Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

China has appeared in search engines frequently over the last two years, which may not be new or surprising, especially since China is an economic giant and major international trade partner. However, what is new is that this emergence stems not only from this strength or partnership, but also from the new role Beijing has begun to play, which has taken on a political nature, at least in its main description.One has only to search Google to find that words like "Beijing agreement," "Chinese mediation," and "Beijing talks" have become a common denominator in many events and searches. This is primarily due to initiatives China has proposed on international issues like global security, as well as its efforts on some regional and international issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Iranian-Saudi tension, and the conflict between the Palestinian Hamas and Fatah movements.Growing InvolvementOn 20 February 2023, China launched the Global Security Initiative, which—according to its vision—aims to eliminate the factors that exacerbate international crises. On 24 February 2023, Beijing likewise adopted an initiative to resolve the crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, in line with the first anniversary of the war, which broke out in February 2022. Talk of this initiative was revived during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s European tour, from 6-10 May 2024, which included France, Serbia, and Hungary. On 10 March 2023, China also brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran to restore diplomatic relations. Finally, Beijing announced that it had hosted talks between the Palestinian Hamas and Fatah movements on 30 April 2024.These developments have pushed many opinions toward China’s likely quest to play a new international role as "diplomatic mediator," and not just "trade partner." Indeed, many international powers, including China’s competitors, have rushed to demand that China involve itself in some crises—such as the United States, which has called on China to intervene with Iran and the Houthi militia to stop their attacks in the Red Sea, which have threatened and disrupted the movement of global trade since 19 November 2023.Notably, China’s momentum through its role of "mediator" parallels its ranking as "the greatest diplomatic power" in the world, surpassing the US, which took second place, according to the Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Index 2024. The index, published by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute on 24 February 2024, includes 66 countries and relies on multiple variables, including each country’s number of global diplomatic missions. Key VariablesDespite the preceding, its appears that China’s likely move toward playing a broad diplomatic role as "mediator" at the regional and international levels is a major risk. It can be said that the following four key variables will have a part in controlling the scope of the role that China can play: 1. Impact of economic interests: Economic interests continue to be the main driver of China’s role at the regional and international levels, even though its main focus is political. Here, a comparison between Beijing’s positions on two different crises—the Iranian-Saudi tension and the Houthi-Western escalation in the Red Sea—can reveal the broad influence of economic interests on this role.In the first case, China brokered an agreement, signed between Saudi Arabia and Iran on 10 March 2023, that restored diplomatic relations between the two nations seven years after they cut ties following the storming of the Saudi embassy in Iran in January 2016. After this development was announced, speculation began to indicate China’s quest to play a greater diplomatic role in the Middle East, even competing with the US as a major international player in the region.However, a careful reading of the data that accompanied the signing of this agreement and subsequent developments suggest that economic interests were the most prominent focus of China’s role in this issue. For example, China is the first trade partner of Riyadh and Tehran, and half of its energy imports come from the Middle East, specifically from the Arab Gulf. Hence, Beijing believed that the ongoing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia could affect those vital interests, thus prompting it to accept the role of mediator between the two parties.In the second case, China did not register a noticeable presence in mediating to stop the military escalation between the Houthi militia and Western nations, especially the US and Britain, after the Houthi militia began detaining commercial ships in the Red Sea on 19 November 2023. Subsequently, a naval force, Operation Prosperity Guardian, was formed on 18 December 2023, and, beginning on 12 January 2024, the US and Britain launched strikes against Houthi positions. &nbsp;Thus, many opinions have linked China’s reluctance to intervene strongly in efforts to end this escalation to the diverging Chinese and American positions on the Israeli war in Gaza. While the US is keen to separate the war in Gaza from the escalation in the Red Sea, Beijing insists that there is a direct relationship between the two.However, this link, which has a distinctly political nature, does not explain China’s reluctance to intervene to halt this escalation completely. The issue goes back to Beijing’s economic interests, which have not been significantly harmed by this escalation.While true that this escalation has increased the cost of insurance and pushed many companies to use the Cape of Good Hope as an alternative to the Suez Canal, at the same time, there has been no widespread targeting of Chinese ships. Indeed, on 21 March 2024, Bloomberg revealed that China and Russia have an agreement with the Houthi militia not to target their ships. On 6 February 2024, Bloomberg also noted that Chinese-owned ships incur lower