Nawar Samad

European "defense autonomy" is no longer presented as a project aimed at separating from NATO. Instead, it is increasingly framed as a pathway to building stronger European capabilities within the logic of Atlantic integration. Europe has recognized that geopolitical shifts—particularly the continuing Russian threat and the policies adopted by the Trump administration—require a different approach. In this regard, the discussion has moved from general slogans to a concrete package of tools and funding related to armament and production. The European Commission has been assigned a greater role, with the aim of enhancing strategic autonomy.Key PillarsWith the acceleration of security developments on the European continent, the concept of European defense autonomy has gradually shifted from political debate to more explicit institutional and military pathways: 1- Shift toward self-reliance under external shocks: European defense autonomy is no longer presented as a long-term theoretical option. It is increasingly seen as a practical response to two overlapping strategic shocks.The first shock is related to Russia's war on Ukraine. This conflict has brought the logic of deterrence and nuclear pressure back to the heart of European security. The second shock stems from growing doubts about the continuity of the U.S. security guarantee following Trump’s return. These doubts have been accompanied by frank American discussions regarding burden-sharing and reducing direct involvement in European defense.&nbsp;This shift helps explain why European debate has moved from rhetoric to addressing the "<a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/external-book-chapters/external-publications/mind-deterrence-gap-assessing-europes-nuclear-options" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Deterrence Gap</a>" through enhanced European roles and capabilities. The dynamic was particularly evident during the February 2026 meeting of the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/02/20/e5-defence-ministers-in-krakow-say-europe-has-woken-up" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">defense ministers of the five largest European countries</a> (E5)—Germany, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Italy—in Krakow.During the meeting, the LEAP initiative was launched to develop low-cost platforms and autonomous drones, drawing on lessons from the Ukrainian war. Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz emphasized the significance of this shift, stating that "<a href="https://defence-industry.eu/e5-defence-ministers-launch-low-cost-effectors-and-autonomous-platforms-leap-initiative-boost-readiness-and-support-ukraine/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Europe has woken up</a>."2- Expanding European defense action: European defense autonomy is no longer constructed through a single institutional pathway. It is being pursued through a practical combination of EU frameworks on one hand, and flexible cooperation among European countries on the other. This combination allows the slow pace of broad consensus to be overcome when crises demand rapid responses.This approach is particularly evident in the context of Ukraine's security. The concept of a "<a href="https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2026/01/04/10-points-sur-la-defense-europeenne-en-2026/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">coalition of the willing</a>" has emerged as a flexible mechanism for managing potential military crises outside the constraints of traditional procedural complexity. In parallel, the European Union has developed a Rapid Deployment Capacity <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/common-security-and-defence-policy-eu-rapid-deployment-capacity-becomes-operational_en" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">of 5,000 personnel</a>. This effort reflects a deliberate combination of political flexibility with systematic institutional building.Similarly, the "<a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/power-few-how-clusters-can-strengthen-european-defence" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Defense Clusters</a>" approach seeks to link smaller initiatives to broader European instruments, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative. The ultimate goal is to transform current fragmentation into a more cohesive system of cooperation.3- Developing European defense financing mechanisms: Europe has begun to link defense autonomy not only to discourse but also to actual financing and implementation tools. European Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius has played a central role in this process within EU institutions. He has advocated for transforming defense plans into practical programs backed by clear financing.In this context, the SAFE initiative has emerged as a key tool. It is a European loan mechanism designed to help EU member states finance defense purchases and projects more quickly and in a coordinated manner, instead of acting individually. The initiative has a total volume of <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/defence-funding/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">€150 billion</a>, with initial requests totaling approximately <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/ifri_faure_instruments_financiers_ue_2026.