SDF as a threat to Turkish security, despite the coalition’s ties with NATO. Early last June, the Turkish newspaper Sözcü reported that Washington was training and arming around 70,000 members of the PKK and YPG in order to establish what it called a "terrorist entity" along Turkey’s southern borders. This is one of the most contentious points between Ankara and Washington, and Erdoğan is expected to discuss this issue with Biden during a meeting that will be held during the summit celebrating NATO’s 75^th anniversary in Washington in mid-July 2024.

5. Regional rivalries over Syria: Despite Russian mediation and Chinese and Iranian support for Ankara and Damascus in resuming normalized relations, this does not mean that Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing do not have their own regional rivalries over bolstering their respective political and economic influence and military presence in Syria. Syria is threatened by key regional powers like Turkey, which currently wields major influence in northern Syria. After normalizing ties with Damascus, this would extend throughout Syria. Russia and Iran possess a significant military and security presence and considerable economic interests in Syria. Meanwhile, China’s influence centers on economic infrastructural and rebuilding projects. In the security sphere, China seeks to prevent the return of around 6,000 Uyghur fighters. There will be regional competition over expanding influence in Syria, and these rivalries could also hinder normalization between Ankara and Damascus.

In conclusion, resuming normalized relations between Ankara and Damascus will take place through Russian and Iraqi mediation to achieve Turkish and Syrian strategic interests. However, there are various geopolitical challenges between the two sides that will take a long time to address. The most significant of these challenges is perhaps the Turkish military presence in northern Syria, which might not fully end. Instead, there could be shifts in its form, content, and mechanisms based on the security arrangements between Ankara and Damascus. This could result in a new structure for the military and political balance of power in Syria, which will have implications for dynamics throughout the Middle East.

Why Turkey’s President is Ready for Normalization with Damascus