Dr. Ahmad Abdelkader Yahia‏‏

As preparations continue for Israel’s 26th Knesset elections, scheduled for October 27, 2026, the latest opinion polls point to an increasingly competitive race between the bloc supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led by Likud, and the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party. A Channel 13 <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/poll-shows-pro-netanyahu-bloc-pulling-even-with-opponents-in-sharp-shift/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">poll</a> conducted on September 2, 2026 showed both the pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs winning 53 seats each—eight short of the 61-seat threshold for an absolute majority—while Arab parties were projected to win the remaining 14 seats.At the party level, Yashar, led by Gadi Eisenkot, continues to lead the race with 22 seats, compared with 21 for Likud. Eisenkot also holds an advantage over Netanyahu in head-to-head comparisons of who is better suited to serve as prime minister. A Channel 12 <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-906469" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">poll</a> conducted on August 25, 2026 found that 44% of respondents preferred Eisenkot, compared with 34% who favored Netanyahu, while 16% were undecided. This is consistent with other polls <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-shows-eisenkot-with-significant-lead-over-netanyahu-for-pm-knesset-blocs-static/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">conducted</a> in July 2026 that also showed Eisenkot leading Netanyahu in voter preferences. Nevertheless, Eisenkot’s prospects of forming the next government will depend not only on the level of support for his party, but also on his ability to build a viable governing coalition.Potential Policy DirectionsBased on Eisenkot’s past positions and Israel’s current political dynamics, several potential policy directions can be identified. The precise form they take, however, would depend on the composition of the governing coalition and the prevailing political and security conditions.1. Curbing Settlement Expansion in the West Bank While Rejecting a Two-State Solution: Eisenkot is likely to adopt a somewhat different approach to settlement policy from the current right-wing government, without necessarily opposing settlements in principle. He has previously <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-716630" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">criticized</a> unchecked settlement expansion and warned of its risks, while also rejecting efforts to reestablish settlements that were evacuated from the northern West Bank. At the same time, his <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eisenkot-visits-illegal-settlement-outpost-site-of-severe-assault-against-israeli-lawyer/amp/jeremy%40timesofisrael.com/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">positions</a> do not suggest that he favors dismantling settlements or putting a comprehensive halt to the settlement project.If he takes office, Eisenkot may seek to curb the most controversial forms of settlement expansion, tighten oversight of unauthorized outposts, and impose greater accountability on settlers involved in attacks. He could also move to reaffirm that the military and the Civil Administration are the bodies authorized to manage affairs in the West Bank, thereby curbing the ability of settler groups to operate outside the state’s authority.Nevertheless, Eisenkot is unlikely to move <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eisenkot-says-two-state-solution-delusional-post-oct-7-but-e1-settlement-plan-a-mistake/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">toward</a> dismantling settlements or taking steps that could facilitate the establishment of a Palestinian state, given his emphasis on Israeli security considerations. Maintaining Israeli military and security control over large parts of the West Bank is also expected to remain a central element of his approach, particularly amid Israeli concerns over weapons smuggling across the Jordanian border and the growing activity of Palestinian factions.2. Potentially Reducing the Military Presence in Gaza While Maintaining Pressure on Hamas: Gaza is likely to be one of the clearest areas in which differences between Eisenkot and Netanyahu could emerge. However, those differences are not expected to involve abandoning military pressure on Hamas. Rather, Eisenkot would likely seek to tie Israel’s military presence in Gaza to a clearly defined political and security objective.Eisenkot has previously <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/ex-israeli-army-chief-says-any-gaza-deal-failing-to-dismantle-hamas-would-be-complete-failure-/4015187" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">stated</a> that any agreement that fails to dismantle Hamas’s military and governing capabilities would constitute a "complete failure," reflecting his opposition to the group remaining either a military force or the governing authority in Gaza. His departure from the war cabinet in 2024 was also <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-war-cabinet-member-expected-to-resign-over-lack-of-clear-plan-for-victory-in-gaza-local-media/3242660" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">linked</a>, according to his public statements, to the absence of a clear strategy for ending the fighting.Against this backdrop, Eisenkot would likely make any future political and security arrangements conditional on ensuring that Gaza does not again become a security threat to Israel. This could include continued pressure on Hamas, preventing it from rebuilding its military capabilities or returning to govern the territory, while accepting a larger role for the Palestinian Authority or another transitional Palestinian body. Such an arrangement could also include Israeli security mechanisms in specific areas, allowing Israel to intervene when deemed necessary.3. Linking Withdrawal from Lebanon and Syria to Security Guarantees and Strict Monitoring Mechanisms: As regards the Lebanese theater, Eisenkot is likely to continue to view Hezbollah as a major security and strategic threat, while seeking to drive it away from the border and constrain its military capabilities, particularly south of the Litani River. This could involve military and intelligence pressure and limited operations, alongside coordination with the United States, the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese Armed Forces to establish enforceable security arrangements.His <a href="https://thejewishedition.com/opinions/editorial/2026/07/05/gadi-eizenkots-dangerous-security-strategy/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">positions</a> also suggest that he does not oppose withdrawal in principle but could condition it on clear military and security arrangements, including restrictions on Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, a stronger role for the Lebanese Armed Forces, and effective international oversight or guarantees. He may also seek a buffer security zone and monitoring mechanisms designed to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its capabilities near the border.In Syria, Eisenkot may <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907531" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">view</a> regional changes as