Mervat Zakaria‏‏

The ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, which started on April 12, 2025, have sparked widespread controversy within the fundamentalist camp in Iran. This opposition has intensified in light of recent developments, particularly after certain U.S. officials calling for the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program and a complete cessation of uranium enrichment activities. Meanwhile, fundamentalists have signaled that the country may consider an alternative course of action. These may include military measures, should the negotiations demand ‘unacceptable’ concessions, or fail to include credible guarantees against a future U.S. withdrawal from any potential agreement.Multiple MotivationsSeveral underlying factors help explain the opposition to continuing nuclear negotiations with Washington:1- Benefiting from the Continuation of Sanctions: A significant portion of Iran’s fundamentalist camp, particularly figures associated with the Revolutionary Guards and charitable foundations operating under the auspices of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, recognize that an agreement lifting sanctions could entail Iran’s integration into certain international agreements on oversight of banking transactions, such as compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Such adherence would likely disrupt illicit oil smuggling through black markets and curb the activities of intermediaries who exploit oil trade for embezzlement and corruption.In this context, increased openness to foreign investment would jeopardize the economic dominance of companies affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and elite-run charitable organizations, which hold substantial stakes in strategic sectors such as oil and petrochemicals. This tension was already evident in the tensions that arose between the Revolutionary Guard and the government during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, particularly following the July 14, 2015 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).2- Undermining President Pezeshkian’s Administration: The fundamentalist bloc, especially the "Front of Islamic Revolution Stability"; a parliamentary coalition of hardline fundamentalists, has resisted efforts by President Pezeshkian’s administration to claim political credit for any progress in nuclear negotiations or in alleviating the immediate economic hardships caused by sanctions.Saeed Jalili, the former presidential candidate and current leader of the Front, appears motivated by a desire to avenge his electoral defeat by delegitimizing Pezeshkian’s government. This agenda came to the fore with the March 2025 dismissal of Iranian Minister of Economy Nasser Hemmati, who was held accountable for the worsening depreciation of the rial and broader economic instability. This was followed by the resignation of Deputy President for Strategic Affairs and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif amidst allegations of obstructing the government's work and that his children hold U.S. citizenship.The Front of Islamic Revolution Stability further leveraged the explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas to further its series of ministerial dismissals, initiating a wave of parliamentary inquiries into key cabinet officials, including the Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, and the Minister of Energy, Abbas Ali-Abadi. This demonstrates its determination to blame the government for all failures, even in instances where responsibility may be shared with other actors such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Foundation of the Oppressed (Bonyad Mostazafan). Notably, the Guards are known to import chemicals used in missile and weapon manufacturing via subsidiaries of the Foundation of the Oppressed, which also manage port operations.3- Maintaining Control over Decision-Making Institutions: Fundamentalists fear that a successful nuclear agreement with Washington, brokered by the reformists, could significantly bolster the latter’s prominence within decision-making bodies that remain under fundamentalists’ dominance. These include the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Assembly of Experts, and the Expediency Council. A successful deal could also bolster President Pezeshkian’s political standing, potentially paving the way for a second term and enabling him to extract further gains through alignment with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.This dynamic is vividly illustrated by the president’s role in securing the release of Mehdi Karroubi, a prominent political figure and key leader of the Green Movement, who had been under house arrest for fourteen years. Pezeshkian has also delayed the enforcement of the hijab and chastity law. This legislation, had it been implemented, might have significantly undermined the administration’s legitimacy and intensified reformist criticism. Reformist actors have long accused Pezeshkian of failing to deliver on his campaign promises, particularly those related to easing restrictions on the public sphere.In the same vein, fundamentalist actors are actively working to exclude reformist voices from the succession process that will follow the eventual passing of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Their aim is to preempt the rise of moderate political figures or the expansion of reformist influence, which promotes a collective leadership model. This model envisions a Supreme Leadership Council of four or five members, that would adopt a more moderate stance and be better equipped to address Iran’s evolving domestic and international challenges in the decades ahead. In stark contrast, fundamentalists remain committed to installing a hardline successor who would preserve the existing power structure and safeguard their entrenched influence across the state’s decision-making institutions.4- Safeguarding Ties with Russia and China: The continuation of sanctions and the absence of a nuclear agreement are viewed by fundamentalists as instrumental in preserving Iran’s alignment with Moscow and Beijing. Such a stance bolsters the entrenched hardline pillars of the regime. This approach aligns with fundamentalists’ calculations that a deal with Washington or the entry of American and European companies into the Iranian market following an agreement with Washington would threaten to dilute these strategic alliances Iran has developed with Russia and China in recent years.The significance of these major eastern powers for the system of the Supreme Leader lies in their shared governance models. Both Russia and China operate within frameworks that parallel Iran’s semi-authoritarian structure, and crucially, unlike Western countries, they refrain from leveraging international mechanisms in their relations with other states, such as imposing economic sanctions or intervening in human rights matters.While Iran has offered substantial economic incentives, reportedly up to one trillion dollars in investment opportunities for the United States during ongoing negotiations in Oman, many fundamentalist voices view the presence of U.S. firms as a conduit for Western cultural influence, particularly liberal social and political rights that could resonate with Iran’s younger generations. Thus, for fundamentalists, deepening ties with Russia and China, even if they do not directly remedy the country’s economic constraints, constitutes a strategic alternative that protects economic and political gains they were able to achieve during the past stage, by exploiting the escalating tension in relations between Iran and Western countries, especially the United States.Pivotal Factors Ultimately, fundamentalists are unlikely to relent in their efforts to obstruct a nuclear deal with the United States. Their stance, however, remains contingent on several crucial determinants: whether President Pezeshkian’s administration can mobilize sufficient domestic support for a potential deal, particularly one that promises tangible economic benefits through sanctions relief. The scope of the negotiations also remains uncertain; whether it will remain confined to nuclear-related issues, or expand to encompass other topics such as Iran’s missile program and regional proxies.

Why Do Iran’s Fundamentalists Oppose the Nuclear Negotiations with Washington?