Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

The visit of Iran’s minister of foreign affairs, Abbas Araghchi, to Afghanistan, on 26 January 2025—during which he met the Taliban’s prime minister, Mohammad Hasan&nbsp;Akhund, and his foreign ministry counterpart, Ahmed Taqi Khan—is notable for being the first visit of an Iranian foreign minister since 2017, as well as the first such visit since the Taliban retook power in Kabul in mid-August 2021. This suggests a change in Iranian policy towards the Taliban, imposed by recent changes taking place in the regional and international arenas, most notably Iran’s declining role in the Middle East.Although Iran has not formally recognized the Taliban—even after it handed over the Afghan embassy to some of its officials—the visit suggests that Tehran may be inclined to take further procedural steps in this regard, paving the way for recognition of the second edition of Taliban rule.Multiple ReasonsIran’s eagerness to open up channels with the Taliban at this time can be explained by several factors, most notably:1. Repercussions of Iran’s declining regional influence: It appears that the harsh blows to Iran’s regional influence across the Middle East—due to Israel’s war on Gaza and Lebanon, beginning on 7 October 2023, and its direct consequences, such as the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December 2024—have prompted Iran to shift its foreign policy to developments on its eastern borders, particularly with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In other words, Iran’s presence in the Arab region, especially in the recent past, was a distraction from its efforts to strengthen or develop relations with neighboring countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan.To some extent, this may explain why many Iranian officials are eager to visit their eastern neighbors. During President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Tajikistan on 16 January 2025, the two countries signed twenty-three memoranda of cooperation in various fields. Likewise, Iranian Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri visited Pakistan, on 19 January 2025, prior to Araghchi’s visit to Afghanistan. 2. Containing the consequences of Raisi’s policies: These moves are part of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s efforts to contain the blowback caused by the policies of the late President Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a helicopter crash in East Azerbaijan, on 19 May 2024. During the late president’s term, tensions escalated in Iran’s relationships with both Afghanistan and Pakistan.Notably, this tension reached the military level in the case of Pakistan, and the same level was nearly reached in the case of Afghanistan. On 16 January 2024, Iran launched military strikes against sites belonging to anti-Iran groups inside Pakistan, prompting Pakistan to respond in kind with military strikes against sites belonging to anti-Pakistan groups inside Iran two days later.Raisi’s threats against the Taliban, on 18 May 2023—after the Taliban deliberately blocked the Helmand River and prevented its waters from reaching Iran—almost expanded the limited military clashes taking place between Iranian border guards and Taliban elements on their shared border. These clashes killed three Iranian border guards on 17 May, before the sharp confrontations between the two parties subsided.Now, the Pezeshkian government has made improving relationships with both Pakistan and Afghanistan a top priority. This could be an opening to settle outstanding differences with Afghanistan over the Helmand River waters, which Iran desperately needs, particularly amid the extreme rise in temperature during the summer.3. Transferring Afghan issues from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the Foreign Ministry: It appears that developments at the regional level—which led to Iran’s declining role in the Middle East—have already produced significant repercussions domestically. For example, the scope of issues managed by the Foreign Ministry has expanded under Abbas Araghchi, especially given the IRGC’s current preoccupation with managing and tracking other files that may be, in its view, more important, such as preparing for a potential military escalation with both Israel and the United States—especially after the return of President Donald Trump to the White House on 20 January 2025.The IRGC is conducting successive maneuvers and continues to reveal military and naval bases in order to send a direct message to Washington and Tel Aviv that any military action against Iran will be very costly. The latest display of the IRGC’s capabilities was the announcement of its leader, Ali Shadmani, on 27 January 2025, that Iran had obtained Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets from Russia.Hence, it can be said that the Foreign Ministry has seized the opportunity to reclaim the Afghan file. Under the former minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who was killed in the helicopter crash along with President Ebrahim Raisi, the Ministry had suffered from the IRGC’s increasing interference in the management of key issues, such as choosing ambassadors and members of diplomatic groups.4. Repatriating Afghan refugees: Repatriation is a thorny issue that puts strong economic and security pressure on Iran, especially amid the growing number of refugees following the Taliban’s return to power in mid-August 2021. Estimates indicate that these numbers range between 3.5 and 6 million Afghans, a large segment of whom continue to suffer from numerous crises inside Iran.The Pezeshkian government believes that the presence of these numbers of refugees inside Iran puts a heavy strain on the Iranian economy, which, for its part, is also suffering from complex crises due to the sanctions imposed by the US since 7 August 2018, after it withdrew from the nuclear agreement on 8 May 2018. Hence, the Iranian government is seeking to repatriate the refugees by improving relations with the Taliban, and thus reducing the economic pressure caused by the refugees’ presence in Iran.Taliban 2.0In this light, it can be said that Iran is gradually approaching recognition of Taliban rule, especially after the latter succeeded in consolidating control in Kabul and containing the influence of opposition forces whose presence Iran was counting on as a pressure point against the Taliban on the line of resistance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud.However, despite Iran’s desire to improve relations with the Taliban and open political and security channels of communication, a trust gap remains between the two parties that may pose an obstacle to efforts to resolve the outstanding differences between Tehran and the Taliban. Furthermore, the legacy of "hatred" between the two parties since the first era of Taliban rule (1996-2001), which nearly caused a direct war between them in 1998, remains a significant variable that will play a role in determining the direction of the relationship between the two parties during the coming period.

Why is Iran Interested in Opening Up to the Taliban?