The tone of official statements by U.S. President Donald Trump toward Cuba has escalated markedly in recent months. Most notably, in mid-March 2026, Trump pledged to "take over Cuba," stating that whether he "liberates it or seizes it," he believes he can ultimately do whatever he wants with it. These remarks followed earlier statements at the beginning of the same month, in which he suggested that Cuba would "fall very soon."

Such rhetoric raises the prospect of potential U.S. military escalation toward Cuba, similar to what occurred in Venezuela. In this context, a range of economic, geopolitical, and legal drivers may push Washington toward considering military intervention, while several countervailing constraints could limit the likelihood of this scenario materializing.

Potential Drivers

A number of potential drivers may push the Trump administration to replicate the Venezuelan scenario in Cuba, most notably the failure of sanctions to alter the behavior of the Cuban regime, the country’s substantial mineral reserves, as well as broader geopolitical and legal considerations, as will be elaborated further below:

1. Cuba’s long-term adaptation to U.S. economic sanctions: Cuba has been subject to U.S. economic sanctions for more than six decades, prompting Havana to develop diverse strategies to adapt to trade and financial restrictions. These strategies include diversifying economic relations with international partners and developing alternative sectors such as tourism and overseas medical services.

Although sanctions have contributed to deepening Cuba’s economic crisis, the Cuban economy has demonstrated a relative capacity to adapt to these constraints over decades of economic isolation. This may reduce the effectiveness of further intensifying sanctions as a tool relied upon to drive political change.

Accordingly, Washington may consider shifting its approach toward Cuba by resorting to military options, particularly in light of the failure of long-term sanctions to impose political or economic change or to undermine Havana’s ties with U.S. rivals. On the contrary, as sanctions intensify, Cuba has increasingly deepened its relations with competing powers. This pattern of deepening ties with rival powers may serve as an incentive for the Trump administration to replicate the Venezuelan scenario through a limited military operation aimed at changing Cuba’s political leadership, raising the cost of anti-U.S. policies, and strengthening future deterrence through more coercive instruments.

2. Cuba’s substantial reserves of nickel and cobalt: Cuba possesses substantial reserves of nickel, cobalt, and phosphates, in addition to smaller quantities of copper, gold, and silver. Its nickel reserves are estimated at approximately 5.5 million tons, while its cobalt reserves are around 500,000 tons, placing it among the world’s top five holders of reserves in both minerals.

In contrast, the United States suffers from limited domestic reserves of nickel and cobalt, making it dependent on imports to meet its needs, particularly in military industries, aerospace alloys, electric vehicle batteries, advanced technologies, and clean energy applications.

This factor may constitute an economic driver for replicating the Venezuelan model, especially given that Venezuela’s vast oil reserves were among the key motivations behind Washington’s hardline policies, which initially included offering financial rewards for information leading to the capture of Nicolás Maduro, followed by threats of military action, and ultimately a military operation aimed at capturing him.

Accordingly, Cuba’s mineral wealth may be viewed as a potential driver for the United States to replicate the Venezuelan scenario, with the aim of gaining control over its substantial nickel and cobalt reserves, as well as counterbalancing China’s influence in the minerals sector. This is particularly significant given that critical minerals have become a central arena of competition between Beijing and Washington, especially as China accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt refining and maintains considerable influence over the nickel industry, thereby granting it broad strategic leverage over global supply chains vital to defense, energy, and advanced technology sectors.

3. Leveraging legal prosecution as a justification for escalation: The United States has taken legally framed steps against the Cuban regime, opening investigations targeting government officials and prominent figures within the Cuban Communist Party. These investigations—conducted by several U.S. federal law enforcement agencies—allege involvement in drug trafficking through Cuban territory and ports, money laundering linked to illicit activities, support for armed groups in Latin America, and interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states.

These developments reflect a broader trend toward leveraging legal justifications as a basis for potential U.S. escalation against the Cuban regime, in a manner similar to the legal and military approach adopted against Nicolás Maduro, when the U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal charges against him and senior officials prior to his capture in January 2026 following a U.S. military operation. In this context, Washington has used criminal proceedings as both a tool of pressure and a legal cover enabling it to pursue foreign leaders individually through federal indictments and programs such as the "Rewards for Justice" initiative.