creating an opportunity for interim security understandings, while upholding Israeli security interests. Such arrangements could involve regulating military deployments and establishing border-monitoring mechanisms, with the possibility of withdrawing from some areas currently controlled by Israel, provided there are credible security guarantees and monitoring mechanisms to prevent Syrian territory from becoming a source of threats and to keep Syrian forces at a greater distance from the border. Accordingly, his approach toward Syria and Lebanon could be based on using military deployments and security pressure as temporary <a href="https://thejewishedition.com/opinions/editorial/2026/07/05/gadi-eizenkots-dangerous-security-strategy/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">bargaining</a> tools rather than as permanent substitutes for political arrangements.4. Continuing to View Iran as Israel’s Foremost Strategic Threat: Eisenkot is unlikely to abandon the view that Iran represents one of Israel’s principal strategic threats. His assessment of the Iranian challenge extends beyond the nuclear program to include ballistic missile capabilities and Iran’s regional proxies. <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907531" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Reports</a> suggest that he may seek to expand Israeli intelligence and covert operations to target Iranian missile capabilities, in addition to nuclear-related facilities and activities.On the nuclear issue, Eisenkot may <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907531" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">favor</a> bringing military and intelligence pressure to bear simultaneously while rejecting any agreement that does not permanently eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. He is also likely to support U.S.-backed deterrence and monitoring arrangements around sensitive Iranian sites where nuclear material may be located, so that any attempt to move or reuse such material could be detected and potentially targeted.5. Prospects for Reviving the Normalization Track: An Eisenkot government could create an opportunity to revive normalization efforts, particularly if it adopts a political discourse less closely associated with the religious and nationalist right and places greater emphasis on institutions and foreign relations. He is also <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-first-ever-saudi-interview-idf-head-says-ready-to-share-intel-on-iran/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">expected</a> to seek expanded security and intelligence cooperation with <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/5045940" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Arab states</a> that share Israeli concerns over Iran and its regional proxies.This approach, however, would not necessarily produce a rapid breakthrough in normalization. The positions of many Arab states are likely to remain linked to Israeli <a href="https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/661637/saudi-arabia/saudi-source-to-cnn-palestinian-state-is-a-prerequisite-for-any-normalization-with-israel" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">policies</a> in the region more broadly, particularly toward the Palestinians and postwar arrangements in Gaza. Any effort to expand normalization could also face political preconditions that extend beyond security and economic cooperation. Progress would therefore depend on the specific preconditions attached to normalization, the willingness of the next Israeli government to offer meaningful concessions that are acceptable to the other side, and the role played by the United States in creating an environment conducive to moving the process forward.6. Recalibrating Relations with Washington and Israel’s Traditional Allies: Eisenkot is likely to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907531" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">seek</a> to reestablish Israel as a strategic partner of the United States and strengthen political and security coordination on Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. This could include efforts to restore a greater degree of trust with the U.S. administration and broaden cooperation with American institutions, rather than relying primarily on a direct personal relationship between the prime minister and the president.He is also likely to place particular emphasis on maintaining military and intelligence cooperation with Washington, including efforts to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge and leverage U.S. support in confronting regional threats. This would not necessarily mean going along with all U.S. policy preferences, however. Eisenkot is unlikely to endorse arrangements he believes would weaken Israel’s deterrence or restrict its ability to act militarily in response to direct threats. He would also seek to preserve Israel’s ability to make independent security decisions, particularly concerning Iran and its regional proxies.Eisenkot is likewise expected to work toward strengthening relations and coordination with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other European states, following the deterioration in Israel’s external relations in recent years amid the policies of the right-wing government, particularly regarding the war in Gaza and developments in the West Bank.Constraining FactorsIn conclusion, Eisenkot’s ability to implement these policies would depend largely on the composition of his governing coalition. If he is able to form a broad centrist government, he could enjoy greater room for maneuver on Gaza, the West Bank, and relations with Washington. If, however, he is forced to rely on right-wing or religious parties, he could face pressure to make concessions on issues relating to the Haredi community, settlements, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, potentially limiting his ability to pursue more flexible policies in these areas. He may also seek to contain the far right rather than confront it directly, by putting a check on the measures that are most provocative internationally while preserving the broader contours of Israeli security policy. The success of such an approach would remain contingent on the cohesion of right-wing parties and their ability to obstruct government decisions or threaten coalition stability.A major regional escalation, particularly involving Iran and its proxies, could also narrow Eisenkot’s room for maneuver and push him toward more hardline security positions. Continued security concerns among the Israeli public following the October 7 attacks may likewise make it difficult for him to offer far-reaching concessions. His ability to change existing policies would therefore depend on balancing coalition pressures, the positions of right-wing parties, security considerations, and the expectations of an Israeli society that has shifted noticeably to the right in recent years.Overall, an Eisenkot premiership would likely represent a change in the style and management of Israeli policy rather than a fundamental break with its core security and strategic principles. His government would therefore be more likely to recalibrate Israel’s political and security approach within the existing framework than to overhaul its broader strategic direction.

How Would Israeli Policy Change Under an Eisenkot Government?