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">€38 billion</a> from eight member states in a short period.The SAFE initiative also requires <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/les-efforts-budgetaires-sur-la-defense-tardent-a-stimuler-la-croissance-en-europe-20260218" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">a minimum European content of 65%</a> in contracts. This reflects the dual objective of not only purchasing weapons but also strengthening Europe’s own defense industry. Despite these efforts, a significant portion of European defense spending continues to be managed at the national level. This limits the speed at which a cohesive European defense force can be built.4- Franco-German focus on developing European defense capabilities: At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reaffirmed the goal of making the German army "<a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/a-l-ere-des-grandes-puissances-notre-liberte-n-est-plus-acquise-a-munich-friedrich-merz-reaffirme-ses-ambitions-militaires-20260216" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">the strongest conventional army in Europe</a>." This reflects a broader shift in Germany’s approach to European security.At the same time, <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/les-europeens-tatonnent-sur-le-futur-de-leur-bouclier-nucleaire-20260214" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">French President Emmanuel Macron</a> proposed harmonizing French national doctrine with specific forms of European cooperation. These include joint exercises and shared security interests. Merz also referenced discussions with Macron regarding European deterrence. Together, these developments highlight a Franco-German convergence in opening the debate on defense, while stopping short of full sovereign integration.5- European Commissioner for Defense proposes a unified army: In January 2026, Commissioner Kubilius presented a more institutionalized proposal for a permanent "<a href="https://lesfrancais.press/peut-on-encore-se-permettre-de-pas-avoir-armee-europeenne/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">European Army</a>" <a href="https://lesfrancais.press/peut-on-encore-se-permettre-de-pas-avoir-armee-europeenne/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">consisting of 100,000 personnel</a>. He also proposed a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/01/11/l-union-europeenne-devrait-envisager-de-constituer-une-armee-commune-estime-le-commissaire-europeen-a-la-defense_6661411_3210.html?search-type=classic&amp;ise_click_rank=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">European Security Council</a> to oversee deployment decisions. This initiative reflects a broader trend within EU institutions toward building European instruments that are parallel or complementary to Atlantic frameworks.This political momentum is further reinforced by a notable financial increase. EU military spending rose by <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-defis-du-rearmement-de-leurope-reveil-strategique-ou-chaos-organise-266762" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">17% in 2024</a>, reaching <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-defis-du-rearmement-de-leurope-reveil-strategique-ou-chaos-organise-266762" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">$693 billion</a>.Determinants of the FutureAs European ambitions in defense expand, the future of defense autonomy depends on the EU’s ability to address several key challenges:1- The dilemma of relations with NATO and the United States: In the foreseeable future, the most likely path for European defense autonomy is to strengthen the "European pillar" within the Atlantic system, rather than immediately establishing a single European army.This position aligns with influential voices within Europe. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, emphasizes that the objective is not a unified army, but rather to make the armies of the 27 EU countries <a href="https://fr.euronews.com/2026/02/02/norvege-kaja-kallas-rejette-les-appels-en-faveur-dune-armee-europeenne" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">more capable of joint action</a>, improve interoperability, and increase spending.Other perspectives, such as that of Spanish Foreign Minister <a href="https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2026/02/03/armee-europeenne-albares/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Jose Manuel Albares</a>, view a European army as a long-term strategic direction with a defensive, deterrence-oriented role.It should be noted that <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2025/09/07/un-systeme-europeen-de-defense-pourrait-etre-mis-en-place-ou-les-pays-participants-seraient-a-la-fois-actionnaires-et-garants_6639587_3232.html?search-type=classic&amp;ise_click_rank=13" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">23 EU member states</a> are already members of NATO, which complicates any European separation from the alliance. NATO Secretary General <a href="https://fr.euronews.com/2026/02/02/norvege-kaja-kallas-rejette-les-appels-en-faveur-dune-armee-europeenne" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Mark Rutte</a> has also stated that Europe cannot defend itself without U.S. support under current conditions. This indicates that the measure of European defense autonomy lies not in separation from NATO, but in the EU’s ability to build a complementary European force without creating duplication in leadership or