Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

The war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other has entered its third week with no clear indications of an imminent end. The continued military escalation by the three parties suggests that ending the war may face numerous obstacles. This is particularly due to the ambiguity surrounding the objectives pursued by Washington and Tel Aviv seek to achieve, in addition to Tehran’s determination to raise the cost of the military strikes it has endured, which have caused significant human and economic losses—especially following the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, along with several senior military leaders in both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular army.Four Possible PathsThe current war could evolve toward one of several possible scenarios in the coming period, including the following:Scenario One: Prolongation of the War: This scenario assumes that the objectives for which the United States and Israel launched the war against Iran have not yet been fully achieved. While the military strikes carried out by the two countries have contributed to the destruction of a significant portion of Iran’s military capabilities, Iran still retains the ability to launch successive attacks using drones and ballistic missiles. Such attacks could target Israel, U.S. military bases, or the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), constituting a direct violation of the security and sovereignty of Gulf states.Prior to the outbreak of the war, GCC countries had made considerable efforts to prevent such a confrontation. They sought to enhance the prospects of reaching an agreement between Iran and the United States during the negotiations that preceded the conflict. Moreover, the status of Iran’s nuclear facilities remains uncertain. Destroying Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon was declared as one of the main objectives of the current war, yet there are no clear indications that this goal has been achieved.This scenario could represent the "worst-case outcome" for the United States and Israel while simultaneously appearing to be the "most likely scenario" from Iran’s perspective at the present stage. A prolonged war could generate domestic pressure on U.S. President Donald Trump, particularly in light of the criticism he faces regarding the management of military operations and the ambiguity surrounding their objectives. It could also affect the Republican Party’s prospects in the upcoming U.S. midterm elections.Similarly, prolonging the war may not align with the calculations of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who seeks to strengthen his chances of remaining in office following the next Knesset elections. Netanyahu has already opened the Lebanese front simultaneously with the outbreak of the war with Iran, which could complicate his political calculations if the war drags on—especially if Iran and Hezbollah continue launching drone and ballistic missile attacks against Israel.From Iran’s perspective, prolonging the war may currently be the most suitable option. Tehran seeks to raise the cost of the military strikes it has suffered. It may also view prolonging the conflict as a way to transform it into a war of attrition that may not align with the strategic calculations of Washington and Tel Aviv, thereby placing pressure on both Trump and Netanyahu simultaneously. Moreover, Iran may hope that extending the war could eventually lead to a ceasefire agreement that includes guarantees preventing the future use of military force against it.Scenario Two: A U.S. Blockade on Iran: This scenario is linked to the steps taken by the United States beginning on 13 March 2026, when it launched military strikes on Kharg Island, which serves as the main terminal through which about 90% of Iran’s oil exports pass.In this context, President Donald Trump may order additional military strikes targeting the island’s economic infrastructure. Such actions could also include planting naval mines in Iranian ports along the Arabian Gulf, thereby depriving the Iranian regime of financial resources that it previously relied upon to manage state affairs, including the payment of public sector salaries and the majority of funding allocated to the armed forces—both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular army.Trump has already threatened to target Iran’s economic infrastructure if Tehran continues threatening commercial shipping and navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. At the same time, orders were issued for approximately 2,200 U.S. Marines to deploy to the Middle East aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli.Although the objective of this scenario may be to weaken Iran’s ability to continue the war—and perhaps push Tehran to respond positively to any future decision by President Trump to halt military operations—it is not guaranteed that Iran’s reaction will align with U.S. calculations.Within the context of the current escalation pursued by its leadership, Iran may respond by launching retaliatory strikes targeting power stations, oil refineries, and pipeline networks in GCC countries. It may also instruct the Houthi militia movement—whose involvement in the current war has so far been limited compared to Hezbollah and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces—to launch attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, further escalating the crisis affecting global maritime routes and transportation lines in both the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea.Indeed, the movement announced through its political bureau member Mohammed al-Bukhaiti on 13 March 2026 that it had decided to join the war alongside Iran, stressing that such involvement had become "only a matter of time."Scenario Three: A "Surprise" Decision to End the War: This scenario cannot be ruled out given the noticeable and continuous shifts in the statements and positions of U.S. President Donald Trump.Recently, Trump—along with several American officials—has begun emphasizing the scale of the "victories" achieved in Iran through military strikes targeting the regime’s leadership as well as nuclear, missile, and military facilities.While such rhetoric may partly aim to respond to criticism from members of the U.S. Congress and various American media outlets regarding the management of military operations and their objectives, it may also reflect the president’s intention to pave the way for declaring an end to the war "after achieving its intended objectives," according to his own assessment.However, such a scenario may face resistance from both Israel and Iran. Israel may believe that the appropriate time to end military operations has not yet arrived, given its determination to exploit the current opportunity to eliminate what remains of Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities.Tel Aviv also appears to have sought from the outset to include the objective of toppling the Iranian regime among the central goals of the war. Yet this objective has proven difficult to achieve on the ground. As a result, Israel may have shifted toward weakening the regime’s internal security capabilities by targeting domestic security agencies responsible for maintaining public order. This approach could potentially pave the way for future protests that might contribute to the overthrow of the regime—an outcome that, from Israel’s perspective, would require time to materialize.Iran, meanwhile, may also resist such a decision for two main reasons. First, Tehran does not want to repeat what it considers the "strategic mistake" it made during the June 2025 war when it accepted a ceasefire that allowed Israel and the United States to reorganize their strategies before breaking the ceasefire and resuming hostilities on 28 February 2026. Consequently, Iran seeks a future agreement that includes guarantees against renewed military action, even if such guarantees require the involvement of international or regional actors.Second, the massive losses suffered by Iran may encourage it to prolong the war and transform it into a war of attrition, thereby raising the cost of the military operations launched by the United States and Israel. The assassination of Khamenei has represented a major blow that Iran is unlikely to overlook at this stage.Scenario Four: Collapse of the Regime’s Military Capabilities: This scenario assumes that the intensive and successive military strikes carried out by the United States and Israel could destroy what remains of Iran’s military arsenal—particularly drones and ballistic missiles—and significantly reduce Iran’s ability to threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf.This could occur through additional strikes on Kharg Island, the possible deployment of U.S. forces on the island, or the execution of special operations inside Iran itself.Although Iran still retains the capability to launch missile and drone attacks, the number of such operations has declined significantly. This decline may partly reflect the impact of U.S. and Israeli strikes targeting missile launch platforms, but it may also indicate a deliberate Iranian strategy of conserving missile and drone capabilities in order to sustain a prolonged war of attrition against the United States and Israel.Importantly, this scenario does not necessarily imply the immediate collapse or fall of the regime itself. Rather, it suggests that the regime may lose its ability to continue the war, while its long-term survival could become uncertain. The war may weaken not only its military and nuclear capabilities but also its internal security apparatus. In other words, according to this scenario, the fall of the regime could remain a delayed possibility until conditions emerge that facilitate such an outcome.ConclusionRegardless of which scenario ultimately unfolds, it is likely that Iran after the war will be significantly different from Iran before it. This transformation may affect the internal balance of power within the regime, its relationship with Iranian society, and the broader direction of its foreign policy—particularly its relations with neighboring countries, most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council states.Relations with these states have suffered severe damage as a result of the reckless and imprudent steps taken by the Iranian regime in threatening their security and sovereignty through repeated attacks targeting civilian facilities and vital infrastructure.

Possible Scenarios for the U.S.–Israeli War with Iran