From this perspective, Washington may expand its ongoing investigations to include senior Cuban leadership, including President Miguel Díaz-Canel, as well as political and military figures associated with the regime. Such legal charges could then be used as a pretext for any potential U.S. military operation aimed at capturing the head of the Cuban regime and transferring him to the United States, mirroring the Venezuelan model.

4. U.S. concerns over Cuba becoming a Chinese intelligence platform: Cuba represents a unique geopolitical case for the United States due to its close proximity—approximately 145 kilometers—from the state of Florida, making it part of a highly sensitive U.S. security perimeter. Accordingly, any military or intelligence presence by rival powers in Cuba constitutes a direct threat to U.S. national security.

In this context, growing ties between Cuba and China have raised concerns in Washington, which has accused Havana of hosting Chinese intelligence facilities on the island. U.S. officials have suggested that Cuba may possess several sites capable of supporting signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities on behalf of China, potentially enabling Beijing to monitor U.S. military communications, naval and air operations in the southern United States, as well as missile launches and military testing activities.

In parallel with expanding U.S.-Taiwan military and intelligence cooperation—which China perceives as a direct threat to its strategic interests—Beijing is likely to deepen its intelligence and military ties with Cuba. This dynamic may, in turn, incentivize Washington to consider military intervention in Havana, potentially on a broader scale than the Venezuelan case, with the aim of eliminating or degrading perceived security threats arising from the growing Chinese presence along the southern perimeter of the United States.

5. U.S. concerns over expanding military cooperation between Cuba and Russia: Defense relations between Moscow and Havana have witnessed a relative revival in recent years. In March 2025, the two sides signed a military cooperation agreement aimed at enhancing military training and defense coordination. The agreement establishes a legal framework for military cooperation, intelligence sharing, the potential provision of military assistance, the deployment of military facilities, and the conduct of joint exercises. Such developments may be interpreted as part of Russia’s efforts to demonstrate its ability to project power and operate in areas close to the United States, within the broader context of geopolitical competition between the two countries.

Although the current level of military cooperation between Russia and Cuba does not approach the level of the close military alliance that existed during the Cold War, nor does it indicate a definitive return to such a level, it nonetheless reflects a gradual evolution in bilateral defense ties. This could potentially pave the way for the future establishment of a Russian military base in Cuba or the reactivation of strategic intelligence facilities near the United States, such as the former Soviet Lourdes electronic intelligence station in Cuba—located less than 270 km from the coast of Florida—which Russia shut down in 2001.

This growing military cooperation may push the Trump administration toward military escalation against Cuba, with the aim of curbing the expanding influence of rival powers in the Caribbean. These powers may seek to exploit Cuba’s geostrategic location to establish military and intelligence bases that could pose a direct threat to U.S. national security.

Constraining Factors

Despite these drivers, several key factors may constrain the likelihood of the United States replicating the Venezuelan scenario in Cuba, including the following:

1. The entrenched dominance of the Cuban Communist Party: The Cuban Communist Party has maintained firm control over the political system since the 1959 revolution, exercising authority over all political and security institutions, in the absence of any legal opposition parties under the country’s constitutionally enshrined one-party system. This structure enhances the regime’s capacity to maintain political stability and manage crises, even amid rising protests and mounting economic challenges, thereby reducing the likelihood that the United States could trigger internal chaos or political collapse in the absence of the head of the regime.

In contrast, although Venezuela’s Socialist Party has maintained dominance over the political system, it remains partially dependent on electoral and political dynamics to sustain its hold on power and faces a degree of internal competition, despite constraints imposed on the opposition. This, in addition to external pressures, renders its grip on power—while resilient—less institutionalized than that of the Cuban model. The Cuban Communist Party, by comparison, exercises a higher degree of institutional control and stability, holding ultimate authority over state policymaking and directing all major institutions, including the government, the military, and the legislature, thereby ensuring continuity of power.

Moreover, the opposition in Venezuela is stronger and more influential than its counterpart in Cuba, as it is organized within political parties, participates in elections, and retains the capacity to mobilize protests. In Cuba, however, the Communist Party-led system prohibits the existence of legal opposition parties, limiting dissent to activists and small groups with restricted influence, which in turn reinforces regime cohesion.

