Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

When a two-week ceasefire took effect on April 8, 2026 in the recent conflict between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, this development was welcomed by China. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning <a href="https://arabic.news.cn/20260408/851216c56e0b4fa9ba5146902d720511/c.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">stated</a> that Beijing supports arrangements aimed at achieving a ceasefire and backs mediation efforts led by regional actors, particularly Pakistan.In this context, China has engaged in mediation efforts to support de-escalation and initiate negotiations between Washington and Tehran with the aim of reaching a sustainable ceasefire agreement. During Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Beijing on March 31, 2026, China and Pakistan announced a joint initiative calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, an end to attacks on infrastructure—including nuclear power and desalination facilities—the facilitation of humanitarian aid, the safe passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, and the restoration of normal maritime traffic. The initiative also emphasized the need for urgent negotiations, alongside a <a href="https://www.independentarabia.com/node/645678/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-5-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">commitment</a> to refrain from the use of force during talks.Beijing’s CalculationsChina’s approach to the ongoing war in the region is shaped by a range of economic and strategic considerations, most notably:1. Concerns Over a Prolonged Conflict: It appears that China was less concerned about the onset of the U.S.–Israeli war against Iran than it is about the risk of its prolongation. In Beijing’s assessment, the conflict itself was largely anticipated, given the accumulation of underlying drivers that contributed to its outbreak at this particular moment.In this context, China has taken steps in recent years to insulate its interests—at least temporarily—against such conflicts in strategically significant regions, particularly the Gulf. For example, China has built up what is considered the world’s largest strategic oil reserve, <a href="https://www.albayan.ae/financial-times/1165424" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">estimated at approximately 1.3 billion</a> barrels. It has also diversified its sources of energy imports, drawing supplies from Russia and Turkmenistan to the north, as well as from the Gulf to the southwest.This helps explain China’s relatively delayed engagement in the crisis. During the first month of the war, the conflict did not cause immediate and significant economic repercussions for Beijing. However, the risk lies in a prolonged conflict, which could sustain and amplify negative spillover effects—particularly in light of continued Iranian attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council states and escalating threats to trade and navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Gulf region.Under such conditions, China could face a gradually worsening crisis with no clear endpoint, given the deep divisions among the main actors involved in the conflict. This is especially significant in a region that represents a strategic crossroads for major Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Even though Beijing announced on March 31 that three Chinese vessels had transited the Strait of Hormuz—suggesting a degree of coordination with Iran—this does not provide long-term reassurance, particularly if the war continues without a negotiated settlement, thus potentially creating new dynamics that may not align with China’s strategic calculations.2. Leveraging U.S. Strategic Uncertainty: In a view shared by other observers, China appears to believe that while the United States had a clear plan to start the war, it lacked a comparable strategy for ending it. From Beijing’s perspective, the current conflict, despite its potential long-term economic costs, could affect the United States’ position within the global strategic balance as the leading global power.This view was echoed in a <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/04/01/how-china-hopes-to-win-from-the-war" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">report</a> by The Economist titled "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake," which suggested that the war could weaken the U.S. position vis-à-vis China and potentially enable Beijing to extract concessions from Donald Trump during his expected visit to China in May.However, such dynamics may not necessarily serve China’s long-term interests. Beijing does not appear prepared—at least for now—to fill any potential vacuum resulting from a decline in U.S. influence, particularly given the high costs associated with expanding its political and security role globally.3. Avoiding a "Venezuela Scenario" in Iran: China seeks to avoid a replication of the Venezuela model in Iran. This is not only due to its strong bilateral ties with Tehran, including a strategic partnership agreement signed on March 27, 2021 involving $400 billion in Chinese investments over 25 years, but also because such a scenario could expose China to increased international pressure.This risk is heightened by U.S. signals, including remarks by Donald Trump on March 30, suggesting that the <a href="https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/1861391-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">United States could seize Iran’s Kharg Island</a> and take control of Iranian oil.Moreover, China views the collapse of the Iranian regime as contrary to its interests. While Beijing has demonstrated an ability to establish relations with new regimes emerging from conflict—such as in Syria—the fall of a state like Iran could lead to significant security spillovers in its geographical neighborhood, especially in a region already marked by persistent instability—with neighboring Afghanistan being a prime example of that.4. Preserving Strategic Relations in the Region: China has successfully established strong economic ties across the region through trade and investment agreements. In addition to the strategic dimensions of its partnership with Iran, China is also the primary buyer of Iranian oil, with imports averaging <a href="https://www.reuters.com/ar/business/TIASKV2JYZOERCVBPRFABQAFKY-2026-03-21/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">approximately</a> 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025—representing about 13.4% of its total daily oil imports of 10.27 million barrels.China is also the leading trading partner of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with total trade reaching $257 billion in 2024 and <a href="https://asharqbusiness.com/economics/116174/%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">projected to rise to $375 billion by 2028</a>. Additionally, China is Israel’s second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching a <a href="https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/chinas-foreign-investment-jumps-as-beijing-bypasses-iran-and-russia" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">record $33 billion in 2025—an increase of 48%</a>.&nbsp;A prolonged conflict could disrupt these economic relationships, particularly given emerging dynamics such as the suspension of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, renewed involvement of the Houthi movement, and the rising likelihood of attacks in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These developments could negatively affect China’s regional partnerships, despite speculation that Beijing may benefit from reconstruction contracts in Iran in a post-war scenario.The Guarantor DilemmaChina’s involvement in efforts to end the war has led some observers to suggest that it could assume the role of an international "guarantor" for any eventual settlement, within a broader division of roles that may also involve regional actors such as Pakistan serving as mediators.However, such a role may not align with Beijing’s preferences. Acting as a guarantor could require China to engage in specific security arrangements—something it has consistently sought to avoid, particularly in a region as volatile as the Middle East.China is also accused of providing political support to Iran in international forums. This perception was reinforced when China and Russia vetoed a Bahraini-drafted UN Security Council resolution on April 7, 2026 calling for coordinated efforts to protect maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—potentially undermining perceptions of China’s neutrality in any guarantor role.It is therefore not appropriate to draw direct parallels with China’s successful mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which culminated in the Beijing Agreement of March 10, 2023, as the circumstances surrounding that agreement differ significantly from current conditions.ConclusionIn light of the above, China’s role in efforts to reach a settlement to end the current war appears to be constrained by its broader strategic calculations and interests at both the regional and global levels.

Why Has Beijing Engaged in Mediation Efforts Between Washington and Tehran?