Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

The Middle East has witnessed key developments over the past few years, most notably the expansion of ‘flexible partnerships.’ Such partnerships are expected to produce significant repercussions as they will largely shape major affairs in the region. This does not mean that rigid classical alliances have ended, which still exist, nor does it mean that this pattern was absent in managing interactions in earlier periods. However, ‘flexible partnerships’ are becoming increasingly popular. Shifts in foreign policies of major powers concerned with the Middle East may be the reason behind such a popularity. More broadly, the changing pattern of partnerships in the region aligns with shifting strategic balances globally as well as emerging developments in the region.Flexible partnerships arise when a set of regional or international actors align around a specific issue. Their purpose is to maximize shared interests among the participating states or to enable them to contain common threats more effectively.Multiple Reasons The growing influence of flexible partnerships in shaping interactions across the Middle East can be understood through five key factors, as follows:1- The Expansion of Strategic Options: This approach provides actors with greater freedom of movement and a wider margin for maneuver, enabling them to manage shared interests more effectively while neutralizing sources of threat. A notable example is the movement of the new Syrian administration, which tried to reengage with Russia despite widespread expectations that fall of former Assad on 8 December 2024 would weaken the influence of Russia there.Several indicators highlight this recalibration, including the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Moscow on 24 December 2025, approximately one year after Assad’s fall, accompanied by Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra. During the visit, al-Shaibani <a href="https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5222949-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">affirmed</a> that "Russian-Syrian relations are entering a new phase." The trip followed a string of reciprocal statements, most prominently the <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1827322-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%88-%D9%88%D9%87%D8%B0%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%94%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">visit</a> of President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Moscow and his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 15 October 2025.What Damascus seeks through this approach is a more balanced foreign policy that simultaneously builds strong ties with the United States while maintaining political and security channels with Russia—Assad’s former ally—without pushing for a reduction of the Russian military footprint in Syria, represented by the Hmeimim and Tartus bases. This inclination toward balance is also evident in Syria’s outreach to China, as reflected in Foreign Minister al-Shaibani’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9/a-74776216" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">visit</a> to Beijing on 17 November 2025.2- The New Direction of the U.S. Foreign Policy: The policy pursued by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump reinforces this pattern of interactions taking place in the Middle East region, as revealed by <a href="https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9/a-74776216" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">the National Security Strategy</a> announced by the White House on 4 December 2025. This strategy calls for partners to bear greater security and military responsibilities. While it focuses on establishing strong bilateral relations that include broad economic partnerships, it does not bind partners to specific strategic ceilings regarding relations with other international powers.In essence, the current U.S. administration does not object to its partners pursuing strategic ties with American adversaries, provided that they do not negatively impact their relations with Washington. This position emerges at a time when the Middle East is losing its former weight in U.S. strategic priorities. As a result, a clear message has been conveyed to partners, encouraging them to broaden their options on the international stage and to pursue parallel partnerships with other major powers such as China and Russia.The current pattern of relations between Turkey and the United States represents an example in this regard. Washington is not concerned about the growing bilateral cooperation between Ankara and Moscow and may view it as an opportunity to serve its interests in some files such as reaching a settlement in Ukraine. However, Washington’s concern emerges when this cooperation begins to affect its bilateral relations with Ankara. Notably, the Trump administration reiterated its condition that Ankara abandon the S-400 deal concluded with Moscow in order to approve its rejoining of the F-35 fighter jet production program. The U.S. ambassador to Turkey and the U.S. envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/ar/world/5T3QSOTJBVIXBPBUSDDBY33UJY-2025-12-10/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">said</a> on 10 December 2025 that the positive relations between Donald Trump and Erdogan opened the door for productive talks on F-35 fighter jets. He added that U.S. laws prevent Turkey from operating or possessing the S-400 system if it wishes to return to the F-35 jets program.3- The Impact of Emerging Strategic Transformations: Russia has begun adopting a new strategy that includes acknowledging that old classical alliances no longer align with the strategic realities imposed by developments at both the international and regional levels. This is evident in several files such as relations with Central Asian states. Western presence, particularly American, has become prominent in those areas, which until recently were considered exclusively Russian spheres of influence in which Moscow played a dominant role.Accordingly, Russia sought to redevelop