Dr. Mona Soliman‏‏

On 28 June 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan affirmed that he was willing to work with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to normalize relations between the two countries, after al-Assad expressed his openness to any initiative for normalization between Damascus and Ankara. This suggests that the two sides want to restart negotiations on normalization after Russian-sponsored talks began two years ago were halted due to major differences between the two sides. For Damascus, normalization hinges upon ending the Turkish military presence in northern Syria, which is a step Ankara refuses to take, since the latter claims it is combatting terrorist organizations including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Other than Russian pressure, the main driver for both sides in restarting talks is a shared fear about the establishment of a US-backed autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Syria. This became a matter of particular concern after it was announced that municipal elections would be held in seven districts in northeastern Syria under SDF control. If these elections take place, they would constitute a threat to Syrian and Turkish national security. Given current regional geopolitical variables, normalization talks between Ankara and Damascus are expected to be complex. The outcomes of these negotiations will have implications for security arrangements and the balance of power within Syria and across the entire Middle East.

Why Turkey’s President is Ready for Normalization with Damascus

The Kurdish Threat:

Dr. Diana Galeeva‏‏

Since it began almost a year ago, Russia’s "special operation" in Ukraine has been compared with its actions in Syria. Experts have compared Russian hybrid methods in Ukraine and Syria, identified common tactics, offered potential scenarios, and concluded that the Ukraine conflict is becoming more and more like Syria. With the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine war approaching on 24 February 2023, this article aims to examine whether Russia will withdraw from Syria because of its involvement in the Ukraine war. A second, perhaps related, question is whether Ukraine will follow the Syrian model, where 15 March 2023 will mark almost 12 years of civil war following the original protests, although Russia’s involvement did not begin until late 2015.

How Ukraine War Affects Russia's Syria Involvement

Interconnected Wars:

Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan

On 19 October, a Hamas delegation arrived in Damascus to meet with Syria’s ruler, Bashar al- Assad. The meeting was announced after months of speculation about the restoration of ties between the al-Assad regime and Hamas, the Palestinian movement which is the de facto authority in the Gaza Strip. The al-Assad family had historically cultivated close relations with Hamas in the 1990s and 2000s, but the partnership unravelled during Syria’s civil war. In 2012, as violence mounted against the Syrian opposition, Khaled Meshaal, then-chairman of Hamas’s political bureau in Damascus, decided to leave the country and to close the Hamas office in the Syrian capital.

How is Hamas Consolidating its Regional Presence Through al-Assad?

Reshuffling Alliances:

InterRegional for Strategic Analysis

There have recently been increased tensions between regional and international powers engaged in the Syrian arena, as each tries to gain control over Syrian border crossings with neighboring countries, or internal crossings between areas under the control of different groups. This becomes clear from examining the recent positions taken by Russia, Turkey, and the US.

Syria

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