Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

Even before the current turmoil in 2026, Iran’s political landscape has long been characterized by constant flux and realignment, making it difficult to describe the country as one divided into clearly delineated political or ideological factions. Rather, Iranian politics has always been highly fluid, with political actors continuously adjusting their positions and policies in response to changing domestic and international developments.Adding to this complexity is the fact that Iran's political landscape cannot be analyzed solely by examining individual political parties. Instead, it requires investigating the broader ideological currents that shape political competition and define the patterns of interaction among the various actors operating within the political arena.Although this fluid dynamic is likely to persist in the aftermath of the war that erupted on February 28, 2026 and which saw Iran face off against the United States and Israel, the postwar period may nevertheless introduce new features that distinguish the emerging pattern of political polarization from the forms that characterized Iranian politics before the conflict.The War's RepercussionsThree major variables are expected to shape the nature and trajectory of political polarization in Iran during the postwar period:1. A Leadership Transition in Iran: Perhaps the most consequential change brought about by the war has been the change in Iran's leadership. Prior to February 28, 2026, the political system was headed by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, alongside influential figures such as Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Following the accession of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader after his father's death, and the disappearance of Larijani and several other prominent figures from the political scene, Iran's internal balance of power is expected to undergo significant change. Before the war, much of the country's political polarization revolved around proximity—or opposition—to the Supreme Leader himself. For example, part of the longstanding divide between reformists and conservatives centered on the powers vested in the Supreme Leader (Velayat-e Faqih). Reformists advocated limiting those powers and expanding public oversight over state institutions as part of a broader political agenda that emphasized greater civil liberties, engagement with the outside world, and confidence-building with neighboring states. Conservatives, by contrast, strongly defended the Supreme Leader's broad constitutional authority and accused reformists of serving foreign interests seeking to undermine the Islamic Republic and foment instability inside Iran. Even today, this conservative faction continues to press for the reimposition of stricter hijab regulations, viewing them as one of the ideological pillars of the Islamic Republic.Against this backdrop, Mojtaba Khamenei's accession to the position of Supreme Leader is expected to reshape Iran's political landscape, particularly given the different relationships he cultivated with various political currents during the years he remained largely behind the scenes while his father dominated public political life. During that period, Mojtaba divided his activities between religious studies in the seminary (hawza) and political responsibilities within his father's office.Notably, recent developments have suggested a growing willingness among some political actors to challenge the authority of the office of Supreme Leader. A striking example was the controversy surrounding conservative parliamentarian Hamid Rasaee. Posting on Telegram a Qur’anic verse where God tells the Prophet Noah that his son "is not of your family" (Surah Hud: 46), Rasaee commented that "family lineage is not the true criterion; faith and righteous deeds are." This message was widely interpreted as questioning hereditary succession and suggests that Iran's postwar political balance may shift considerably as the new Supreme Leader begins exercising his authority after a period of relative absence imposed by wartime circumstances.2. A Possible Power Struggle: Iran may also witness an intense struggle for power in the aftermath of the war—a prospect which stems in part from the political and military vacuum created by the disappearance of several senior figures. Beyond Ali Khamenei and Ali Larijani, the war also saw the assassination of Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi, IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour, and several other senior officials.These losses are expected to intensify the rivalry among influential institutions and competing factions, as they rush to fill the newly opened vacancies in the political and military hierarchy. In particular, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is expected to seek greater influence over decision-making institutions, a development that is likely to deepen divisions among political actors between those who support an expanded political role for the IRGC and those who oppose it.President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is associated with the reformist camp, has already expressed reservations about the expanding influence of the IRGC, warning that it could undermine the authority of the civilian government. On May 31, 2026, he <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/world/1872305-%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">stated</a> that "the administration of the country should not be confined to a narrow circle of officials and decision-makers."These concerns coincided with speculation that President Pezeshkian might resign in protest over his inability to implement the political and economic programs that had played a decisive role in his election.3. Divergent Positions on Negotiations with Washington: The war—and the negotiations currently underway to bring it to an end—will undoubtedly shape