decision-making.2- Organizing cooperation within multiple European frameworks: The future of European defense autonomy is expected to follow a practical formula combining two tracks.The first is an institutional track, led by <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2025/11/25/defense-de-l-europe-a-terme-c-est-la-survie-meme-du-projet-europeen-et-de-ses-valeurs-fondamentales-qui-sera-menacee_6654769_3232.html?search-type=classic&amp;ise_click_rank=4" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">EU bodies</a>, to secure funding, coordination, and medium-term defense priorities. The second is a flexible track, through which a group of willing European countries can act rapidly during crises without waiting for broader consensus, which may take longer.This dual-track approach does not imply competition. Instead, it reflects a European attempt to address the slow pace of collective decision-making on sensitive defense matters.The most likely outcome is a realistic distribution of roles: the EU provides regulatory and financial frameworks, while flexible coalitions manage rapid operational responses. This makes defense autonomy more practical on the ground, rather than a mere political goal.3- Financing and financial sustainability: A major challenge is increasing military spending rapidly without destabilizing national budgets. Countries such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/feb/18/us-military-support-european-defence-union-ukraine" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">France and Italy</a> (and, in a broader context, the United Kingdom) are more inclined toward expanding joint financing instruments. Germany, however, remains cautious about large-scale joint European borrowing.In practice, the "joint loans" path is advancing through the SAFE initiative. This mechanism aims to provide up to €150 billion in EU budget-backed loans to member states. It helps countries strengthen their defense capabilities through joint procurement. This reflects a European bloc advocating collective financing, even in the form of targeted loans, rather than waiting for slower mechanisms.&nbsp;4- Developing military manufacturing capabilities: The future of European defense autonomy will not be determined solely by increased spending or political rhetoric. It depends on Europe’s ability to turn promises into actual production and delivery within short timeframes.Although European military spending has increased rapidly, this surge has been accompanied by uncoordinated procurement and fragmented acquisitions. This reflects a gap between political momentum and organized industrial capacity.For example, the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/ifri_peria-peigne_char_combat_2025.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">joint program</a> between Leonardo and Rheinmetall to modernize Italian armored forces, announced in early 2025 and spanning ten years, includes 132 tanks, 248 other armored vehicles, and approximately 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles. The program costs around <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/ifri_peria-peigne_char_combat_2025.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">$16 billion</a>, with roughly 60% produced in Italy. This demonstrates real progress in European industrial sovereignty, while highlighting that building a coherent defense production base requires a long industrial timeframe.In France, restarting production of older Leclerc tanks presents similar challenges. The next-generation alternative is not expected to enter service <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/ifri_peria-peigne_char_combat_2025.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">until 2045</a>.5- Diverging priorities and perceptions among European countries: A significant challenge is coordinating priorities among countries that perceive threats differently and move at different speeds.Northern and Eastern European countries, perceiving higher threats, pursue more intensive cooperation. Southern European countries are less urgent in unifying defense priorities.Major European countries such as France, Germany, and Italy often <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/opinion/europes-fragmented-rearmament-undermines-its-own-security/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">prioritize protecting their national defense industries</a>. They may favor bilateral deals that serve their domestic industry first. Smaller countries, especially those closer to Russia, prioritize speed and rapid readiness, even if this comes at the expense of long-term industrial considerations.This divergence means that the future of European defense autonomy will depend on the EU’s ability to manage these differences effectively.ConclusionCurrent European defense policies represent an important foundational step toward greater autonomy, but true strategic independence has not yet been achieved. Success depends on three interconnected conditions: aligning priorities among European countries, accelerating production and delivery within the European industrial base, and transforming joint financing instruments into operational joint capabilities on the ground. If the gap between political rhetoric and collective implementation persists, Europe is likely to see increased defense spending without achieving fully integrated strategic autonomy.

The Future of the European Union’s Defense Autonomy