Dr. Ahmed Askar‏‏

On 9 December 2023, Djibouti hosted an extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to discuss solutions to the conflict in Sudan. The conflict, which is entering its ninth month and has spread geographically to 11 of Sudan’s 18 states, is undergoing fundamental course shifts. Both parties are committed to resolving the conflict militarily, without offering any concessions, as reflected in the failure of international and regional peace initiatives, such as the Jeddah platform, to find a way out of the Sudanese crisis thus far. This threatens further escalation in the Sudan, and perhaps a resort to catastrophic scenarios for the future of Sudanese unity and cohesion.Complex ContextDevelopments in the complex Sudanese context during the current period can be highlighted as follows:1. Increasing intensity of fighting in Sudan: Artillery and missile strikes and drones have become the most significant tools in the ongoing conflict in the country, amid a relative decline in ground battles in some combat areas. This has contributed to expanding the geographic scope of the war to include multiple Sudanese states, including the three cities in the capital of Khartoum and the ongoing siege of the city of El Obeid. The latter includes the neighborhoods around the armored corps and Sports City, the camp territory south of Khartoum, and the Sudanese Army headquarters east of the capital, where Sudanese Army fighter jets have targeted Rapid Support Forces (RSF) positions, as well as artillery shelling of RSF positions at Wadi Seidna military base in Omdurman. Meanwhile, the RSF controls large parts of the capital, including the Jabal Awliya military base south of Khartoum.The conflict in Sudan has seen a remarkable transformation with the expansion of fighting into ethnic areas, such as Darfur. The RSF achieved some strategic gains there after extending its control over three of Darfur’s five cities: Nyala in the south, the central city of Zalingei, and Geneina in the west. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Army continues to maintain its positions in the cities of El Daein and El Fasher in northern Darfur. The RSF forced government forces to retreat in Darfur and Kordofan. Since it began, the conflict has killed more than 12,000 people, according to UN statistics, and more than 6.6 million have fled, a reflection of the worsening human suffering due to the conflict in the country.2. Involvement of new domestic parties in the conflict: This development came about after a number of Sudanese armed movements that signed the Juba Agreement announced that they were abandoning the neutral position they had held since the beginning of the conflict and would participate in military operations alongside one of the parties to the conflict. The Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Minni Arcua Minnawi (approximately 30,000 fighters), and the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Gibril Ibrahim (approximately 35,000 fighters)—with the exception of the recently splintered faction led by Suleiman Sandal—announced, in mid-November 2023, that they would fight alongside the Sudanese Army against the RSF in Darfur, which has become an open theater for ongoing military operations. The two movements accused the RSF of engaging in practices hostile to the country, and they affirmed their adherence to the unity of Sudan and not allowing Darfur to lead to the country’s future disintegration.The two movements have military weight in the region, alongside the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Abdul Wahid Nour, thus strengthening the military balance between government forces and the RSF, which has more than 100,000 fighters spread across every state in Darfur.3. Insistence on resolving the conflict militarily: The two parties insist on continuing their fight throughout Sudan, despite the announcement in the final statement of the IGAD summit that both Burhan and Hemedti had pledged to meet as soon as possible. With that, Burhan renewed armed clashes between the two warring sides in combat areas, including the area around the Sudanese Army General Command, the Armored Corps Command, northern Omdurman, and parts of Khartoum.This reveals the lack of political will on both sides to reach a permanent ceasefire agreement. Each side aspires to achieve strategic gains on the ground that would be reflected in the strength of its position during potential post-war negotiations, especially after Burhan’s statements that his forces are close to achieving victory over the RSF and his assertion that the fighting will not end until what he calls "the mercenaries" are eliminated. This attitude threatens to extend the Sudanese war and its negative repercussions on domestic security and stability and on the region.4. Exchange of accusations between the two conflicting parties: Each side is trying to legitimize its position in the ongoing war, domestically and abroad. Burhan asserts that the army alone has the legitimacy to defend the country and its sovereignty. He accuses the RSF of violating its commitment to the Jeddah Declaration on humanitarian principles in May 2023, after it seized hundreds of thousands of homes, displaced nearly 5 million people, and turned hospitals, universities, and places of worship into military barracks.In return, the RSF is promoting the control that leaders of the former Salvation regime have over the Sudanese military establishment, thus indicating that it is fighting to restore democracy in the country. It accuses the army of failing to commit to implementing the confidence-building measures agreed to in the Jeddah Platform with regard to arresting leaders of the former regime who have escaped from Sudanese prisons. The RSF also accuses government forces of targeting and destroying Al-Jili Oil Refinery, north of the city of Bahri in the capital, which impacts the country’s oil needs, especially since the refinery supplies about 70% of the country’s oil needs.This situation widens the gap between the two parties and make it unlikely to find an opportunity to settle the conflict, especially given each side’s insistence on settling the war militarily, without offering any concessions that would spare Sudan from the scenario of partition or permanent civil war in the next phase.5. Worsening humanitarian crises in Sudan: These crises are the result of the ongoing conflict in the country since April of 2023, which has displaced more than 6 million people, including 1.3 million of them abroad. More than 25 million people in the country need humanitarian aid, prompting the UN to adopt an immediate response plan to rescue civilians at a cost of USD 2.6 billion. Fears are also growing concerning the spread of diseases due to poor conditions in the country, as the cholera epidemic has expanded into nine Sudanese states amid Sudan’s deteriorating health sector.6. Termination of UNITAMS mandate: On December 3, 2023, under Resolution 2715, the Security Council decided to terminate the mission’s mandate, at the Sudanese government’s request, and to transfer its programs and funds to UN agencies. Its work in the country will wrap up in February 2024. The Sudanese government considers this a diplomatic success, particularly since it claimed that the UN mission had not