Accordingly, the cohesion of the Cuban political system constitutes a key factor that may reduce the likelihood of a U.S. military operation aimed at capturing the Cuban president. Removing Miguel Díaz-Canel from power would be unlikely to lead to substantive policy change, given that the Communist Party functions as the supreme authority in Cuba, and that presidential and governmental decisions remain closely aligned with party directives.

2. The cohesion of the Cuban military institution compared to Venezuela: The Cuban armed forces exhibit a high degree of institutional discipline and political loyalty to the regime, surpassing their Venezuelan counterpart. Since the 1959 revolution, the Cuban military has constituted a central pillar of the political system, operating under the direct authority of the Communist Party. It has also been deeply integrated into key sectors of the state—particularly the economy. Through the military-run conglomerate GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial), the armed forces control strategic sectors such as tourism, financial services, foreign trade, ports, and logistics. Estimates suggest that this conglomerate accounts for approximately 40% of Cuba’s GDP, underscoring the military’s dominant role in the national economy.

This extensive institutional and economic entrenchment has reinforced the military’s vested interest in regime survival and significantly reduced the likelihood of internal fragmentation or defections.

By contrast, the Venezuelan political leadership has historically exhibited lower confidence in the cohesion and loyalty of its armed forces. This has led to reliance on Cuban military advisers—particularly since the era of former President Hugo Chavez—who were granted broad influence within Venezuela’s security apparatus. Under Nicolas Maduro, Cuban personnel were reportedly integrated into elite security units responsible for presidential protection, while Cuban counterintelligence elements expanded their role within the Venezuelan military to prevent potential coup attempts. Despite the appointment of Venezuelan military officers to key political and economic positions, the armed forces in Venezuela remain less cohesive and more susceptible to internal divisions and political volatility than their Cuban counterparts.

Accordingly, the interests of the Cuban military elite are closely tied to the survival of the existing political order. Although the Cuban military’s capabilities remain limited compared to those of the United States, any potential U.S. attempt to overthrow the regime or conduct military intervention would likely encounter significant challenges, given the cohesion of the military institution and its deep-rooted stake in preserving the current system.

3. The potential role of escalating internal crises as a pressure mechanism: Cuba is currently facing multiple and intensifying internal crises, which may incentivize the Cuban government to demonstrate a degree of flexibility toward U.S. demands and engage in negotiations aimed at reaching mutual understandings. Such an approach could help Havana avoid potential U.S. military escalation while alleviating the severity of ongoing challenges, particularly in the energy and electricity sectors. In this context, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel revealed on March 13, 2026, that discussions had taken place between Cuba and the United States to address existing disputes, a development that aligns with repeated statements by the U.S. president regarding ongoing high-level talks with Havana.

Washington may seek to exploit these crises by exerting pressure on the Cuban government to resolve outstanding disagreements in a manner that accommodates U.S. demands in exchange for easing economic pressures. This could contribute to mitigating acute shortages in food, medicine, and energy. Notably, the disruption of fuel shipments from Venezuela since December 2025 has exacerbated Cuba’s economic crisis, leading to widespread electricity outages that have affected water supply systems as well as economic, social, and healthcare activities—particularly in the context of U.S. restrictions on Cuba’s oil imports.

Within this framework, the U.S. administration may calculate that worsening living conditions in Cuba could increase the government’s flexibility in negotiations or fuel public frustration, potentially leading to internal divisions and unrest. This helps explain statements by the U.S. president suggesting that Cuba "will fall," alongside indications that Secretary of State Marco Rubio could be dispatched for negotiations amid intensifying fuel-related pressures in the country.

4. Cuba’s strategic mobilization updates following Maduro’s capture: In the aftermath of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s capture, the Cuban regime faced a strategic shock, given Venezuela’s longstanding role as a key ally providing vital oil and financial support. This development prompted the Cuban leadership to initiate a comprehensive strategic mobilization of its defense and security capabilities. Measures included strengthening internal surveillance over opposition and media, intensifying military exercises, raising domestic readiness levels, and reassessing regional alliances and diplomatic options.