insurance costs when passing through the Red Sea compared to Western-owned companies.2. Potential cost of the diplomatic role: China is aware that playing a diplomatic role in some regional and international crises can, to an extent, contribute to both protecting specific interests and incurring a cost that it is does not wish to pay—at least at the moment. Hence, this sets up limits to the speculation that Beijing is likely to compete with the US in its traditional spheres of influence in the Middle East and Europe, for example. Washington’s assumption of this role actually had an impact on protecting specific American interests, but at the same time it was forced to pay a price. In addition, it sometimes imposed adverse repercussions on those interests, prompting Washington to recalculate in some cases, as happened when it withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021.In fact, Washington has at times been forced to intervene militarily to defend its interests—an option that has become more costly—such as when its military base, Tower 22, in northeastern Jordan suffered a drone attack on 28 January 2024, killing three American servicemen. Washington responded to this by launching military strikes against some armed militias in Iraq and Syria on 3 February 2024.Thus, it can be said that the potential cost of the role may have been the main reason prompting the US to "overlook" this role that China is trying or is being called on to play. This may persuade Beijing to clash on many regional and international issues, thus dispersing its efforts, reducing its insistence on giving an economic focus to its movements abroad, and most importantly, forcing it to pay a cost for this role.3. Fear of attracting opponents: While China, in its attempt to play a diplomatic role in certain issues, relies on key descriptors like "stability support" and "conflict avoidance," it is undeniable that this role can attract more opponents for China because it cannot be assumed that all concerned powers and parties will accept this role or the new data it will produce.Undoubtedly, China does not appear to need to expand its list of enemies, for which there is already a candidate. For example, it cannot be ruled out that Beijing’s interests are subject to threat from terrorist groups, such as ISIS or the pirate gangs that have begun to reappear in the Horn of Africa. This could draw China into options that do not seem likely to be adopted currently.Furthermore, China’s effort to appear as a "neutral mediator" may not achieve significant results, as seems clear in its attempts to mediate the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite the European nations’ interest in ongoing communication with China—as evident in the visits to Beijing made by some European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, as well as the Chinese president’s recent tour of France, Serbia, and Hungary—overall, it cannot be denied that some Europeans see China as closer to Russia, which reduces the importance and relevance of China’s previously proposed initiative to resolve the crisis.4. China’s improving international image: This consideration is tied to domestic calculations that receive special attention from Beijing, as it faces ongoing accusations and criticisms over human rights, some of which are used politically to manage relations with China, such as the approach adopted by the US.However, whether the human rights issue is deployed or not, China seems interested in improving its image in this area. This may be one of the factors that prompted Beijing to engage with specific political issues, such as reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Beijing’s eagerness to host talks between the two movements, announced on 30 April 2024, raised many questions about its motives and interests in this regard.These questions gained particular momentum given that these talks were not expected to bridge the wide gap between the two parties, who were eager to launch mutual campaigns against each other even after those talks.Here, it cannot be ruled out that one of China’s calculations is to improve its image and promote its attempt to resolve conflicts between "Arab and Muslim" powers and parties in order to counter accusations of Chinese violations against the Muslim Uyghur minority. This, in turn, is no doubt inseparable from China’s quest to protect its economic interests, many of which depend on strong relationships with many Arab and Muslim countries.Note that China’s role in this respect is more prominent on the Palestinian-Palestinian level than on the Palestinian-Israeli level. Although Beijing has adopted a different policy from that of Western countries regarding the Israeli war in Gaza—as reflected in China’s positions in the UN Security Council—it seems reluctant to engage further in this issue, at least so far.This, in turn, is further evidence that China is aware of the limits of its role on the ground on certain issues, most notably the Palestinian-Israeli issue, which the war that began on 7 October 2023 established the US as the main international power involved. Beijing realizes that its influence does not seem sufficient to play a role in this issue, while it possesses greater stock in the Palestinian-Palestinian issue, whether in terms of its adoption of the principle of a "two-state solution" or its decades-long establishment of relations with some Palestinian factions, notably Fatah.Finally, it can be said that the foregoing in its entirely suggests that China has the ability to make calculations on the ground, through which it can assess the opportunities and risks of any diplomatic role it plays in the international arena. Whether Beijing wanted to play this role or was called upon to do so by other powers, it ultimately anticipates this through a feasibility study to foresee the impact on its economic interests first and foremost.

How Does China's Leadership View Regional and International Crises?