made progress since its arrival in the country in June of 2020. Meanwhile, Sudanese parties opposed the decision because of the poor conditions at all levels of the country.7. Deterioration of the Sudanese economy: The military conflict in Sudan has put most public and private productivity sectors out of service in the country, including banks, &nbsp;companies, and factories, due in part to their exposure to destruction, looting, and theft. The government has also struggled to pay the salaries of government workers since the conflict began in April of 2023, at a time when the prices of essential goods and products are rising at an unprecedented rate in all Sudanese states. According to data from the International Bank, the Sudanese economy has contracted 12% due to production stoppage and the destruction of Sudan’s state capabilities. Outside InfluencesForeign influences have become a determining factor in the ongoing and complex military conflict in Sudan, and they may determine to a large extent Sudan’s future path. This argument is supported as follows:1. Stalled mediation initiatives: Through two rounds of talks since the start of the military conflict in Sudan, the Jeddah Platform, sponsored by both the US and Saudi Arabia, has failed to find a way out of the Sudanese crisis. With its latest round held on December 5, the initiative has failed due to differences and mutual accusations between the two sides of the Sudanese conflict. The Sudanese Army maintains misgivings, such as its refusal to begin a comprehensive political dialogue two weeks after signing an agreement to cease hostilities. The army also rejected the proposal for a joint commission to monitor the ceasefire, composed of four countries and headed by Saudi Arabia, and insists on the withdrawal of the RSF from Khartoum.Despite the recent IGAD summit’s agreement to form an expanded international mechanism based on the vision of the African Union, and its adoption of a plan to combine the vision of the Jeddah platform and the IGAD proposals, which stipulate measures leading to stopping the war and launching a political process, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry rejected the IGAD summit’s final statement due to its reservations on certain points. Both sides have also set forth preconditions for the possible meeting between Burhan and Hemedti. The army demanded the adoption of a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of the RSF from the capital of Khartoum. In turn, the RSF does not recognize Burhan as head of the Sovereignty Council and requires that the RSF meet with him only as the commander of the Sudanese Army. These preconditions reveal the difficulty of reaching an agreement between the two parties in the short term.2. US sanctions on the parties to the conflict: The American side seems to recognize the lack of political will on the part of the Sudanese Army and the RSF to settle the conflict. Against the backdrop of the faltering Jeddah Platform negotiations, the US has escalated the situation by accusing both sides of committing war crimes during the ongoing conflict in the country—an accusation rejected by both the army and the RSF.Washington has called on both sides stop the fighting and go to the negotiating table to end the fighting, for fear of descending into difficult scenarios. In a related context, on December 4, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions on three former regime officials—Salah Abdallah Gosh, the former director of intelligence, Mohamed Etta al-Moula, the former head of security, and Taha Osman, the former director of Bashir’s office—due to their involvement in fueling the ongoing conflict in Sudan and undermining security and stability in the country.3. Juba’s use of the Sudanese crisis to build a regional role: South Sudan is trying to play a prominent role in settling the Sudanese conflict, which may help increase its regional presence and give Salva Kiir’s regime an opportunity to overcome the domestic crises it is facing. Juba has begun hosting meetings that include Sudanese actors, such as the Civil Front led by Abdalla Hamdok, to discuss a roadmap for resolving the crisis in Sudan, as well as to activate its role in IGAD and the Jeddah Platform as well.4. Summoning regional parties to the conflict: The goal here is to create military balance between the two parties to the conflict, especially in terms of logistical and military support. While the Sudanese Army claims that the RSF receives military aid from some regional players via neighboring countries, a Sudanese delegation recently visited Iran with the mission of purchasing and training in the operation of Iranian fighter drones, according to the Iran International newspaper. For years, Washington has monitored Sudanese forces’ use of Iranian Mohajer and Ababil drones, which is within the framework of efforts to enhance the Sudanese Army’s military capabilities to achieve qualitative superiority in the current conflict.Furthermore, Minni Arcua Minnawi, the Darfur governor with close ties to the Sudanese Army, asked the Turkish government to contribute to resolving the Sudanese crisis during his recent visit to Ankara in December. Such a request threatens to expand the scope of the Sudanese conflict and turn Sudan into a regional theater for a regional conflict that would increase the country’s instability for years to come.Possible RepercussionsThe escalating military confrontation between the Sudanese Army and the RSF in Sudan may have negative repercussions at the domestic and regional levels, threatening security and stability in the region as a whole. At the domestic level, the insistence of both warring parties on a military solution to the current conflict is suicide for the state of Sudan given the deteriorating situation at all levels, economic, humanitarian, and security. The threat of a potential new partition scenario in the country may prompt other divisions in the county in the next phase. At the regional level, the ongoing conflict constitutes a significant threat to neighboring countries in the region, especially Egypt, South Sudan, Chad, and Ethiopia, with the security and economic burdens it places on those countries. Furthermore, the extension of the conflict to eastern Sudan may have a direct effect on security in the Red Sea, which is tied to the threat to maritime navigation and international trade there. This may be a pretext for foreign intervention in the Sudanese conflict, thus turning Sudan into a regional and international theater for international conflict and competition that would threaten the future of the country and the entire region.In summary, the Sudanese crisis is unlikely to be resolved internally given the warring parties’ lack of political will and each side’s stubborn adherence to its position of eliminating the other. This zero-sum game will have disastrous results for Sudan’s security and unity and will require African mediation, via IGAD and the African Union, with regional and international support, to pressure the parties to reach a permanent ceasefire, begin a comprehensive dialogue to resolve the Sudanese crisis, and push toward a political transition process in Sudan to restore the stability lost in recent years.

What Obstacles Hinder the Resolution of the Sudan Conflict?