In this context, Cuba’s National Defense Council, during meetings held in January and February 2026, reviewed and updated contingency plans for a transition to martial law in the event of war or foreign military aggression, as well as for repelling potential attacks. Cuban leadership indicated that these plans were revised based on "lessons learned from recent international conflicts," suggesting preparations for the possibility of the United States replicating the Venezuelan scenario in Cuba.

At the same time, Havana has focused on ensuring loyalty within the military establishment and reinforcing the linkage between institutional interests and internal stability, thereby enhancing regime resilience in the face of mounting U.S. pressures—including economic sanctions, legal measures, and political and military threats.

These developments reflect a proactive and preemptive tactical approach adopted by Cuba in anticipation of a potential Caracas-style scenario. This, in turn, may reduce the likelihood of success of any rapid U.S. military operation aimed at capturing the Cuban president and could necessitate a broader and more complex intervention should Washington choose to pursue the military option.

5. The difficulty of opening a new military front amid the ongoing conflict with Iran: The ongoing war between the United States and Iran has led to a sharp escalation in military and political tensions, resulting in significant disruptions to global energy markets. Oil and energy prices have surged to exceptional levels, driven by supply disruptions and the repercussions of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. These developments have, in turn, increased transportation and production costs within the U.S. economy.

At the same time, rising energy prices have been accompanied by direct fiscal pressures on the federal budget due to the costs of financing ongoing military operations. This has contributed to increased strain on public spending, slower economic growth, weakening domestic demand, and rising inflation.

In this context, the U.S. administration appears less capable of expanding its military engagements into additional theaters such as Cuba at the present time. With the continuation of the conflict with Iran, Washington is likely to prioritize the allocation of its political and financial resources toward managing the Middle East crisis and stabilizing global energy markets, rather than entering new conflicts that would entail additional economic and political costs.

6. The proximity of the U.S. midterm elections scheduled for November 2026: In the aftermath of the U.S. military operation in Venezuela, several members of Congress moved to constrain President Donald Trump’s authority to conduct similar military actions without legislative approval. A draft resolution was introduced under the War Powers Resolution framework, seeking to require the president to obtain congressional authorization before undertaking any additional military operations in Venezuela. Although the resolution did not ultimately become binding law, it reflected bipartisan concern over the expansion of executive authority in the use of military force.

With the November 2026 midterm elections approaching, domestic political considerations may further discourage the Trump administration from pursuing military escalation toward Cuba. The administration may seek to avoid provoking congressional opposition—similar to the reaction following the Venezuela operation—and to preserve the Republican Party’s electoral prospects. This is particularly relevant given the potential for public and political backlash against U.S. military interventions abroad to influence voter sentiment.

Moreover, the ongoing conflict with Iran has revived legislative debates in the United States regarding the War Powers Resolution, adding another layer of political sensitivity to any decision involving the use of force. In this context, the convergence of electoral pressures and institutional constraints may reduce the likelihood of initiating a new military intervention in Cuba.

A Deferred Option

In conclusion, despite the presence of economic, geopolitical, and legal drivers that may push the United States toward attempting to replicate the Venezuelan model in Cuba, a set of practical constraints is likely to limit the feasibility of such a course of action in the near term. Notably, repeating a similar scenario within a short timeframe and in the same geographic region is unlikely to carry a high probability of success.

Accordingly, it appears unlikely that Washington will pursue a military operation in Cuba comparable to the Venezuelan case in the current phase. Instead, the United States is more likely to rely on non-military pressure to compel Havana to enter negotiations. This may include leveraging Cuba’s worsening economic and social conditions to gradually weaken regime control and induce political change without resorting to direct military confrontation. In this context, Washington may also seek to utilize economic tools more selectively, including offering incentives or intensifying pressure on key actors such as the leadership of GAESA.

However, should current U.S. pressure fail to produce tangible outcomes, negotiations stall, and the conflict with Iran come to an end, the U.S. administration may shift its focus toward pursuing a more decisive resolution to its dispute with Cuba—potentially including the military option. This is particularly plausible if Washington assesses that it was able to manage the fallout from Maduro’s capture without incurring significant international backlash, thereby lowering the perceived risks of replicating a similar approach elsewhere.

Will the United States Replicate the Venezuelan Model in Cuba?