the new political polarization emerging in Iran. What is particularly significant, however, is that the divide is no longer confined to the traditional reformist-conservative split. It has increasingly taken hold within the conservative camp itself, where competing factions have adopted different positions towards both the war and negotiations with the United States.The clearest division that has emerged pits the faction led by Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf against the faction associated with Saeed Jalili, the Supreme Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council. Jalili's camp includes members of the Paydari Front in parliament, one of the country's most hardline conservative blocs, including lawmakers such as Mahmoud Nabavian, Hamid Rasaee, and Amir Hossein Sabeti.For example, seven members of the so-called "<a href="https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4266771-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A6%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Jalili Team</a>" refused to sign a letter of support sent on April 27, 2026 by members of parliament to Speaker Ghalibaf, in his capacity as head of Iran's negotiating delegation. Although the letter ultimately received 261 parliamentary signatures, the refusal reflected growing dissatisfaction within Jalili's camp over his marginalization in favor of Ghalibaf, who had been entrusted with leading the negotiations.Their opposition did not stop there. They subsequently launched a sustained campaign against Ghalibaf and the negotiating team, accusing them of crossing Iran's "red lines" during the talks. The criticism focused particularly on Ghalibaf. On June 26, 2026, conservative MP Kamran Ghazanfari accused him of becoming "a <a href="https://www.eghtesadnews.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-57/793238-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">friend</a> of Soleimani's and Khamenei's killer"—a reference to U.S. President Donald Trump.These developments point to a growing split within Iran's principlist conservative movement between a pragmatic faction led by Ghalibaf and a radical faction led by Jalili. At the heart of their divide lies a disagreement over the war and negotiations with Washington. Although neither faction appears confident that a comprehensive agreement to end the conflict can ultimately be reached, the pragmatic camp argues that negotiations remain a viable option and that ending the current war would be preferable to prolonging a conflict that continues to impose heavy military and economic costs on Iran—particularly amid ongoing military escalation and the mounting consequences of the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports in the Arabian Gulf.The Jalili camp, by contrast, argues that either renewed military confrontation or a prolonged state of "no war, no peace" would be preferable to negotiating with the United States. From this perspective, Iran has already tested the diplomatic option only to see it fail after President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, despite the substantial concessions Tehran had made under the agreement signed in 2015 with the P5+1. The faction further contends that any new agreement would merely provide the United States and Israel with time to prepare for a third round of war against Iran, just as they allegedly used the ceasefire that followed the first round of fighting in June 2025 to prepare for the second round, during which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and numerous senior political and military figures were assassinated.In contrast, the reformist movement continues to advocate negotiations as the only viable means of ending the war and securing the removal of U.S. and international sanctions on Iran. It also calls for renewed engagement with the outside world, particularly neighboring countries—including those targeted by Iranian military operations during the conflict. According to this view, Iran cannot remain isolated from its regional environment, but instead must strengthen political and economic relations, expand regional cooperation, and attract foreign investment, including from Western countries and especially the United States.Reflecting this perspective, in an <a href="https://www.sharghdaily.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-65/1111114-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">article</a> published in the newspaper Shargh on June 20, 2026 and entitled "The Gulf States in the Postwar Period," former reformist Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi argued that Iran should reopen channels of engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for both security and economic reasons, emphasizing the need to restore and deepen bilateral cooperation.Against this backdrop, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the reformists and the pragmatic conservative faction could enter into a short-term tactial alliance to prevent the radical conservative camp from consolidating control over Iran's decision-making institutions. Such an alliance, however, is likely to face significant obstacles, foremost among them the political ambitions of some of its leading figures—notably Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who may intend to make another bid for the presidency.Future BellwethersThe upcoming electoral milestones—most notably the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) elections and the presidential election, both scheduled for 2028—will serve as important bellwethers for how the balance of political power in Iran is evolving during the postwar period. The outcomes of these elections are likely to reveal the extent to which the war has reshaped the country's political landscape, the relative strength of competing factions, and the direction of Iran's domestic politics under its new leadership.

The Emerging Struggle for Influence in Post-War Iran