its bilateral relations with them through two summits held in the Tajik capital Dushanbe on 9 and 10 October 2025: The Russia Central Asia summit, and the Commonwealth of Independent States summit. The former included Russia and the five Central Asian states, while the latter included Russia and the five states in addition to Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova.What is striking in this context is that the Central Asian states have also come to understand the significance and implications of these transformations and have moved to engage with them from a position of maximizing their gains. Thus, these states participated in the summit of the <a href="https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85/%D8%A2%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7/5195541-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Turkic States Organization</a> held in Azerbaijan on October 7, 2025, just two days before the Russia-Central Asia summit. Azerbaijan and Armenia also supported the American efforts that culminated in the signing of a peace agreement between the two countries at the White House on August 8, 2025. This agreement led to the new American initiative called the ‘<a href="https://arabic.rt.com/world/1743021-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity</a>,’ which replaced the Zangezur Corridor. This initiative contributes to the United States becoming a key player in the economic, and subsequently security and political, arrangements being formulated in this region, which holds particular importance for Moscow. Perhaps following the same logic, Moscow did not dwell on the points of contention with the new Syrian administration that came to power on December 8, 2024, after the overthrow of its former ally. Instead, it quickly met the latter's moves halfway by opening channels of communication.4- Establishing a Common Interests Approach: This is evident in the American and Israeli positions regarding the Russian presence in Syria. It is noteworthy that this presence did not hinder the development of relations between the Syrian administration and the United States. The U.S. did not stipulate the end of this presence as a precondition for taking significant steps to reduce pressure and sanctions on Syria. These steps included President Trump's decision on December 18, 2025 to repeal the <a href="https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2025/12/19/syria-trump-sign-removal-all-sanctions-assad-regime" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Caesar Act</a>, which had imposed severe sanctions on Syria since 2019, in addition to the submission of a draft <a href="https://news.un.org/ar/story/2025/11/1143692" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">resolution</a> to the UN Security Council on November 6, 2015, to remove Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa from the sanctions list imposed on ISIS and al-Qaeda, which the Council eventually approved.Furthermore, this presence does not appear to be a source of pressure on Israel. In fact, it might be argued that Israel adopts a different perspective, namely that this presence could align with its interests, particularly in terms of countering the Turkish presence or participating in security and political arrangements that could serve Tel Aviv's interests and objectives. Several <a href="https://www.alkhaleej.ae/2025-12-25/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-6237681/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">reports</a> indicated, on December 26, 2025, that Russia was acting as an intermediary between the Syrian regime and Israel to reach a security agreement between the two parties. Moreover, these same reports indicated that this was taking place with the support of the United States.5- Managing Outstanding Bilateral Disputes: Developing relations between Tunisia and Russia was one of the most important options Tunisia pursued in managing outstanding bilateral disputes with European countries. Numerous disagreements arose between Tunisia and Brussels recently, stemming from Tunisia's rejection of criticisms leveled against it by various European parties, particularly within the European Parliament, regarding issues of freedoms and interference in judicial affairs. These criticisms are based on the policy adopted by President Kais Saied, which seeks to establish relations with Europe based on equality, balance, and non-interference in internal affairs.Although these criticisms do not necessarily reflect a unified European stance toward Tunisia, they remain part of a broader debate within the EU. Several European actors are calling for a stronger partnership with Tunisia, given its strategic importance amid developments in western Libya and its central role in curbing irregular migration to Europe. However, Tunisia still favors the opportunity to deepen its bilateral relationship with Russia. From Tunis’s perspective, this step could enhance its leverage and strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis European states.This has raised clear concerns in Brussels, as expressed by the former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, on June 26, 2024, when he said that Tunisia has been a long-standing <a href="https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC/%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87/20240626-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">partner</a> of the Union, adding that in light of recent developments, the Union must conduct a collective assessment and avoid certain events that could lead to a rapprochement between Tunisia and both China and Russia.In light of the above, it can be argued that this pattern of relations among regional and international powers involved in Middle Eastern affairs is likely to persist in the coming period. This continuity is reinforced by the diminishing influence and relevance of the rigid alliances formed in previous decades. Such traditional alliances no longer accommodate the high degree of fluidity that now defines interactions on both the regional and international levels.

What Are the Key Features of Interactions in the Middle East during 2026