Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

The confrontation between the United States and Iran has reached a stage in which three main paths remain possible: resumption of the war, an agreement to end it, or continued maneuvering in the gray zone between war and a negotiated settlement. Some currents within Iran are calling for an end to the war and an agreement with the United States to resolve outstanding disputes and avoid the adverse consequences of a prolonged conflict, even if pursued through other means such as increased economic pressure. However, the more influential faction within Iran’s decision-making circles continues to view the current state of "neither war nor peace" as potentially more consistent with Tehran’s interests and strategic calculations.On August 23, 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged that Iran was facing economic difficulties, arguing that Tehran was engaged in a war on multiple fronts, including the economic, military, and security spheres. Although he justified his call to "<a href="https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2026/08/21/iran-presidents-call-highlights-competing-views-war-peace" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">end</a> the war today" by claiming that Iran would be doing so from a position of strength, his underlying concern appears to be that prolonging the conflict would impose high costs on Iran across several fronts, particularly economically, as the United States moves toward stricter enforcement of sanctions against Tehran. Moreover, on August 24, 2026,&nbsp;Zahra Behrouz Azar, vice president for women and family affairs, was even more explicit, stating that the <a href="https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6926059/%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">government</a> was making intensive efforts to move the country out of the state of neither war nor peace.However, statements by senior military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, along with figures associated with the principlist conservative camp, suggest that this faction favors a different approach: maintaining the current gray-zone situation for as long as possible. Even a resumption of negotiations would be unlikely to alter this position fundamentally.In this context, on August 24, 2026, Iranian Army Commander Amir Hatami said: "We <a href="https://ar.irna.ir/news/86244543/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">must</a> defeat the enemy and make it taste the bitterness of defeat so that it understands that Iran is not a country it can come to from the other side of the world and say: I will change the country’s map." He added: "We will fight generation after generation and will never allow it to do so."Similarly, in a statement issued on August 20, 2026, the Paydari Front, which reflects the orientation of the principlist conservative current, called for "<a href="https://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/1061637/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%AF" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">raising</a> the cost of returning to negotiations," suggesting that Washington should not be allowed to resume talks on easy terms. The statement amounted to a clear criticism of Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who had linked a return to negotiations to lifting the blockade on Iranian ports in the Arabian Gulf and releasing Iranian assets frozen abroad. The Front argued that such conditions were no longer sufficient and that new punitive measures were necessary in response to what it described as the United States’ violation of the memorandum of understanding and its use of military force against Iranian facilities in the country’s southwest.Different CalculationsThis faction’s preference for maintaining a state of "neither war nor peace" can be explained by four main considerations:1. Doubts About the Benefit of Negotiations with the United States: This faction has little confidence in the effectiveness of negotiations with Washington, drawing on two principal considerations.The first is U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018, during his first presidential term, followed by the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran on August 7 of the same year after they had been suspended under the agreement. These sanctions produced significant adverse economic consequences for Tehran, particularly as foreign companies that had rushed to sign commercial deals with Iran were forced to withdraw to avoid U.S. penalties.The second is the Libyan model, which <a href="https://www.radiofarda.com/a/33380998.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">some</a> Iranian currents cite as a <a href="https://iranwire.com/fa/features/140180-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%DB%8C-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%86%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">warning</a> that former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s response to international and U.S. pressure and his dismantling of components of Libya’s nuclear program did not prevent the subsequent collapse of his regime following NATO’s military intervention in March 2011.2. Insisting on a Permanent Agreement to End the Crisis: This faction believes that the current state of war can only be ended through an agreement that provides a durable settlement. However, such a condition would be difficult to achieve under current circumstances, particularly given the reluctance of any U.S. president to constrain his successor’s options.Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei underscored the importance of this condition during a meeting with Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, on August 24, 2026, stating that "the <a href="https://x.com/Alhadath_Brk/status/2092167624280961375" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">Supreme Leader</a> wants a permanent solution to the crisis."This condition is closely linked to the faction’s broader security outlook. From its perspective, U.S. efforts to reach an agreement with Iran may represent little more than a tactical step designed to prepare for a new round of military operations. Therefore, this faction sees such an outcome as unacceptable, given the potentially high costs Iran could incur if military confrontation were to resume.3. Avoiding Major Concessions on Disputed Issues: The prospects for any agreement between Iran and the United States will depend largely on the scale of the concessions each side is prepared to make. This faction appears unwilling to offer substantial concessions, because doing so would contradict its recent efforts to raise the level of confrontation with Washington—particularly domestically, through a narrative that Iran successfully prevented the United States from achieving its wartime objectives. Furthermore, the new realities created by the war may also have hardened the faction’s position on several key issues, most notably the nuclear program and threats to maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.Notably, this faction has already begun signaling that it is not ruling out taking steps toward producing a nuclear weapon. On August 20, 2026, principlist lawmaker and member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Ebrahim Rezaei hinted at this possibility when he said that "the <a href="https://x.com/EbrahimRezaei14/status/2090325573855809697" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">best response</a> to the U.S. economic war is withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."Nor, amid the growing influence of this faction within decision-making institutions, does Iran appear likely to retreat from using maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as a source of pressure. Instead, Tehran may seek to turn the Strait into a tool for exerting leverage over particular states as it manages disputes with them in the coming period.In this regard, on August 23, 2026, Hassan Ghashghavi, spokesperson for Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, announced the <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.ir/ar/news/2026/08/23/3678337/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%DB%8C%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%91-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B5%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%86-%D9%81%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B6%DB%8C%D9%82-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B2" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">approval</a> of Article Three of the draft Strategic Plan for Securing and Developing the Strait of Hormuz. This provision calls for collecting fees for services Iran provides to vessels from countries permitted to transit the Strait, with payments to be made in Iranian currency or any other currency designated by the authorities.4. Concerns About the Day After the War: This faction does not expect an agreement with the United States to end the crisis altogether. Rather, it believes such a path could generate another crisis that may prove no less serious, particularly on Iran’s domestic front.According to this view, the war contributed to a temporary sense of popular solidarity with the regime despite the losses Iran sustained across multiple areas. However, that solidarity has begun to erode under mounting economic pressure on Iranian society, particularly amid <a href="https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2-116/4290667-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B4-%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">persistently</a> high inflation and the continued collapse of the local currency, the toman, against the U.S. dollar, which has risen to more than 200,000 tomans.This raises the possibility that protests could once again emerge in Tehran and other Iranian provinces, similar to those that took place between December 18, 2025, and mid-January 2026. The regime appears to have begun preparing for such a scenario, which became evident on August 10, 2026, when Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.ir/ar/news/2026/08/10/3668259/%D8%AA%D8%B9%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%B9%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%81%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">Hossein Taeb</a> as commander of the Basij, the force responsible for controlling street mobilization and responding to any protests that may erupt in the coming period. The authorities have also carried out further executions of Iranians who participated in the latest protests after accusing them of killing police officers, Basij members, or armed forces personnel, working for foreign intelligence services, or undermining the country’s internal security. Among them was activist <a href="https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5310112-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 99, 193);">Majid Adineh</a>, who was executed on August 23, 2026.In conclusion, the continuation of the state of neither war nor peace in the coming period will depend largely on one key variable: the impact of economic pressure and U.S. sanctions on Iran following Washington’s announcement of the launch of Operation Economic Outcast on August 24, 2026. The operation could generate direct consequences both for Iran’s domestic situation and for the trajectory of escalation between Tehran and Washington, which in turn could produce significant regional repercussions in the period ahead.

Iran’s Calculations Behind Maintaining a State of Neither War nor Peace