Mervat Zakaria‏‏

Despite the widespread criticism and skepticism surrounding the potential appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s Supreme Leader—especially given the Islamic Republic’s longstanding rejection of hereditary succession, his perceived lack of formal qualifications, and the presence of other clerics who may be more capable according to Shiite religious hierarchy—his position as the preferred candidate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, coupled with the exceptional circumstances imposed by the war, provides him with a relatively solid political footing. This raises important questions regarding the likely trajectories of Iranian foreign policy under his leadership.Regional OptionsAt the regional level, Iran may adopt several key approaches in the post-war phase:1. Renewed Outreach to Neighboring States: Although Mojtaba emphasized in his first audio message to the Iranian public on March 11, 2026, the importance of strengthening relations with neighboring countries—declaring Iran’s readiness to establish friendly and sincere ties—the war with the United States and Israel exposed Tehran’s underlying strategic intentions toward its neighbors, notably in the Gulf. While Iran initially claimed that its attacks would be limited to U.S. military bases, it later targeted vital economic infrastructure, including ports and airports, within these states.These actions are likely to have lasting repercussions on Iran’s relations with Gulf countries in both the medium and long term, especially given that these states had previously sought to dissuade Washington from launching military strikes and instead prioritized diplomatic solutions. Consequently, Iran may attempt to bridge the resulting trust deficit; however, such efforts will face significant challenges, as these attacks constituted clear violations of sovereignty and national security.2. Continued Hostility Toward Israel: Iran is expected to maintain its hardline stance toward Israel, largely due to its perceived role—alongside the United States—in the assassination of the former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as reported threats against Mojtaba himself. Reports indicate that, following the assassination, several fatwas were issued in the Qom seminary calling for retaliation, potentially driving Iran to target Israeli interests across the region and beyond.In this context, Iran may seek to sustain military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, providing support through various channels. It may also attempt to curb Israeli influence in the Red Sea and Africa—with a particular focus on Somaliland—by <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/al-shabaab-houthi-security-red-sea/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">strengthening ties</a> with Somalia and other Horn of Africa states such as Djibouti and Eritrea, in addition to Sudan, where the Yemeni Houthi movement has begun to play an increasingly prominent role.3. Expanding Support for Proxy Actors: Mojtaba is likely to intensify support for Iran-aligned militias across the region, especially in light of their involvement in confrontations with both Israel and the United States. This includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. This trajectory was reflected in his first audio message, in which he expressed gratitude to the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite factions, describing the so-called "<a href="https://www.yemeniwindows.com/en" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Axis of Resistance</a>" as an integral component of Iran’s regional strategy.4. Strengthening Relations with Regional Powers: Iran may seek to deepen its relations with key regional powers such as Pakistan and Turkey, continuing the trajectory established under the previous leadership. This approach may gain further momentum in light of the regional isolation Iran could face due to its strategic miscalculations, most notably its violations of Gulf sovereignty.In this regard, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appears to support this direction, as reflected in his recent communications with Arab and regional leaders aimed at mitigating the repercussions of Iran’s attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure in Gulf states.5. Exploring New Arenas of Influence: Iran is also likely to explore new fronts to expand its influence, following setbacks associated with the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and the collapse of the Syrian regime. In this context, Sudan may emerge as <a href="https://www.jns.org/opinion/habtom-ghebrezghiabher/iran-moves-into-sudan-something-israel-cannot-ignore" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">a key arena</a>, especially given the growing ties between Tehran and the Sudanese army, reflected in Iranian support in its confrontation with the Rapid Support Forces.Simultaneously, Russia’s efforts to establish a military base in Sudan underscore the strategic importance of the Red Sea. Moreover, Libya may represent another potential arena for Iranian expansion, offering <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/global-security-mil-priorities/russias-potential-withdrawal-from-syria-and-pivot-to-libya/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">access</a> to the Mediterranean, proximity to Israel, and broader opportunities for influence in Africa through religious, economic, and potentially military engagement.International TrajectoriesAt the international level, Iran may pursue the following paths:1. Targeting U.S. and Israeli Interests: Mojtaba is likely to continue his father’s adversarial policies toward the United States—often referred to as the "Great Satan"—and Israel, labeled the "Lesser Satan." This is expected to manifest in continued threats against U.S. and Israeli interests across the region, including calls for regional states to close U.S. military bases on their territories, as reflected in his first written message.In the same context, Iran may move toward increasing the frequency of sabotage operations in various countries targeting Israeli interests, with a focus on &nbsp;diplomatic missions such as embassies. Evidence of this trend can be seen in a series of incidents during the ongoing war. For example, on March 13, 2026, a Lebanese-American individual <a href="https://www.france24.com/ar/%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88/20260313-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%83%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">drove</a> a truck into a Jewish synagogue and an adjacent kindergarten in the state of Michigan. On the same day, a person previously convicted of supporting ISIS opened fire in a study hall at a university in Virginia.Concurrently, on March 11, 2026, Norwegian police announced the arrest of three Norwegian brothers of Iraqi origin involved in targeting the U.S. embassy in Oslo. Similarly, on March 14, 2026, Dutch authorities arrested an individual who was filmed <a href="https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85/%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7/5251305-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%91%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">planting</a> an explosive device that later detonated outside a Jewish school in Amsterdam.2. Escalation of Disputes with the West: Tensions between Iran and Western countries are expected to intensify, specifically regarding Iran’s missile program. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has repeatedly indicated that Iran is unwilling to return to negotiations with the United States.He justified this position by pointing to repeated joint military strikes by the United States and Israel during ongoing negotiations. Notably, the most recent attack on February 28, 2026, occurred shortly after a round of talks that had reportedly shown progress, according to Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, who highlighted the participation of IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi as an indication of advancing technical discussions.Although U.S. President Donald Trump announced renewed talks in March 23, 2026, Iranian authorities dismissed these statements as <a href="https://www.radiofarda.com/amp/trump-postpone-attack-electricity-facilities-iran-negotiations/33713810.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">deceptive claims</a> aimed at reshaping regional dynamics and stabilizing energy markets. Even if negotiations were to resume, Iran is unlikely to make significant concessions regarding its nuclear and missile programs or its ties with regional proxy actors.3. Deepening Strategic Alignment with Russia and China: In light of anticipated regional and international isolation, Iran is likely to deepen its strategic alignment with major Eastern powers, particularly Russia and China, both of which supported Mojtaba’s rise and opposed threats against him.Reports indicate that Iran concluded a €500 million <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-agreed-secret-shoulder-fired-missile-deal-with-russia-ft-reports-2026-02-22/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">agreement</a> with Russia to procure advanced air defense systems, alongside growing <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-is-sharing-satellite-imagery-and-drone-technology-with-iran-0dd95e49" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">intelligence cooperation</a> related to U.S. military deployments in the region. Meanwhile, China—being the primary importer of Iranian oil—has actively sought to mediate <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-send-envoy-middle-east-mediation-foreign-minister-says-2026-03-04/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">efforts</a> to de-escalate the conflict, aiming to safeguard its economic interests and ensure stability in critical maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz.This orientation aligns closely with the priorities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which continues to exert significant influence over key state institutions, especially following Mojtaba’s emergence and the appointment of Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.Influencing ContextsIn conclusion, the implementation of these policies will depend largely on Mojtaba’s ability to manage escalating domestic challenges in post-war Iran, as well as the continued institutional support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It will also hinge on his personal security and ability to remain in power, particularly given that he may be a target for assassination attempts by both Israel and the United States, which has reportedly offered a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture.

Potential Foreign Policy Orientations of Mojtaba Khamenei